Category Archives: Uncategorized

Brent Scowcroft

By Michael F. Duggan

Brent Scowcroft has died at 95.

You didn’t have to be a Republican to appreciate his form of moderate realism in foreign affairs. He, along with James Baker and the first President Bush masterfully eased the world out of the (first) Cold War during 1989-1991.

Other foreign policy successes were the reunification of Germany, the intervention in Panama, and Desert Storm (in spite of its toxic spawn and the subsequent U.S. military entrenchment in the region, it was a great operational success). The only beginning-to-end mistake of this period the intervention in Somalia in the waning days of the administration, and this seems to have been an unrealistic concession to humanitarianism.

Excommunicated by the Neocons of the George W. Bush Administration, he wrote an article that appeared in the Wall St. Journal on August 15, 2002 making the case not to invade Iraq. This article is a more-than fair sample of his good sense and wisdom. He turned out to be right, and, having not heeded his advice, we are left with haunting counterfactuals of history and a legacy of failure in an already volatile region.

A thoroughly decent man, he took a meeting with me—a nobody—when I was the Supreme Court Fellow in 2011-2012. I just called his office and scheduled an appointment. This man who had advised presidents and oversaw world historical events in momentous times gave me a full hour of his own time. Quiet spoken and unfailingly courteous. A gentleman. A great policy adviser. The world is literally a less sane place without him.

I could write volumes singing the praises of General Scowcroft, but will defer to those who knew him. Suffice it to say that he and his ideas were an inspiration for creating this blog. It is in part a memorial to him and others like him.

X, Y, and Z Vectors: The Great Abdication

By Michael F. Duggan

One hears a lot these days about generations—shorthand categories for cohorts of people supposed to embody distinctive personality traits, virtues, and flaws based on the multi-decade cycle in which they were born.  People who would never reduce others by categories of race or sex have no problem with lumping them together in broad chronological swaths.  As with decades, generations are a handy, if imprecise, basis for periodization with added moral implications for the placing of kudos or blame.  There is a saying that a bigot is a sociologist without a degree.

Generations used to have names.  We speak of the Founding and Framing Generation(s), the writers of the Lost Generation, the rapidly fading Greatest Generation of WWII, their children the Baby Boomers (aka the “Pepsi Generation,” or more simply “Boomers”), and the Silent Generation that came of age in the 1950s.  Nowadays we designate generations with letters, like variables to be plugged into equations (X, Y, Z).  Although each of us has a formative aesthetic, historical, and social backdrop that we share with others of similar age—and as animals, we reproduce in 20-30 year cycles—the fact is that people are born in every minute of every day and to speak in such general terms is only slightly better than the categories of Chinese astrology.  As with the categories of race and sex, there are far more differences among individuals within a generation than between generations.  But if “generations” are the terms of discussion of mass behavior these days, so be it.  After all, everybody generalizes.

Oedipal chafing is inevitable between members of successive generations.  I have certainly experienced this two-way street in classes I have taught (I am a member of a supposed sub-generation sometimes called “Generation Jones”—those who are too young to match all of the stereotypes about bona fide Boomers, but too old to be Gen Xers).  But by and large, my experiences with people of the rising generations have been most mostly positive.  For a number of years, I have seen them as the only glimmers of hope for the future of the nation and the planet.  The Millennials and Gen Zers I knew have been of a high order in terms of education and thoughtfulness.  I found many of them to be angry, idealistic, smart, and well-informed on issues of the economy, the environment, and other emerging crises that threaten us all.  I was banking on their intensity and high-minded discontent to be a catalyst for change.  It is therefore all the more demoralizing to realize how the resurgence of COVID-19 in the United States is disproportionately the result of the behavior of people under 40.

Generations X, Y, and Z, along with conservative populists, appear to be engaging in some of the worst pandemic-related behavior: COVID-19 parties, crowding into bars and clubs without masks, and what seems like a kind of self-conscious generational smugness.  This exceptionalism is apparently the result of the much-reported age-based resistance to the virus.  While hiking I have come across smirking young people—presumably amused by the simple precautions of the over-forty crowd—as if some degree of age-based immunity were a basis for categorical superiority.  Apparently it does not matter to some of these people that they may become vectors to more vulnerable people.  Their defiance of sensible precautions reminds me of the psychopathic logic for committing a crime: “I did it because I could.”  

The young people I know are not of this sort.  They are impatient with their elders, but they want to save the world, and they realize that the clock is running.  Some see the pandemic as the opening volley of the looming global environmental crises and are as concerned about the present visitation as their parents, perhaps more so. And yet others of their cohort are acting in ways that seems like the large scale bad behavior of any other generation.  The popular meme that made its rounds back in March referring to the COVID-19 virus as the “Boomer Remover” goes beyond smugness.  It makes light of a global tragedy with crassness that shocks the conscience. 

There is of course an irony to the bad blood between today’s young people and the Baby Boomers.  The stereotypes and wholesale loathing of Boomers by many young people is well-known to be a cliché of the culture wars.  And yet if there is another generation that the rising generations resemble, it is the first wave of the Baby Boom who embraced idealism—civil rights, the Peace Corps, the antiwar movement, the environmental, women’s rights, and gay rights movements.  Now they appear to embody the charges leveled against Boomers as the 1970s sellouts—the hippies-turned-yuppies—of the “Me Generation.”  

The danger of stereotypes—and generational categories are certainly based on stereotypes—is not found in their patent falsity, but rather in the fact that they contain enough generalized truth to appear to be plausible in specific cases where they do not apply.  Some of the stories we read about irresponsible youthful behavior back in May, June, and early July may be exaggerations and distractions—the efforts of desperate governors and mayors trying to deflect blame for the consequences of opening their state and local economies too soon.  It’s a convenient take on the “kids these days” argument that goes back to Gildas, Tacitus, and even the Old Testament.  Indeed a major cause of the climb in infections was the rush to reopen and a lack of a coherent national strategy. 

As infection rates continue to increase, the COVID-19 pandemic in the U.S. is taking on the character of a national-historical tragedy of epic proportions, but also of a blunder that might someday be called the Great Abdication.  It is not just that the virus was bad enough, but our response to it has been a colossal failure of policy, and a failure of our spirit, our will. It is a national shirking.

We know that the World War II generation was “disciplined by a hard and bitter peace” before fighting and dying in the largest conflict in history.  But what will history say about people of our time who have resisted even the mildest measures to flatten the curve and how they responded to this crisis in general? It is as if it is the spring of 1942 and a considerable number of our people do not want to enlist or join the industrial war effort—which called for much more severe impositions on individual rights and the private life than wearing a mask in public—because the general crisis is getting in the way of their enjoyment of life.  It is as if we are losing the Second World War by default.

Just as crises provide opportunities for the emergence of great leadership (those who aspire to greatness consciously or unconsciously welcome crises), they are also opportunities for “generations” to distinguish themselves.  Insofar as the idea of generations has any legitimacy, we can make comparisons (as long as we generalize with precision).  Given their first test in facing a world historical crises, the rising generations hardly seem to be among our greatest. As others have observed, the COVID-19 pandemic is, among other things, a test of character. With the initial results of this test becoming apparent, one wonders if there may be something to the stereotype that Americans are increasingly becoming a bunch of yahoos incapable of sacrifice and who are primarily concerned with their own entertainment.

As for the behavior itself, we must ask: if there is no punishment for stupidity and recklessness, then what is the benefit of not being stupid and reckless?  If infections were limited to those who shun modest precautions, then we could shrug off the newly infected as victims of self-inflicted natural selection.  But the consequences of this kind of brazen stupidity (or delusions, in the case of political deniers) obviously run deeper, and many of those who will become sick and die are blameless victims along the vectors of the unthinking, the unfeeling.

Two Books by Independents: Diana Johnstone and Larry Wilkerson

Diana Johnstone, Circle in the Darkness, Memoir of a World Watcher (New York: Clarity Press, Inc. 2020). 435 pages. $24.95.

Lawrence Wilkerson, War Is Not About Truth, Justice and the American Way (New York: The Real News Network, 2015). 210 pages.

By Michael F. Duggan

The Internet Age is also the Age of the Corporate Media and the Age of Political-Propaganda-as-Entertainment. The first encourages a solipsistic existence of self-reinforcing delusions that may further radicalize upon meeting kindred spirits.  The second lulls us into a fool’s paradise of consensus by offering something like an official or “mainstream” version of events, and in dark times, pulls us back from the brink with manipulative feel-good segments at the end of their nightly broadcasts.  These are “news” segments complete with soft focus piano or guitar background music for atmosphere and feature heartwarming stories that no decent person could oppose.

The third, political propaganda and entertainment cable networks, are an amalgam of the first two: they offer clearinghouses for the “news” that true believers select on the basis of ideology and temperament and embody the seeming legitimacy of a big network newsroom/anchor desk format.  They also may reflect the myriad of subdivided views found on smaller online outlets.  Cable TV offers corporate mouthpieces for angry right as well as networks presenting an ideological standard line for what passes for the mainstream left and center these days: heavy on social issues, light on economic progressivism.

The irony of all this is that the Internet—the technological communication and information miracle that provides a virtually limitless array of perspectives and news outlets—has rendered Americans more intellectually provincial and divided than ever before (more so than the 1790s, 1960s, and perhaps the 1850s).  Cable television and opinion programing on local AM radio stations have only reinforced the anger and chaos.

Obviously, none of this is healthy.  The amalgamated effect of these things is a synergy that drives division and a kind of mass psychosis.  It is an open question about whether or not a large and diverse liberal republic can coexist with such powerful and ubiquitous tools of manipulation (of course it is also an open question about whether a large, diverse, and overpopulated nation can exist as all as a social democracy).

In our time of the Three Ages of Mass Communications, rational people have to select news sources and individual commentators judiciously with an eye to the truth rather than just a desire to have their own perspective affirmed and spoon-fed back to them.  Sometimes the truth must be found among independent voices outside of the mainstream (but not on the extremes), both left and right.  In an age of neoliberal predominance and a lockstep corporate media on the one hand, and angry cranks and insurgents on the other, I feel that we must look to reasonable independent commentators, whether it is, for instance, a self-described conservative like Andrew Bacevich, or an old school independent journalist of the left, like Chris Hedges.

