By Michael F. Duggan
It is one of the oldest maxims of war: hit ’em where they don’t expect it. First, hit ’em hard at a weak point, or a strong point for that matter. Then, when they are distracted and have committed resources elsewhere, attack the real objective in earnest.
Now Putin knows how Marshal Tallard felt at Blenheim, or how the Germans felt when the D-Day invasion forces showed up at Normandy instead of Calais (Operation Fortitude), or how the commander of any quiet sector felt when it suddenly became the focus of the entire war on the Western Front (feints were also used during the Great War to take pressure off of beleaguered portions of the line). Until February 1916, Verdun had been a quiet sector.
A few months ago, I conjectured that the Russian drive towards Kiyv was either an error or a feint to distract from their real objectives to the south and east. Now it seems that the much-reported Ukrainian counteroffensive in the south and east was itself a feint from the real objective in the Karkiv Oblast immediately to the east of Donesk and Luhansk. It has been a great success; The Ukrainian right-feint-and-left-hook strategy reintroduced shock and decisiveness to a war that had appeared to have settled into deadlock. The Ukrainians have shown themselves to be remarkable fighters, and, with roughly $1 billion per week in the latest Western weaponry and real-time intelligence, it seems that there is little they cannot do.
Of course a possible alternative is that the southeastern feint and the northern punch were both real attacks—a coordinate right-left, Mike Tyson-like combination, from which only the left hook drew blood. But let us assume that for a moment that the real Ukrainian focus was primarily on the north.
Does this mark a turning point in the war? It is hard to say. The West hopes that this victory will cause a general collapse in Russian morale and that the momentum of revitalized Ukrainian forces will allow them to roll up the line to the south and east. The success of the current offensive will no doubt encourage those supporting Ukraine to continue their support. But the degree to which Russia begins to lose the war will be proportional to the increased risk of an expanded and far more dangerous conflict. Forcing a nuclear-armed foe into a choice between losing face or lashing out with tactical nuclear weapons is no way to resolve a conflict. It is something like insanity.
Of course even if the counteroffensive is a turning point, it may not be decisive or final in a broader strategic sense. It may be just another round of escalation or a change in a shifting tide. As James McPherson observes in Crossroads of Freedom, the American Civil War was like a pendulum and had multiple “turning points.” This is certainly the case of many protracted conflicts, like the Second World War, and anything can happen. Momentum can swing back and forth numerous times in a long war. Along the rest of the line in Ukraine, both sides are dug in and it has hard to imagine Kiyv or Moscow suing for peace at this point. It seems that both sides are likely to redouble their efforts in the face of setbacks.
We know what the Kharkiv Oblast means to the Ukrainians. The question then is how much does it mean to the Russians? If they permanently lose this area, it will (from Russia’s point of view) remain a permanently hostile frontier and perhaps a Western bastion on the Russian border. This may be intolerable to them. If Russian strategy and pride dictate that this area must be retaken and included with Donetsk and Luhansk as a territorial war aim, then there will be a redoubled effort there, a counter punch, a counteroffensive to the present counteroffensive but with no chance of surprise. This would likely signal an even greater intensity of fighting, a magnitude of violence perhaps well beyond what we have seen to date. It will mark yet another escalation, an escalation in the viciousness in the prosecution of the war by both sides.
If the Russian leadership comes to regard Kharkiv as “a bridge too far” relative to their apparent territorial ambitions to the east and south, they might swallow their pride and abandon any ambitions of retaking it. The Kharkiv region is well beyond the prewar separatist areas, but has significant ethnically Russian and Russian-speaking populations.
Fasten your seat belts.
Postscript: December 13, 2022
The Ukrainian victory in Kharkiv three months ago was widely interpreted at the time to be the rolling up of the Russian right flank in the northeast. It now appears to be something like the American victory at St. Mihiel in September 1918. This attack, the first large-scale campaign by the American forces under Pershing, was intended to reduce the long-standing St. Mihiel salient. It was launched on September 12, just as the Germans were withdrawing from the sector. Although it would be an overstatement to say that the Americans only punched air at St. Mihiel (U.S. losses were 4,500 killed with another 2,500 wounded), the reduction of the salient was not the battle that was expected.
Like the Germans in September 1918, it now appears that the Russians were consolidating their positions both in Kharkiv and in Kherson during the late summer and fall of 2022, ceding territory not easily defended—a fighting withdrawal. Unlike the Germans during the final months of the Great War, the Russian forces now seem poised to launch a cold weather offensive that could be decisive.