Michael F. Duggan
More than two months ago, I posted on this blog a prediction stating that if you want to know the likely future boundaries of Ukraine, just take a look at a prewar cultural/ethnic/linguistic map of the nation, and subtract some of the Russian areas. (“Limited Goals?” March 23, 2022).
Russia appears to be consolidating the eastern, Russian-speaking portions of Ukraine along with its eastern Black Sea coast and a land bridge between the two. It is an open question about whether this territory will be absorbed into Russia of whether it will be the Russian vassal state.
At first I was perplexed by Russia’s initial incursion—a beeline corridor directly south from Belarus—with the apparent purpose of taking Kyiv, as well as westward advances from Russia itself. Even beyond its patent illegality, it made no sense. Could it have been a costly, slow-motion, Marlborough-like feint to distract from the real objectives on a strategic scale (Marlborough’s feints were battlefield tactics and operations)? No, it was just a mistake based on miscalculation and overreach.
Now Russia’s strategy looks like a variable, front-wide push to secure the Donbas region and adjacent areas. In terms of strategic goals, it is like the annexation of Kosovo in 1999. In terms of operations, it is a slow, grinding offensive complete with tactical reverses but what could be strategic success. In this sense, it is a little like Grant’s Virginia Campaign of 1864, except that Grant was pursuing the Clausewitzian design of destroying the enemy army, where the Russians appears to be pursuing the Jominian goal of taking and holding territory. The pinching off of salients and the use of massive artillery and rocket barrages, is also reminiscent of the Soviet offensives of WWII.