Below are reviews of two books by very different authors who fall into the category of honest brokers, of truth-tellers who call it like they see it.  They are voices that are not owned by anybody but the author.  One of these was a part of the antiwar movement of the 1960s, the other fought in the Vietnam War.  These are the journalist, Diana Johnstone, and Colin Powell’s former chief of staff, Colonel Larry Wilkerson.

Diana Johnstone, Independent

The journalist, Diana Johnstone, has written a fascinating memoir.  Her reputation as a radical should not put off non-radicals. It makes no difference who delivers the truth.  We all have assumptions, but Ms. Johnstone, who certainly has a point of view, writes with a clarity and insight that rises above the clichés of ideological orthodoxy. In my opinion, she is too smart, her perception too acute and nuanced to accept any packaged outlook whole cloth.

Although not resembling it in any literal way, Johnstone’s memoir is reminiscent of The Education of Henry Adams in that the author is a good writer and chronicler of her time with a distinctive point of view. Although you will likely not agree with all of her opinions, the book is rich and rewarding.

The memoir takes us from Jonstone’s youth in Minnesota and Washington D.C. (as a child her family lived immediately behind the Supreme Court building, and Johnstone recalls a “lively little friend” shouting “Resign!” to passing justices during Roosevelt’s battle with the Court), to the American antiwar protests of the 1960s, to the May Revolution of Paris in 1968, and then down to the present day by way of events in Yugoslavia and Libya. She has spend a large portion of her long career in France working as a correspondent for In These Times and as press officer for the Green Group in the European Parliament.  She is a perceptive reporter of events, although her nuanced understanding of French political and intellectual affairs may be of limited interest to some American readers.  

Johnstone has a fearless commitment to the truth as she sees it, and as far as I can tell, she has never backed down from a fight.  She has a simple, perhaps naive, confidence in the truth.  In this world, telling the truth tends to garner more enemies than friends, and when the truth is particularly inconvenient, it will anger the powerful.  Johnstone has angered a lot of people over the course of her long career.  Quick to point out flaws and contradictions among those on all sides, she has made powerful enemies on the left, right, and what passes for the center these days.  In this sense she has in some circles come to be regarded as an apostate and even a betrayer rather than a straight shooter. A moving target for those of differing perspectives, one senses that she has axes to grind. For those who search her name online, be aware that the Internet is full of ad hominem screeds against her and even seemingly respectable articles may uncritically reference distortions. Read everything hostile to her with skeptical eye after researching the specifics of the case in question. 

For me, Johnstone is a serious correspondent of the old school.  She writes with a powerful and distinctive journalistic style and clarity of voice, vision, and understanding.  Because her language is so clear, so concrete, it was equally clear to me to see where I disagreed with her and why (e.g. she makes the case that Nixon was both a “scapegoat” for the “distraction” of the Watergate scandal and an early victim of the deep state, thus downplaying his significant and very real domestic crimes relative to what she sees are the far greater crimes of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia).  Unlike so many writers on the academic left, she is a down-in-the trenches journalist and a good writer who does not hide behind neologisms.

I think that Johnstone and her book are important for several reasons.  The first is the care she takes in researching accounts of complex events that most Americans either know little about or else misunderstand because of bad mainstream reporting.  A paragon example of this is the widespread, uncritical acceptance of the inaccurate reporting of the 1990s Balkans wars by major American and European news outlets.  Her chapters on these conflicts, and NATO’s “humanitarian” bombing of Libya in 2011 should be read by all Americans (her 2004 book Fool’s Crusade is the best account of the enormously complex Balkans wars I have read and outlines just how badly the Western media dropped the ball in terms of reporting what happened there).

Her reporting of intellectual trends is also impressive and she gives a lucid account about how the new philosophers of the late 1970s superseded the existentialists of the postwar period (she sees through the Postmodernists as phonies).  On the point of French intellectuals (and of death of French intellectualism in general) Judt’s Past Imperfect makes for an interesting cross reference to this chapter in Johnston’s memoir.

But along with her powerful understanding are currents of naïveté and perhaps misapprehension.  Again, one senses in her a simple belief in the power of speaking the truth.  She also seems to have misjudged the earnestness and motives of the radicals of the 1960s somewhat.  Rather than Marxist revolutionaries genuinely concerned with the plight of the proletariat, most seem to have been more individualistic than the Old Left which really was concerned with collectivist economic issues (as Tony Judt has observed in Ill Fares the Land, 85-91).  More like self-interested eighteenth-century liberals—libertarians—the hippies of the late 1960s became the yuppies of the early 1980s.  A few became postmodernist academic careerists. Others voted for Donald Trump in 2016.  This individualism and shifting loyalties is also a source for the antipathy felt by the left of the rising generation for Baby Boomers.

Perhaps this naïveté is the product of Johnstone’s intelligence and clarity of vision: her grasp of the big picture may at time blind her to problematic details. She may report from on the ground, but her ideals are often at 30,000 feet. It is one thing to defend unpopular ideas under a rubric of free speech, but it is also important to call out people when the go too far—Holocaust deniers and bigots masquerading as comedians, for example.

What about Johnstone’s radicalism?  Here I can only speak for myself.  Even when I have not agreed with them, I have occasionally enjoyed the better writing by some radicals, and Johnston’s book qualifies as good writing.  Although it is an important historical text, Ten Days that Shook the World, like the Bible, is not dispassionate history because its author is a true believer.  It does not attempt to tell the dispassionate truth.  I suppose the logic is that value-neutral interpretations in realms where values are at play is for cowards, cynics, and sociopaths.  The problem with this perspective is that even extremists can claim earnest efforts at the truth, and Jack Reed’s account of the Russian Revolution is too skewed to be anything other than a perspective of strong advocacy.  On the other hand, I enjoyed Witness to a Century, the autobiography of George Seldes, and the gonzo journalism of the late Alexander Cockburn collected in A Colossal Wreck, because these authors were independent thinkers in spite of their strong views.

I think that Johnstone’s intellectual DNA comes less from Marx and his acolytes and more from the tradition of crusading journalism and scholarship trying to set the record straight.  In this she is like contemporary scholars like Stephen F. Cohen and Alfred W. McCoy, and the ideologically very different Andrew J. Bacevich (the works of all three have been reviewed on this blog).  I also see her as heiress to the proud muckraking tradition of Upton Sinclair and Lincoln Steffens.  One also senses something of the serious expatriate journalist—the in-country foreign correspondent as truth-seeking adventurer—about her, like Stephen Crane, Jack London, Ernest Hemingway, Martha Gelhorn, Clare Hollingworth, Chris Hedges, and the photographer, Frank Capa.  I might be mistaken in this perception in that her earnestness and cerebral nature seems fundamentally at odds with the designation of “adventurer.”

Perhaps the greatest importance of this book is Johnstone’s analysis of the failure of the Left in recent decades.  It is how she concludes her memoir and reading the final chapters it becomes clear how her honesty has made her seem like an apostate to more rigid progressives and radicals.  She calls out the hypocrisies of false progressives such as their embracing of war as a basis for foreign policy.  She is also highly critical of their support of neoliberal open border policies and the abandonment of organized labor in favor of immigration and identity issues (which go a long way to explain the outcome of the 2016 election).  She sees liberal support for immigration as the product of guilt and a rejection of the Westphalian nation state that gave rise to liberalism and democracy.  It is not clear whether or not she sees the immigration crises as the inevitable byproduct of the interventionism she deplores.

Having herself been been denounced by Antifa (and there is apparently a distinction to be made between American and European Antifa), Johnstone sees much of today’s radical left as zealous dupes of the real enemy, the neoliberal mainstream, as they attack an unsavory but equally marginalized far right.  Division is good for politics.  On this point, I think a another distinction is in order: an argument can be made in favor of Antifa in a proximate sense: if Germany during the 1920s taught us anything (other than not to debase a national currency), it should have been that when the Nazis show up, they must be strongly opposed, that you cannot concede the streets to them.  However, in terms of the big picture about the failure of the left in our time relative to the neoliberal establishment, I think that Johnstone’s critique has some validity.

But what exactly is the soft authoritarianism that she describes as having undermined the Left?  According to Johnstone, it goes beyond neoliberal policy and includes the Internet and entertainment industries as parts of a rotten overarching status quo.  She disparages the name-calling on the left amounting to the reduction of this state of affairs to “fascism.”  Such epithets are both too easy and inaccurate. She writes:

“The contemporary West combines a mood of ‘anything goes’ with a new sort of nameless tyranny.  The term ‘fascism’ is misleading.  Fascism historically involved a strong charismatic leader of a disciplined, armed party, imposing unity and order on the basis of a clear (however erroneous) program commanding mass support.  Today, whatever leadership there is lies behind the scenes, promoting chaos and disorder.  Today’s strange tyranny is something new, without a name of its own.  In the ‘information society,’ it has no clear doctrine but rather a fluid and often contradictory set of beliefs circulated by the information industry.  This is a media-message tyranny, and it is significant that the most important stance of government repression has concerned not some act of violent rebellion but the peaceful revelation of facts that the public was not supposed to know.  Treated by U.S. leaders as Enemy Number One, Julian Assange was not building bombs to attack Washington but was simply conveying significant information to the public.” 

I’ll leave it at that, other than to say that I recommend the book.

The Reluctant Insider, Larry Wilkerson

I have always liked the idea of the “good” government official and as a historian, have taken joy in each example I have happened upon: Stephen Mather, Harry Hopkins, Harold Ickes, Frances Perkins, George C. Marshall, George F. Kennan, Sargent Shriver, Brent Scowcroft, etc.  It is always a pleasure to come across a new one.

Even if you follow foreign affairs, you may not know of Lawrence Wilkerson.  To the extent that he is known outside of military and government circles, it is for his role as Colin Powell’s chief of staff and speechwriter when Powell was Secretary of State. Increasingly he is known for his frank criticism of the administration for which he worked.  Even if his name is not familiar to you, you still know him—he was one of the people who helped put together Powell’s fateful presentation at the United Nations during the run up to the invasion of Iraq, a performance about which Wilkerson has been completely candid and brutally honest.  Were it not for this performance, Powell, in a more moderate administration, might have become the George Marshall of the twenty-first century.  

Colonel Wilkerson is one of those people who seem to have been everywhere and understood everything that was going on in a time of momentous events as something more than a fly-on-the-wall, an insider.  He is a moderate in the high-minded, traditional sense of the word and a military intellectual and patriot in the best sense of these terms.  

Wilkerson was born in Gaffney, South Carolina in 1945, and his life is an interesting chronicle of events as lived by an American of the postwar period.  A philosophy major, he dropped out of Bucknell to volunteer for service in Vietnam, where, by his own account, flew observation helicopters “low and slow” at treetop level as live bait to draw fire.  He saved Vietnamese civilians from massacre by landing his craft between them and the soldiers about to fire upon them.

It was through his experience in Vietnam that Wilkerson came to realize that the real reasons for war are generally not the stated ones.  It marked a sea change from a simple patriotic view of “good” American wars being fought on principle to, the realist Clauswitzian perspective that war is about power and interests, and in recent times, bad ideology.  This view further gelled during his time as a student at the Naval War College, a point in the careers of many officers when they “Peter Principle out” (i.e. when a person recaches the level of his/her incompetence and/or a level of understanding that they cannot accept without risking a kind of fundamental cognitive dissonance).  Not only is Wilkerson a policy Clauswitzian, but he also realizes the sociobiological fact that human beings are naturally aggressive creatures.

In 1989 Colin Powell noticed Wilkerson and called him in to interview for an open slot as his chief of staff.  Wilkerson aced the interview and got the job after the frank admission that he didn’t want it, that he would rather continue teaching.  

Now that the events of the George W. Bush Administration have passed into history—even though their dividends are still prominent in the news—books like this are important in setting the record straight.  This one corroborates and goes beyond recent works dealing with the ugly behind-the-scenes reality of the Bush II White House that lay the groundwork for what is likely the most catastrophic period in the history of American foreign and military affairs. 

Notable are Wilkerson’s descriptions of the internal power struggles of the Bush II years and his discussions of where the power really resided.  Cheney and Rumsfeld are obviously major players.  By now it will probably surprise few people that the first term of the second Bush Administration was the de facto the Cheney Administration.

Wilkerson details the abuses of power that continue to this day.  In this he is nonpartisan in his criticisms and notes the unsettling trend characterized by the ratcheting-up of illiberal policies (e.g. the dramatic increase of drone strikes in the post-G.W. Bush years).  He presciently observes that all administrations willingly accept the increased power inherited from the previous administration as well as the abuses of that power. 

According to Wilkerson, this trend goes far to explain why the Obama Administration never pursued charges of alleged war crimes by the previous administration.  The excesses and errors of the Bush Administration are well publicized, but the following administration cemented earlier policies in place, and in many cases expanded them and made them respectable for moderates and progressives to embrace.  Wilkerson sees the policies of the Obama Administration as being more “draconian” than those of the administration that preceded it.

Wilkerson is honest, and smart—an idea man with a keen analytical mind and a forthright, no-nonsense military style.  He is smart in a decent, commonsensical way and has a powerful, disillusioned ability to see through cynicism and frauds.  He is completely open about his views and is courageous in speaking the truth. Just as two-time recipient of the Congressional Medal of Honor, Smedley Butler realized that the Banana Wars of the early twentieth-century were about corporate interests, Wilkerson knows that our involvement in the Middle East is in large measure about oil. 

The format of the book takes a little getting used to.  As its back cover describes it, the book is “A collection of interviews conducted by TRNN Senior Editor Paul Jay with Wilkerson.”  The interviews were conducted between 2008 and 2015, and so there is no comparisons of the first two administrations of the present century with the current one.  Except for Wilkerson’s address “The Military-Industrial-Congressional Complex,” delivered at the American University in 2009 (which serves as an introduction), the format is essentially that of a raw transcript that can be a little difficult to read at first.  The text is therefore not a structured monograph by a single author but rather an unscripted dialog and one has to get used to Wilkerson’s rhythms and informal speaking patterns.

At 210 pages (with no table of contents), the book covers a vast territory of topics from torture of terrorist suspects to how the destruction of Iraq made Iran the hegemon of the Gulf region, and this review in no way does justice to its scope.  The tone and expanse of topics make book an excellent compliment to parallel writings of other former military men like Andrew Bacevich (both of whom are members of the nonpartisan think tank, the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft), and perhaps Anthony Zinni, and can be a cross reference for histories on the post-2000 administrations and their various foreign adventures (e.g. the chapters on the second Bush Administration in Bartholomew Sparrow’s biography of Brent Scowcroft, The Strategist). 

I recommend this book, but you might have a hard time finding it.  You will likely not find it on the shelves of any bookstore when they reopen (assuming that there still are bookstores after the pandemic).  I don’t use Amazon, and I couldn’t find it elsewhere, so I just emailed The Real News Network and they kindly sent me a copy.

A Jane Jacobs Moment?

By Michael F. Duggan

Crisis is the mother of prophecy.

Predictions abound among the Cassandras and Jeremiahs of the chattering classes about the economic meltdown that may follow in the wake of the pandemic.  A common theme is that not only will a greater-than-the-Great-Depression depression result, but that the Keynesian machinery is no longer in place to effectively deal with it when it does.  Others have observed that even if a leader with the political skills and economic sensibilities to deal with such a crisis suddenly emerged—and there is no one like this on the horizon—this latter-day Franklin Roosevelt would not be able to unify a nation so badly divided toward an effective approach.1  Do “red” states have a right to impose their values on “blue” states, or vice-versa?   If the answer is “no,” then one possibility is that the nation could eventually break up into smaller sovereign or semi-sovereign regions in the not-too-distant future.  Where unity is not possible, separation becomes inevitable.

The idea of the United States finding a more effective arrangement than its traditional federalism is not a new one.  George F. Kennan and others have suggested the reconfiguration of the nation into provinces or “constituent republics.”2  These might be based on Canadian provinces, the lines of time zones, or cultural-geographical regions.  One justification for this view is the observation that the most successful countries are homogenous, medium-sized nations with diversified economies.  By contrast the Federal Government—at least in its present state of dysfunction—is too unwieldy to deal with local problems, and the states are too uneven in their abilities and approaches. The implication is that big is bad when it comes to a rapidly-evolving national crisis with multifarious local manifestations.  On the other hand, delegating the equivalent of a national war effort to the discretion of more than 50 smaller jurisdictions with varying levels of wisdom, honesty, and competency is even more problematic. 

Most people familiar with Jane Jacobs know her as the author of The Life and Death of Great American Cities and from her famous preservation efforts in New York City (she helped save Washington Square from a Fifth Avenue extension project and was instrumental in stopping Robert Moses’s dream of a Lower Manhattan Expressway that would have destroyed Greenwich Village).3  Jacobs was a natural-born, intuitive genius—an observer of the first order—and her career is the stuff of legend.  Her writing is fresh, her ideas striking and original. 

In the late 1950s and 60s, she stood up to the acolytes of Le Corbusier at Harvard, M.I.T., and the Port Authority.  She warned that the Title 1 projects—the soulless apartment buildings set among superblocks and “[p]romenades that go from no place to nowhere”—would become high-rise hellholes, and was pilloried for it.4  But Jacobs was right and the true believers of the mid-century urban orthodoxy were wrong: cities are living things, and neighborhoods must be reclaimed and not torn down under a misled ideology of the “doctrine of the salvation of brick” and related myths.

In 1984 Jacobs wrote Cities and the Wealth of Nations, a book that is every bit as important as her first.5  The earlier book depicts cities as living systems centered on the human interactions and transactions of street life; the latter work depicts the role of cities in a larger organic context as the basis for regional economies.  Jacobs believed that naturalistic production regions were a better and more sustainable basis for an economy than the artificial structures of the nation-state.  The two books are therefore linked by a concept of economic localism primarily based on small and medium-sized businesses. 

Jacobs argues that in a healthy economy, each region is centered on an import-replacing city.  The region depends on the city and the city depends on the region in close and necessary symbiosis.  By contrast, top-down economies based on military spending or permanent government work projects—although useful as temporary measures to pull a nation out of an economic crisis—ultimately undermine an otherwise healthy economy.6  Likewise, an overly-internationalized economy based on comparative advantage, labor arbitrage, multilateral trade agreements, and Big Finance, undermines naturalistic economies both at home and in developing nations.  A neoliberal economics based on efficiency all but destroys the potential of an economy based on regionally-produced durable goods and local employment.  Globalization is therefore bad for both rich and poor nations alike.

One can imagine a world of several hundred small nations all based on economic production regions and with a sufficient degree of economic diversity to prevent the dangers of over-specialization and “one-trick-pony” economies.  With no hegemons or monster nations, there would be little practical reason for nations to fight each other, although human irrationality and aggression would obviously remain.  Such an arrangement could be the closest thing to an optimal world economic order.

The basis for what constitutes a nation is an imprecise calculus of many things: shared aesthetic and cultural traditions, geographical considerations, historical and legal commonality, ethnicity, language, religion, and sometimes formal founding principles.  But in terms of economics, Jacobs appears to be on to something.  In this nation, localism construed as “states rights” was used as a smokescreen for segregation, provincial bullies, and urban political machines, but Jacob’s version of the local is different.  The question—as with all big ideas—is: how do you get there from here?  Aye, there’s the rub.

Do Americans on either side of the cultural divide have a right to impose their values on their counterparts?  Perhaps not.  But then what is the means to a more rational configuration and what would be the basis for opposing it?  Lincoln succeeded in holding the country together under a transcendent vision of Union, and an estimated 750,000 Americans died as a result.7  By contrast, Norway/Sweden and the Czech Republic/Slovakia chose amicable divorces and the results have been good.  The question is whether both sides of today’s culture wars have the ability and political maturity to cooperate toward such an end.  Does the nation have the capacity to transform into more coherent regionally-based autonomous sections along the lines of Jacob’s model?  At this point, Americans can’t even handle merge zones with grace, much less charity.  

Crises are also drivers of innovation.  Theodore Roosevelt’s Bull Moose campaign of 1912 dangled social democracy before the electorate, but it took the Great Depression and another Roosevelt to implement it.  With the proper political leadership, the current moment could also be one of change.  But with the discussion shifting to issues of reopening and a return to “normalcy”—presumably without taking advantage of a rare historical opportunity to address climate issues or structural flaws in the economy—the chances of something like Jacob’s model coming to the fruition seem as remote as ever.  If the economy tanks, as some economists it expect it to do, the possibility of a national breakup may force itself on decision-makers over the coming years or decades.  If so, a more likely outcome in a nation with hundreds of millions of guns could be a violent social ungluing rather than a cooperative transformation of the Union into regions.  If the United States does come apart at the seams, there is no telling what the result would be or whether it will be violent or controlled.

It is noteworthy that Jacobs’s last book, the uncharacteristically pessimistic Dark Age Ahead, predicts a downward spiral for the United States into a new Dark Age.  Here she casts the nation in the early twenty-first century as a latter-day Roman Empire prior to its collapse.8

Notes

  1. This idea was suggested to me by David Isenbergh.
  2. George F. Kennan, Around the Cragged Hill (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993), 149-151. Gore Vidal also suggested that the United States adopt a more wieldy arrangement of provinces.
  3. Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Random House, 1961).
  4. The Death and Life of Great American Cities, 6.  
  5. Cities and the Wealth of Nations (New York: Random House, 1984).  
  6. Cities and the Wealth of Nations, 183.
  7. See Guy Gugliotta, “New Estimate Raises Civil War Death Toll,” The New York Times, April 2, 2012.
  8. Jane Jacobs, Dark Age Ahead (New York: Random House, 2004), 198-199.  

I thank Joe Musumeci for editing this article.

The Neoliberal Pandemic

By Michael F. Duggan

We cannot go on living like this.  The little crash of 2008 was a reminder that unregulated capitalism is its own worst enemy: sooner or later it must fall prey to its own excesses and turn again to the state for rescue.  But if we do no more than pick up the pieces and carry on as before, we can look forward for greater upheavals in the years to come.

            -Tony Judy, Ill Fares the Land           

How do you like economic globalization now?

The last time a worldview was so thoroughly exploded was probably when the Aristotelian model of the solar system met the telescope.  The neoliberal status quo is not responsible for the COVID-19 virus, but it is a primary enabler of the ineffective responses to it and for the severity of the economic crises that will follow.

With the contagion having fanned out along trade and transportation routes to become a pandemic—a global epidemic—the failure of much of the globalized West to respond to it quickly and effectively is virtually a metaphor for itself: free trade policies also make it easier for viruses conduct their international business, and harder for nations to respond to it.  What we are witnessing is not only the fact that neoliberal globalization is undesirable in terms of long term economics, but that it is literally bad for the health of the world.  Now that it is self-evident that economic globalization makes nations more vulnerable to rapidly-developing crises, the question is whether the powers that be in government, big business, and Wall Street will abandon this bankrupt worldview.

The current visitation is obviously not the first pandemic.  The Black Death also traveled along trade routes and made it to the Mediterranean from the Black Sea and then into Europe through Italian ports.1  Variola major—smallpox—came to the New World with the Europeans probably in 1519-1520 (Caribbean islands slightly earlier) at the beginning the first phase of modern global economic interconnectedness.  With little or no immunity to the illness, as many as 20 million Native Americans died from it in Mexico alone.2  The H1N1 Spanish Flu emerged and spread during a global conflict and was particularly devastating onboard crowded U.S. troopships.  The H2N2 and H3N2 flu strains of 1956-58 and 1968 were the first pandemic pathogens of the jet age.  But the present scourge, which spread so quickly because of ease of travel, permeable boarders, and slow initial responses, now threatens the world economy because of frozen global supply lines and a dearth of vital resources, much of whose production was off-shored over the previous quarter-century to low cost production zones.

The crisis is therefore a “perfect storm” made possible by the trade winds of neoliberal economic meteorology—a tempest not only of disease and economics, but also of economic recovery.  Consider the sequence of events:

  1. A rapidly-spreading disease arrives at a nation that is not prepared to cope with it. 
  2. In order to effectively respond to the disease, the nation needs massive amounts of medical equipment, much of which is produced in other nations with outbreaks of their own and is now in short supply.
  3. The disease spreads rapidly, and its highly contagious nature prevents a significant portion of the domestic workforce from working.
  4. If the situation persists, it could lead to a Great Depression-like economic crisis that destroys U.S. global economic predominance, undermines the Dollar as the world reserve currency, and puts the national economy in a steep and permanent decline.   
  5. If people return to work prematurely, both the virus and the proximate cause of the economic crisis (i.e. people not working) could return and the overall crisis may persist.
  6. Because the U.S. has come to rely on foreign-produced durable goods over the past 30-50 years—to say nothing of important medical equipment and pharmaceuticals—it also relies on long oversea trade routs and remote foreign supply networks.  The pandemic has shut down many of these complex arteries and webs and nobody knows how long it will take to start them up again.  If it takes too long, the United States could experience inflation, perhaps hyperinflation by the end of the year.  If this happens, the United States could experience an economic collapse that would make the Great Depression look like a hiccup.

Those of us who have followed the progress of an increasingly globalized world have long noticed the resulting imbalances and disparities both at home and abroad.  Even a quarter-century ago it was apparent to many of us that this was an unsustainable ideology, an equal and opposite utopian program to the artificial economies of Marxist-Leninism.  The United States took the wrong lessons from the end of the Cold War.  Rather than seeing the dangers and pitfalls of rigid ideology, its leaders simply embraced their own orthodoxy. They did not—and might still not—realize that the idea of a completely unregulated economy is just as an extreme of an outlook as one advocating a completely managed one and just as problematic.

Then came the economic crisis of 2008, and, as the late Tony Judt observed, “[t]o avert national bankruptcies and wholesale banking collapse, governments and central bankers have performed remarkable policy reversals, liberally disbursing public money in pursuit of economic stability… A striking number of free market economists, worshippers at the feet of Milton Friedman and his Chicago colleagues, have lined up to don sackcloth and ashes and swear allegiance to the memory of John Maynard Keynes.”  Alas, he concludes “the reversion to Keynesian economics [was] but a tactical retreat.”3 

But if the 2008 shot-across-the-bow and the corporate socialism that followed did not jar the acolytes of neoliberalism out of their fool’s paradise, what will?  Perhaps dark imaginings of themselves or a loved one dying alone in a chaotic, underequipped hospital ward—drowning in their own lungs over a period of a week or two—will open their eyes.  On a side note, the term “Great Recession” a misnomer for a structural depression that still lingers throughout much of the country.

With a $2 trillion stimulus package in the mail and more on the way, everybody seems to have become a stopgap Keynesian or New Dealer again.  But will it last?  The danger is that the lockstep ideology of Wall Street and the Washington Consensus is so ingrained that the true believers of the establishment will not—cannot—change their ways.  Metaphors and analogies for the situation abound and it is difficult not to mix them.  Like a smoker who goes back to his cigarettes after being told that he has emphysema, will policymakers and advisors not learn from a global catastrophe?  With the egos of high-level careerists and credentialists so deeply invested in the post-Cold War mindset, can they admit error without a neurotic split (and will they risk a public loss of face even if they can admit it to themselves?)?  Like politburo toadies afraid to be the first to stop clapping after an address by Stalin, will any public figure break ranks from the economic religion of the past 30 years to admit error?  Rationalization and denial are the twin pillars of human psychology—dealing with cognitive dissonance is our lot as a creature—and it is yet to be seen whether or not the United States will succumb to a terminal case of The Emperor’s New Clothes.  

When we return to “normalcy” the question will be whether the United States will continue to be hogtied to an economy based on efficiency, multilateral trade agreements, comparative advantages, low cost production zones, corporate internationalism, and an overreliance on Big Finance, or if will it adopt a more sensible and nuanced outlook based on national interests and situational dictates.  Economic realism is simple in its central tenet: countries free trade when it is in their interest to do so and protect when it is in their interest to do so, and each situation must be judged case by case.  Free trade between nations with large GNPs often makes sense, but free trade between rich nations and poor nations results in quasi-imperialistic relationships in which one nation gets fat, lazy, and uncompetitive as it exploits the other for cheap labor, raw products, and low cost production venues with a convenient lack of labor and environmental laws.  As for multilateral trade agreements, suffice it to say that one size does not fit all.  Each trade relationship should be negotiated with an eye to the individualized needs and interests of the parties entering into it.  Above all, a nation should hire its own people at a living wage in order to produce the durable goods it uses and the vital supplies it may someday need.  The N95 respirator and ICU ventilators might serve as examples of the kind of medical equipment that the United States should consider producing entirely at home.

Karl Popper famously observed that “all life is problem solving” and that we learn by abandoning mistaken beliefs when they are demonstrated to be untrue.  To not learn and adapt because of an ideological adherence to a discredited position is not only irrational, but risks a kind of self-inflicted natural selection.  When a national puts ideological considerations above realistic considerations of vital interests, it puts its long term survival in jeopardy.  This is what happened in the decades leading up to the pandemic. 

If the country does respond effectively to the economic crisis that will follow the pandemic, could there be an up side to all of this?  Yes, but only if we are able to apply the lessons learned to other emerging crises.  Some of us who write about climate change and related issues speak of a “Pearl Harbor of the Environment” as a motivation to spur people and governments to an effective global response the way that the attack on Pearl Harbor threw the U.S. war mobilization into overdrive.  The pandemic is a comparatively minor environmental Pearl Harbor, and yet it is a world-historical event. As a friend of mine observed, how the United States and the West react to the economic aftermath of the pandemic will likely be a major turning point in history. Will we go back to policies that have worked, or those that enabled and exacerbated the present crisis?

The pandemic is what some people call a “Black Swan” or a high-impact, low-probability event.5  Those of us who have been predicting a pandemic since the early 1990s do not see it as a “low-probability” phenomenon, much less the last global epidemic.  Human beings are walking, traveling, socially-interacting Petri dishes, and there are now about 7.8 billion of us.  Perhaps climate skeptics will finally realize what nature can dish out and that humans are by far a junior partner on this planet, a small if overpopulated subset, a global plague in ourselves.  The crises of the environment are not low-probability speculations either, but virtual certainties and their impact will dwarf that of the Corona virus.  

Now that everybody appears to believe in science again, perhaps we can prepare for the much greater crises on the near horizon: the crisis of atmospheric carbon and climate change, the shocking loss of habitat and biodiversity, and the overarching problem of human overpopulation (to say nothing of the plastics crisis, soil depletion, and water issues).  Regardless of whether or not you subscribe to the Gaia hypothesis, as far as pushback from nature goes, we got lucky this time.  If the recovery is just about reopening without changing how we do things, the period of the lockdown will have been lost time, a lost opportunity. With no disrespect intended to the tens of thousands of people who have died and will die from this terrible disease and the millions who have been infected and/or put out of work by it, relative to what is coming, the COVID-19 pandemic might one day look like a bad cold.

Notes

  1. See J.M.W. Bean, “The Black Death: the Crisis and Its Social and Economic Consequences,” in The Black Death, the Impact of the Fourteenth-Century Plague (Binghampton, NY: Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 1982), 25. 
  2. Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997), 310.  Regarding the smallpox epidemic of 1775-1782, see Elizabeth A. Fenn, Pox Americana (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2001. 
  3. Tony Judt, Ill Fares the Land, (New York: Penguin, 2010), 7.
  4. See generally, Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan (New York: Random House: 2007).  

A Purdy Commonwealth

Book Review (Unedited)

By Michael F. Duggan

Jedediah Purdy, This Land is Our Land, The Struggle for a New Commonwealth (Princeton, 2019), 164 pages.  $19.95

…when all the time life’s inseparable conditions allow only clumsy opportunities for amelioration by plodding compromises and contrivances.
-Thomas Hardy

It has become a tradition with us.  In December we go up to Rhinebeck for the Sinterklaas festival—an amalgam of Old Dutch, upscale small town America, funky Upstate elements, and any number of cultural traditions of the season.  And then, among the festivities, I duck into Oblong Books and Music to buy another book I don’t need for my burgeoning collection, or a CD (I have a similar summer tradition with The Island Bookstore near the Currituck Beach Lighthouse on the Outer Banks).  For 2018 the book was Andrew Bacevich’s Twilight of the American Century.  Before that was a collection of Charlie Christian recordings.  My choice for December 2019 was Jedediah Purdy’s slender volume, This Land is Our Land, which had the fortune, or misfortune, to be issued during the same season as David J. Silverman’s This Land is Their Land, whose title gives away the moral of a story that, when told accurately, lays waste to the cherished American myth of Thanksgiving and related historical fictions.

Over the course of Western political thought, we have had Plato’s Republic, Moore’s Utopia, Hobbes’s Royalist Leviathan and the do-it-yourself Renaissance principality of Machiavelli.  We have seen the gradualist conservatism of Hume, Burke, Hamilton, and Viereck, and Locke’s individualistic (and legalistic) libertarian Eden echoed by Jefferson and reflected in the Bill of Rights. In the next century, Marx proffers the worker’s utopia. The followers of Locke and Marx assumed that reason, cooperation, and benevolence can dominate as human traits (either while pushing Native Americans off of their land or executing class enemies and their families).  We have witnessed the great twentieth-century excrescences, the tribalistic non-identical twins of Marxist-Leninism and National Socialism.  With a vision drawing on Locke and a temperament reminiscent of the Loner of Walden, the present book presents the egalitarian commonwealth of Jedediah Purdy.

As one would expect, it is well written.  Purdy constantly surprises with just how well he expresses and unpacks his well thought out ideas.  The humbling feeling I get when reading him is like the one I got the first time I read Annie Dillard’s Pilgrim at Tinker Creek thirty-odd years ago, but then one of the most important lessons I have learned about the life of the mind is to not be intimidated or otherwise distracted by impressive form. It is the ideas that matter and one must evaluate by restating them in one’s own voice, no matter how homely.  Thus it is possible to love Purdy’s writing without always liking it.

Professor Purdy is one of those hard cases who sees the world for what it is and still chooses idealism without apology.  In this sense he resembles Gandhi and the early Marx.  Although he has described himself elsewhere as a “political pessimist,” he is not a happy pessimist who has made his peace with an imperfect world like Hardy, Holmes, or Hume.  Nor is he a partner at the Hobbesian firm of Nasty, Brutish, and Short.  Like Twain he sees the underlying motivations of frauds and shams, but has not been beaten down by the world’s dark truths. Rather, he sees the world as starkly as any realist and then for bearing, acquires the unfulfilled ideals of the Enlightenment in his sights.  He is a disillusioned interpreter of the past but a temperamental optimist about human potential.  He puts forth ideas that are even more egalitarian than ones that have by his own account failed in the real world.

His mind is curious—distinctive—and his arguments are powerful in a moral rationalist way. He strikes one as decent, earnest, high-minded, and rational.  If he was younger one would (and some did) call him precocious, but with depth.  He is the real thing: a serious, often brilliant scholar.  He is confident in his abilities and in the correctness of his vision, and it is hard to say whether or not his optimism is hardwired, his moral rationalism dogmatic (and therefore beyond rational discussion), and, without psychologizing the author, I am curious to know what one would have to demonstrate in order to prove to him that a position of his is implausible. Taken to extremes, positions of moral rationalism are as unreasonable at any other perspective.

The book, described by its author and dust jacketeers as a meditation, a “Thoreauvian call,” and a history, works up to the concept of commonwealth after introducing it up front.  He develops the idea, or rather the need for it, through a Preface and five essays or loose-fitting chapters laying the groundwork, and terminating with a “Forward” (presumably a call to advance or else a prologue for either a future book spelling out the details of how to implement his plan, or else whatever is coming in the unfolding environmental catastrophe and the human response to it).  In order, these are “Homeland,” “This Land is Our Land,” “Reckonings,” “Losing a Country,” “The Long Environmental Justice Movement,” and “The Value of Life.”  The perspective, like the problems the book diagnosis is closely tied to the land.

Purdy defines his idea of commonwealth in his Preface, “Homeland.”  A lawyer and a wordsmith, he begins with the etymological roots of the word (in a couple of places he introduces fundamental concepts by examining their Latin, French, or Middle English origins): early usages both common and elite, and the definition provided by the great double-edge sword of liberal political philosophy, John Locke.  He then generalizes, distills, and defines commonwealth by what it is and does: a social/economic arrangement allowing for “the well-being of the whole community—the flourishing that is shared and open to all” (p. xii), and by what he believes it could be: “an economy where no one gets their living by degrading someone else, nor by degrading the health of the land or the larger living world.  In such a community, the flourishing of everyone and everything would sustain the flourishing of each person.  This would be a way of living in deep reciprocity as well as deep equality” (p. xiii). Deep indeed.

Here the author speaks of a world that I do not know other than from the views of early communists, levelers, nineteenth-century anarchists, and utopians unified by a record of failure.  It is also a perspective akin to what one hears on the Millennial left and is reminiscent of the economic egalitarianism of Rutger Bregman.  At best these ideas may embody an idealistic part of a larger equation for successful government, like those of seventeenth-century thinkers such as James Harrington and English Oppositionists like Charles Davenant, John Trenchard, Thomas Gordon, James Burgh, and Henry St. John First Viscount Bolingbroke (see Forrest McDonald, The Presidency of Jefferson, 19-21, 161-162, 171).  His writing rings somewhat of the liberal rationalism of John Rawls, who he criticizes at the beginning of his Forward/last essay. Like a Holmesian legal positivist or an existentialist, he denies Rawls’s idea of a metaphysical theory of meaning for the world and those of us in it.  Thus Utopia is to be the fulfillment of rationalist will and effort and not a deterministic unfolding of historicist laws.

He writes “The freedom of that community [the commonwealth] would not be freedom from the consequence of your actions,” without elaboration. In the commonwealth, equality would seem to edge-out freedom in all of its manifestations both good and bad.  But how are we to enforce such equality in order to secure good results? And what about those who exercise their freedom toward bad ends? He doesn’t say how organized crime, black markets, drug cartels, tribalism, psychopathy, other forms of criminal insanity and anti-social behavior—human venality in general—or simple (or cynical) nonconformity would fit into such a scheme of benevolent reciprocity or how the commonwealth would respond to them. These things are not just inconvenient details to be swept up or shrugged off in light of an otherwise perfect blueprint. They are permanent features of the human moral landscape and extrapolations of significant features of our animal nature.  

I realize that in order to save the planet, humans will have to completely reorient our relationship with nature and in doing so, reconfigure our relationships with one another.  I also understand many of the steps that got us to where we are.  I cannot fault someone for not coming up with the right formula in a race where nobody has a produced workable one.  Perhaps the world cannot be saved within the confines of the existing economic, legal, and social institutions.  But as with any proposal, I am just as curious about the first practical steps of a general outline toward a solution as I am with what the prettiest imaginings of what the final arrangement might look like.

As if to preempt the objections of skeptics like me, he provides a sprinkling of historical instances from the American tradition that foreshadow elements of his vision in the public utterances and deeds of Lincoln, Lyndon Johnson, and Martin Luther King, Jr.  Notably missing is Franklin Roosevelt’s Economic Bill of Rights from his 1944 State of the Union Address.  Purdy then rightfully observes that “The American commonwealth has been blocked again and again by division and exploitation.”

I think that Purdy and people like me ultimately want the same thing: a just and sustainable social order within a just and sustainable world order, or the closest workable thing to it.  The difference is in the way we see history, the nature of power, and human nature, and therefore the basis of possible solutions.  The concepts of chaos in physics and baseline manipulation in advocacy and adjudication tell us that slight variations in initial conditions, premises, and trajectories will take you to very different places.  Purdy and I thus arrive at different conclusions. 

Professor Purdy appears to interpret history in light of a goal: the potential of the highest ideals of the Enlightenment amounting to literal social and economic equality. These objectives may go beyond the actual ideas of the Enlightenment (e.g. literal economic equality in response to an interpretation of capitalism as economic authoritarianism and employment as exploitation).  The result is a vision of egalitarianism taken to an extreme.

By contrast (and rifting off of William James), I see history as a dark and bloody mess (underscore bloody, underscore mess) lit haphazardly by noble ideas and periods of relative enlightenment. I see capitalism as a thing that can be, and has been, regulated toward the public good (e.g. the New Deal paradigm of 1933 to the early 1970s). I see employment as a necessary thing that in some instances can be rewarding, even amounting to a calling or life’s purpose (e.g. the profession of a successful author or law professor), or else something unpleasant we do to barter our time for more meaningful or enjoyable things. I realize that this is not how employment currently works for most of the world’s people.  

Like many of his generation and younger Millennials, his view of “capitalism” suffers from excessive narrowness in interpreting a vague term.  Rather than limit one’s definition of “capitalism” to the collusion of powerful oligarchs, there is another view of it as a mechanism of growth, diversification, and creativity that relies on the dominance of small and medium-sized companies which I believe can be very good.  In this model, people and local and regional economies rely on the market for essential economic relationships that generate wealth and create prosperity. Thus construed, economies are naturalistic phenomena like organisms living in and interacting with their environment (see generally Jane Jacobs, Cities and the Wealth of Nations). Adam Smith himself believed that capitalism becomes poisoned once you allow collusion of the powerful to harm the public good. I digress.

Purdy dreams of things that never were (and not for want of trying) and asks “why not?” where I look at the world and ask “what is reasonably possible based on past experience and a realistic understanding of what people are like and how power operates in the world?”  He seeks to perfect; I seek to accentuate the good given our meager ability to understand it among the cacophony of competing interests and to actualize it and maintain it, however imperfectly.  I embrace efforts intended to curb the worst abuses of our system; he seeks to perfect.  I agree that we can and must do better, but we cannot—and should not—try to perfect human nature.  The perfection of humankind is a dangerous and seductive illusion at the end of a well-trodden path.  I suppose the reply to my criticisms would be that the world cannot survive anything short of an ideal commonwealth and that we have to get it right the first time.  I agree that whatever the solution, it must be the right program done with fewer errors than almost all human enterprises to date. 

As regards human nature—and in spite of the historical record that he understands better than most—Purdy apparently sees people as being essentially good and rational or at least capable of having these qualities predominate in their nature which we can then generalize into a system.  “Deep reciprocity” will not work otherwise. And yet how are we to bring forth and sustain these positive human characteristics?  Proffering a polity based on an assumption of the dominance of the better qualities of our nature is like trying to build a school of clinical psychology on the assumption that people are primarily happy. Both ignore significant aspects of our nature.

By contrast I see people as a mixed bag. We are intrinsically conflicted, off-balance creatures divided between primary considerations of self-orientation driven by pressures of individual selection, and less dominant motivations of altruism driven by group selection (see Edward O. Wilson, The Social Conquest of Earth, 142-47, 156-57, 162-65, 170-88, The Meaning of Human Existence, 22-24). Thus our inborn repertoire of behavior includes the general categories of aggression and competition between individuals and groups as well as cooperation.

Purdy is fully aware that that to date, governing in the real world has had more to do with power and the interests of the powerful than with abstract morality, and that the United States is just another nation whose history is a yin-yang, or rather a thatched weave, of good and bad.  Good acts do not expunge or balance-out bad ones, and how is one to weigh and disentangle these things in a world of shifting gray tones between the Manichean extremes of dark and light?  To what degree does a bold experiment in republican self-rule wipe the slate clean of cultural murder, robbery, cheating, and slavery?  And which side is more truly reflective of what we are as an animal and under what circumstances?  Equally important is the fact that well-intended programs frequently breed disaster just as cynical programs may yield fruit, and we can never be sure if the consequences of our intentions will succeed. One thing is certain: in social and political life, things never turn out entirely as intended. The drag and resistance of the real world of human events and elements of our own internal nature will always thwart idealistic enterprises from working as planned. Utopian projects are nonstarters as intended and tend to morph quickly into monstrosities.

Purdy realizes that “the history of this continent’s past five centuries is woven from fantasy on the one hand and the relentless and often inhumane and destructive extraction of wealth on the other” (p. xv). Ironically both of these are based on, or were justified on, Lockean grounds that cut both ways—they emphasize individual rights while providing moral and legal cover for the killing and displacing of native peoples and the vulgar amassing of capital. 

He ends his Preface with the reassurance that his book “is not a morality tale” (perhaps in a similar way that people asserting that they are not insane are really not insane), that “It is a material story, an accounting of how this familiar tale was made that both illuminates and rebuts the morality tales that have attached to this place.  It is a story about the terms of land making that made American wealth so unequal, uncommon.”  Fair enough, although embedded in this statement is the idea that in order to be meaningful, a material (objective? literally true? accurately reflective of a greater external reality?) story must center around or have proximity to a greater moral point while rebutting false ones (likewise a morality tale must have a tangible relationship to and application in the real world).  It also implies the idea of degrees of truthfulness and falsity of moral narratives.  It is even possible to tell a “material” story shorn of moral implications? How do you tell a neutral story and what would be the point of it? The mere telling of a story means that it is important to the author in some sense. Is this a Hemingway-like exercise in simple description of real trends and events that allows readers to fill in the feelings and morals themselves? In matters where values are at stake, “neutrality” is for cowards, cynics, and psychopaths, and Purdy is no coward or cynic and seems to be about as far from being a psychopath as a person can get.

There is no such thing as morally-neutral interpretations and in history we walk a tightrope between judgment and clemency—the avoiding of unduly presentist chauvinism—of the past, of also trying to understand it in its own terms and values as best as possible.  The liberals of today stand on the shoulders of bold experimenters of the past who are likely to come up short in terms of subsequent developments in moral standards.  So, in spite of a checkered national-historical tradition, and in a time when cynicism, division and mistrust, disparity and exploitation are at levels not seen in almost a century (and in a time when radicals on the right have adopted postmodernist arguments on the relativity of truth), why does he think that our better angels will prevail and that a utopian commonwealth will work when all others have failed?

1. This Land is Our Land

In Chapter One, also the namesake of the book, Purdy attempts to uncover the source of enmity that divides the nation.  He observes that “the things that tie people together and the things that divide them tend to be the same thing,” like the two sides of a coin.  This includes the land itself, whether it is the forever ruined landscapes of the Appalachian coal belts, the agricultural country of eastern North Carolina, the various fracking regions, or the public lands of the West.

Here he is on to something, but I also think that he is emphasizing only one manifestation, one lineage of the rift in the nation that still baffles most of the chattering classes on the mainstream left.  He asks fundamental questions like “How to people come to be one another’s problems, threats, burdens?  How do we become one another’s helpers, protectors, friends?”  While Purdy is too smart to accept uncritical clichés claiming that it was “Russia and racism” that swung an election that should not have been close, he presents a landscape-based explanation rather than one of overarching causes—that the establishment wings of both parties abandoned huge swaths of the electorate and embraced trade multilateralism, comparative advantage, and the off-shoring of jobs. Both have embraced a neoliberal economy based on cheap labor both in distant nations and imported domestically.  Thus the Party of Labor abandoned a primary constituency in favor of identity politics.  In his new book, The Age of Illusions, Andrew Bacevich blames our current predicaments on the failure of post-Cold War policies generally and the entrenched ideologies of the “The End of History” model.

Purdy takes some shots at nationalism (presumably the scourge of extremist ethnic nationalism), characterizing it as a myth “that came into this world dripping blood and soil.”  It is unclear whether or not the moderate embracing of the nation-state falls under this category of myth, although later on he does write that the state would remain the basic unit of the world order (96-101). One can only hope that Purdy is not throwing all forms of nationalism into one basket. Prior to Bismarck, state nationalism was sometimes seen as a progressive alternative to monarchy, and Theodore Roosevelt’s “New Nationalism” of 1910-1912 was the first major platform of social democracy in U.S. History. As Diana Johnstone observes in her new memoir, Circle in the Darkness, “Ho Chi Minh, Amilcar Cabran, Mahatma Gandhi, Simon Bolivar, and Patrick Henry, and a whole array of liberators” were nationalists. She also points out that “within the framework of the nation state, representative democracy was born.” (416). Democracy, to include democratic socialism are phenomena of the state and are not prairie fires of a borderless world.

Purdy notes that “It’s a truism that nativism and nationalism are crises today,” and that “nationalism is bound up in the American landscape.”  Here, too, I wouldn’t put such a fine point on it.  He is certainly right in a proximate sense, but tribalism and bigotry are parts of the human condition and they are always present, even when not conspicuous.  They are not “myths” to be easily rebuffed, but rather manifestations of fundamental human proclivities that must be actively opposed and taught against.  (Edward O. Wilson, The Meaning of Human Existence, 30-31). 

When a nation is doing well economically, these ugly facets remain below the surface; when a nation is prosperous, there are few grievances to pin on others.  The resulting decline in racist incidents during periods of relative prosperity may lull progressives into a false sense of triumph, of permanent social progress, that we are “defeating” what is in fact a dark base element of our nature.  Tribalism and racism reemerge when people are doing poorly and feel a need to bind with their own kind and irrationally look outward for scapegoats for their problems.  This is obviously made worse when people fall prey to propagandists and demagogues who tell them to embrace their ugliest impulses as moral principles.

Bigotry and tribalism are not reinvented whole cloth at particular points in history. Something cannot come out of nothing.  They are not visitations—pandemics—that mysteriously arise out of the corrupted ether.  They always there, dormant, sleeping serpents that reawaken in response to real historical (economic, political, social) conditions.  Sure, nativism and nationalism “may be bound up in American landscapes,” but in this respect whites or Americans in general are by no means unique.  Rather, these are symptoms of much broader problems, and land use is a single (but important) manifestation of these.  They are an indication of just how badly off so many Americans have fared under the globalized economy.  If we do not address the underlying disease, the symptoms will persist, and if we only threat the symptoms, the underlying pathology will persist and spread.

2. Reckonings

Here Purdy develops the idea of land as the basis of division and disparity.  He describes the transformation—destruction—of the environment for shortsighted gain, and how the people living on the ruined land are marginalized and eventually destroyed.  He offers the stark observation that “Power rearranges people on the land.  Those who cannot control the land are controlled by it” and “…economic powerlessness is tied to the incapacity to control your environment.”  As with feudal and agricultural Britain, power is closely tied to property.  But unlike the feudal period, much of today’s use and abuse of the land is primarily extractive and permanent in its transformation.  Unlike the English gentry of a later time or the analogous Junker class in Prussia, the powerful today are remote and no longer tied to the land or the people on it.

In his descriptions and numbers shock the conscience: that an estimated 500 mountains in West Virginia have been destroyed by “mountaintop removal” mining, that adjacent valleys have been filled in to depths of 600 feet (about 45 feet deeper than the height of the Washington Monument), that an estimated 2,000 miles of headwater creeks have been buried, “that mining [has] altered 7 percent of the surface area central Appalachian coalfields,” that “1.4 million acres of native forest [have] been destroyed and are unlikely to recover on the broken soils mining leaves.”  He also discusses the toxicity left behind in addition to the outright physical destruction.  Every American should be required to bear witness to these facts.

Here too my temptation would have been to couch the issue more broadly in terms of neoliberalism (which Purdy has written about elsewhere) and economic globalization, but then a part of his thesis is how the land unites and divides us and “land” and its possession is in the title after all.  Thus he stays more narrowly on point and makes his points with the devastating eloquence of a prosecutor who is certain of his facts and the guilt of the accused.  He does touch on underlying causes, “a tableau of abdication: years of privatization and non-regulation.”  This is putting it mildly: privatization is a part of active agenda that includes a reregulation of the economy in favor of rich special interests (see Barlett and Steele, Betrayal of the American Dream, Chrystia Freeland, Plutocrats, and Tony Judt, Ill Fares the Land).

For most of this essay he writes brilliantly about the abuse of the land and its people—“the disregarded and discarded classes”—by the powerful.  It is no coincidence that the regions he writes about, the ravaged former extractive or industrial areas of West Virginia (his home state), Pennsylvania, the fracking regions of Oklahoma and Texas, and the farm country of eastern North Carolina, voted overwhelmingly for the current administration.  On these issues Purdy knows what he is talking about as well as anybody and he is an expert on the relevant law.  Every American, left, right, and what passes for the center these days should read this striking piece and the price of the books is worth the cost for the observations made in this chapter alone.

3. Losing a Nation

In Chapter Three, Purdy describes the depression felt by many Americans after the 2016 election.  He gives an accounting about how most of his life has been a sequence of political disappointments.  He channels Henry David Thoreau in historical parallel to himself (although one infers that Purdy is a better sport than the moralistic Loner of Concord, although one senses a temperamental affinity and an ideational lineage).

In spite of its eloquence, the beginning of this chapter feels like a backsliding from the previous two—feels a little out-of-place in this collection altogether.  After having diagnosed the disparities on the land that led to the result of the 2016 election with power and insight, Purdy lapses into a stance more like that of a conventional depressed Democrat, baffled at how it all could have happened. 

He reaches the epiphany that he has lost his country writing that a “country lost in this fashion may never have been more than a pleasing illusion, a gauze of selective ignorance of indifference. ‘Losing a country’ may be a way of describing coming to see more clearly”(P. 60).  What he is describing is akin to the moment of peripetia (or perepeteia) in Greek tragedy when (according to Philip Roth’s protagonist, Nathan Zuckerman in the The Human Stain) “the hero learns that everything he knows is wrong.”  With such a realization, one’s moral awareness is suddenly thrown into reverse, crisis, and disillusionment.  In this realization, whites are far behind others in the nation who long knew that they never had a country to lose or at least approached pleasant national-historical myths with a healthy measure of caution and skepticism.  Purdy/Thoreau’s historical illustration is the slave, Anthony Burns, who, after fleeing the South was returned to servitude by the Fugitive Slave Law.

I know of the country about which Purdy writes in this chapter—a nation founded on slavery, Indian wars, land grabs based on Lockean moral justificationism, and the continental expansionism of Manifest Destiny.  Later it would be founded on or allow child labor, wage slavery, myths of rugged individualism and Frederick Jackson Turner’s Frontier Thesis, traditional overseas imperialism, neoliberal imperialism—a nation that “began as both a world-historical land grab and a world-historical experiment in republican self-rule.”  I know this story and so does Professor Purdy, and he is weary of trying to come to terms with it.  Good first principles do not erase or balance-out bad acts, not really. 

But where I see—or at least until recently, saw—each new period of history as just another succeeding Manichaean chapter in the human story in which good and evil are inextricably intertwined, Purdy sees the gold to be separated from the dark ore.  The present day may thus be a hopeful demarcation between the bad old past and a truly enlightened future. The hope here is a modification of Emerson: the present is prologue.  Where I see goodness and reason that may be accentuated and darkness that at times can be minimized or temporarily kept in check, Purdy apparently hopes for bad to be eliminated to a substantial degree, and for good to be perfected as a kind of fulfillment of an uber Enlightenment ideal that has never existed on a large scale. 

Thinking, feeling Americans come to powerful disillusionment when they realize that much of the national mythological history we are taught or absorb via cultural osmosis is just that.  The truth is always more complex and a lot messier.  Thus Silverman’s corrective, This Land is Their Land.  Conservatives tend to cling to the myths and rationalize away or shrug off the dark truth as justifiable (or at least understandable) operating costs, the rounding errors of “freedom” and the foibles of an essentially good system.  As a friend of mine used to say, rationalization and denial are the twin pillars of human psychology—never underestimate another person’s capacity for self-delusion, and never underestimate you own.

A nation’s historical morality is not arithmetic and its history is not a balance sheet.  Progressives tend to focus on the first principles of the Founding and Framing and the more sensitive among them may turn bitterly against their flawed nation when they realize that our sins and attributes don’t balance out on a ledger of sums and deficits (from the point of view of most Native Americans, the British position on westward expansion during the 1760s was more enlightened than that of the American patriots).  The hope is that the national moral vector is straight and upward with a minimum of bad outliers. 

But history is not a simple graph indicating a median or mean of a rising moral trajectory, the “upward trend” of FDR’s fourth (and final) inaugural address.  One problem may be in trying to cast history primarily in moral terms, as if social progress was guaranteed like the growth of scientific knowledge and technological progress and in believing that a nation is somehow exceptional—exempt from human nature—because of the values found in its founding documents; a nation is only as decent as its people and their chosen leaders, and social progress is never a given. Progress must be fought for, and, once achieved, it must be defended.  Those on both the right and the left therefore fall prey to respective kinds of exceptionalism: denial in the first instance and excessively narrow focus in the second that sometimes leads to disillusionment and a crisis of faith.

The second of these appears to be what happened to Purdy in 2016.  If you assume that our system and its history are exceptional because our corpus includes the Declaration of Independence, the U.S. Constitution, Letters from an American Farmer, Democracy in America (by a sympathetic outsider), and On Civil Disobedience, you will spend the rest of you life trying to reconcile these with slavery, Jim Crow, the Indian wars, and the Gilded Age(s). 

Conversely, if you assume that humans are aggressive creatures—a plague species—capable of total warfare, genocide, the strategic bombing of civilians, and the destruction of the world environment, but who are also capable of love, kindness, altruism, courage and self-sacrifice, classical music, hot and cool jazz, the works of Shakespeare, the Sistine Chapel, the New Deal, the Marshall Plan, the Peace Corps, and the Voting Rights Act, the world makes a lot more sense than one we construct in our minds based on binary categories of good and evil and an assumption of the eventual triumph of the former.  A realistic view of our ourselves makes more sense, and one will arrive at the conclusion that, although we may and should take moral lessons from the past, no nation is an unswerving paragon of virtue.  And while we should never abandon efforts to make the world a better place, we cannot ignore what people are capable of doing, and will continue to do.  The question then becomes: at what point does the corruption of a system make it intolerable for us?

The world I know not only permits disparities, to some degree it requires them in a similar way that monochrome photographs require black and white and every shade of gray in between in order to produce an image. The issue is how to keep the dark side in check rather than defeating or eliminating an intrinsic part of what we are.  I rolled my eyes when politicians spoke of “defeating” evil in the world after the attacks of September 11th, and I do not know the world to which Professor Purdy aspires.

Like many people younger than me, Purdy writes about “privilege” and now projects it backward on to someone who likely never used the term in the sense that he means it, his nineteenth-century doppelganger, Thoreau.  Thus even Thoreau does not escape whipping because he fails to keep the abolition of slavery in the forefront in his mind at all times.  “Thoreau is complaining about, among other things, losing the privilege of ignoring slavery much of the time while also disapproving of it.” (P. 60).  Here Purdy falls on his sword, admitting that he is more like Thoreau than Anthony Burns in terms of having a country to lose.  Purdy had a country to lose and now he has lost it.

From here he goes into an elegant, if privileged, wallow into solitude and a Thoreau-like return to the moral instructiveness of a “naïve” response to nature—“a kind of second naïveté that one returns to after time away.” (p. 63).  I think that all of us who are attracted to nature know exactly what he is talking about and choose occasional re-emersions in it.  Sometimes we long for or even attempt to return to it with the lost pre-Darwinian wonder of youth or that high-on-life moral superiority one feels after reading Walden for the first time, a particularly inspiring essay by Emerson or a Wordsworth poem. 

In analyzing this part of the essay two opposite thoughts entered my mind.  On the one hand is the idea expressed by Twain scholar, Ron Powers, on Clemens’s last return to Hannibal, his boyhood home: “When you become unsure of who you are now, you go to who you were when you knew who you were and try to read back out of that.” (see Ken Burns’s documentary, Mark Twain)  On the other hand, you can’t repeat the past, Jay Gatsby—and you cannot unlearn what you know.  My sense is that Jed Purdy, even in despondency, knows full well who he is and does not really need to be reminded what his “nonnegotiables” are.  He asserts a third consideration: that this re-emersion in nature “would never be an escape from history and social life into a greenwood idyll.  It would be a way of getting another angle of vision on the same social facts, the same greedy and unequal humanity.” (65)  In a depressed state, some people self-medicate with ice cream or chocolate.  Others choose scotch.  Purdy chooses reorientation via a return to nature.  Who can blame him?  

In a sense, Purdy and Thoreau, indeed all of us so inclined, must choose a naïve response to nature in order to achieve a fresh vantage point on human events.  A more realistic return would be a distraction.  It would have revealed to Thoreau the Formica subintegra—slaver ants—that live in the woods around Walden, and whose “Austerlitz” (really a typical slave raid) he describes so vividly in his masterwork (see Edward O. Wilson, The Future of Life, xviii-xix).  A less naïve/more realistic emersion would remind Professor Purdy of nature’s overarching amorality, its unfairness to individuals and groups, its universal inequality and ubiquitous suffering, its injustices with no means of redress, its amoral chaos and frequent disasters.  As Annie Dillard writes, “Cock Robin may die most gruesome of slow deaths, and nature is no less pleased.” (Pilgrim at Tinker Creek, 178).

He then goes into a discussion of fear and manipulation.  We are told by some of the powers that be to fear immigrants and Islamists but not the climate change that threaten us all.   Here I think Purdy makes a slight misstep.  He is correct that the rich will be able to initially ride out the changes in the environment that are already affecting so many of the world’s poorest people and affecting them disproportionately.  Where I think he is wrong is in the belief that the rich will be able to escape this for very long, that “The world of 2100 may well be no more dangerous for them than the world of middle-class Americans in 1950 or that of Gilded Age plutocrats in 1890” (73). He is right that there is an immediate risk to them in “opening up economic life and global order to the challenges that would come from an honest confrontation with climate change.”  He calls this “willed complacency” and correctly believes that it will persist as long as enough voters identify with it.  I don’t know how to get to Purdy’s commonwealth from here, but I suspect that any realistic approach to addressing the environment will have to be the result of mortal fear to jar people out of complacency, a Pearl Harbor of the environment.

In the end, it was not the radicalism of Wendell Philips or the brooding meditations of Henry David Thoreau that destroyed slavery.  Nor was it democratic form other than the election of a transformational moderate president with a plurality of the popular vote.  It was brute force and top-down administration.  It was the Armies of the Potomac, the Tennessee, and the James.  Wherever these armies went, slavery was dead forever.  Wherever Thoreau went, we got essays and privileged observations.   

4.  The World We have Built

Here Professor Purdy introduces the ominous metric category of “technosphere” (an important term only slightly less creepy than biomass as used by E.O. Wilson in The Future of Life, (29)).  This he defines as the estimated thirty trillion ton sum total of human infrastructure on the planet, or the 4,000 tons each of us uses to get through our lives.  It is the aggregate of the extended human phenotype and is “five orders of magnitude greater than the weight of the human beings that it sustains” (82).  Without it, individual humans are “like a oyster ripped from its shell—“unaccommodated man” in the word’s of King Lear (perhaps, even more accurately, we are like cancer cells that cannot live independently and are killing the body in which we exist).  “Unaccomodated man” may also be a foreshadow of the fate of the vast majority of the world’s 7.75 billion people in the coming Mad Max world?  An unacommadated plague species.  Imbalance. 

He is correct that “Our species infrastructure is the technosphere of roads, rails, utility lines, and housing.  It also has a broader sense, in which it encompasses all the artificial systems that allow people to survive together and to reach one another for communication and cooperation” (although it would seem to be a point of contention about the degree to which an animal’s extended phenotype is ever truly “artificial,” I digress). (83)  

Purdy then expands the idea of the technosphere to a second category that includes immaterial systems like “the world’s economies, and these in turn shape the global carbon cycle, the food system, mineral extraction… and so forth” (83).  The first two categories of the technosphere are the human world.  The third category is the altered physical systems of the world—the great life support system provided by the planet.  

 Building on a central idea of his 2015 After Nature, he writes “A world that is pervasively human-made present a question: ‘What sort of world shall we make?’” Given the lack of control of the world we have toward progressive ends, one can only wonder what control he thinks we will have in the future. His goal is to make something “chosen and common” (88).  An internal reform he dismisses with the term “hack” or “a way of pursuing system-level agency in the absence of political capacity to act at the scale of the system” (88).  Here he seems to be talking about a kind of technocratic osmosis into the “infrastructure of Leviathan’s circuitry and make[s] it cleaner, faster, cheaper.”  This he rightfully dismisses.  

Then, as if resurrecting the pre-November 2016 Jed Purdy, he launches into a review of positive things government and high political ideas have done and can do (immediately before this he even gives a grudging nod to the New Deal while pointing out its warts).  He endorses the “uniquely constructive power of political sovereignty.” After such a robust assertion of political realism, and the identification of “some of the world’s most powerful states form an Axis of Denial, in which refusing to seriously acknowledge of do anything about climate change is a point of convergence from the coal industry to the religious right,” (93) he also bravely asserts a list of social issues that cynical political hacks frequently uses as wedge issues to distract from topics of survival of the planet and ourselves.  He realizes that “the state, the weaponized tool of the worst things we do—against one another and the rest of life—is also the way to a different solution” (93).

At this point, the rollercoaster turns down again and Purdy concedes “choosing what sort of species we are going to be—often feels like more of a pious wish than a potent reality” (93-94).  He sums up:

“The appeal to humanity is at once cogent and nonsensical, urgent and pointless.  The heavy facts of a fragmented and unequal world contradict the scientists’ call at every point, but they don’t disestablish it.  Here is our paradox: the world cannot go on this way; and it can’t do otherwise.  It was the collective power of some—not all—human beings that got us into this: power over resources, power over the seasons, power over one another.  That power has created a global humanity entangled in a Frankenstein ecology. But it does not include the power of accountability or restraint, the power we need.  To face the Anthropocene, humans will need a way of facing one another.  We would need, first to be a we.”

There is a lot in this paragraph.  To address his points: an appeal to humanity on a basis of the right thing to do is pointless, unless people are motivated into thinking that their survival and that of their children and grandchildren is directly threatened and that they will die unless our behavior changes in fundamental ways.  Yes, we cannot continue to go on this way.  Yes, some people and nations have contributed more to climate change.  But human beings are a plague species, and we are all to blame (see John Gray, Straw Dogs).  The idea of the human species seeing itself as single tribal category—also called for by E.O. Wilson and Adam Frank—is a nonstarter given the time in which we need to take action.

He concludes with a call for a new internationalism based on sovereignty.  In this is he correct, we will have to address the crises of the environment on a global scale from a critical mass of cooperating nations.  Beyond that his solutions seem overly optimistic.

5. The Long Environmental Justice Movement

            Purdy loses me in this meditation with what at times seems like the harsh judgment of good historical efforts.  The moralizing is not dominant, but is a spinoff, an epiphenomenon of the chapter.  In the first seven chapters of his 2015 book After Nature, Purdy shows himself to be an intellectual historian of the first order.  In this meditation he projects onto the past his twenty-first century values as if they were known and accepted as a part of a general normative morality of the earlier time, or else as absolutes that should have been known as we know them today.

He begins with a discussion of “one of the most popular and polarizing politicians in the country… Representative Alexandra Ocasio-Cortez of New York.”  He discusses the meaning of her (and Bernie Sanders’s) self-inflicted ideological tag of “democratic socialist.”  He states that this term is used to characterize “that we have in common the things we choose to share together, and these things—good schools, good transport, public parks, and medical care for all—make a shared worlds.” 

Here, Purdy (like all those who approve of this term) reveals a tin ear for practical politics.  For many Americans over 40, the word “socialism” is political poison.  When we look at the comparative happiness and health of the Scandinavian nations, we realize that socialism need not be a synonym for the USSR under Stalin, but many voters still interpret it that way.

Given that all of the things Purdy lists under “socialism” also fit comfortably under a designation of “social democracy”—e.g. the New Deal—why not use this less contentious term?  After all, another characteristic commonly ascribed to socialism is the takeover of the machinery of the economy by the government, and yet has Ocasio-Cortez or Sanders advocated such a position?  The proposed environmental program supported by Cortez even adopts the language of social democracy: the “Green New Deal.”  So why not call oneself a “social democrat”?  Stay a bit.

The answer may be that the original New Deal was an “industrial [and financial, and agricultural], racially exclusionary, male-centered program” (admittedly with some “potential” that could be reworked into a genuine commonwealth).  A few pages later he repeats that the domestic programs of Roosevelt were “patriarchal and racist.”

To this I would ask Professor Purdy: “patriarchal and racist,” relative to what?  Of Course Roosevelt should have done more for women and African-Americans, but what were the situational dictates and constraints under which he was operating? Let us concede that all times before the present in this country were racist and that even today we have a long way to go. The question is: how does the New Deal measure up relative to the period in which it was implemented?

Did the Roosevelt administration not hire more women, Jews, and other minorities into high-level positions than any before it and more than some that followed?  Were women like Frances Perkins and Eleanor Roosevelt not movers and shakers in the administration (to say nothing of Missy LeHand, the trusted gatekeeper and intimate of Roosevelt’s inner circle and member of his “Cufflinks Gang”)?  What about Roosevelt’s “Black Cabinet” and the fact that by 1935 “one-third of all African Americans were receiving some kind of Federal help” (quoted from Ken Burns and Geoffrey Ward, The Roosevelts).  Was it not the Roosevelts who arranged for Marian Anderson to sing on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial after she was blocked from performing at Constitution Hall?  Was it not Franklin Roosevelt who issued Executive Order 8802 that created the Fair Employment Practices Commission (and if a cultural southerner like Harry Truman could desegregate the military in 1947, it is likely that Roosevelt would have done so at least as quickly had he survived his fourth term)? Were all of these things not regarded as socially progressive and even radical for their time?

In order to appreciate what Franklin Roosevelt might have done in a better world or a different time, we need only look at the activities of his wife.  Eleanor Roosevelt was probably a quarter of a century ahead of most Democrats on issues of civil rights.  She and the reaction generated by her writing and activities were a barometer for what the president could and could not hope get away with.  Why not support civil rights more vigorously than he did?  Because the Democratic Party was not only the party of labor, it was also the party of the deeply racist “Solid South.”  Should Roosevelt have initiated civil rights bills that would have no chance of making it through both houses for another 25 years at the expense of a war footing necessary to defeat Hitler and the Imperial Japanese?  As war loomed, should he have risked losing an election?

Are words like “racist” and “patriarchy” terms that F.D.R, or others at the time commonly used and understood in the sense we use them today with their powerful moral implications?  Are these terms—again, in their modern usage—categories in which people in the mainstream could have consciously included or excluded themselves?  To paraphrase a commentator on a similar topic, calling FDR a “patriarch” is a little like saying that Jesus was a member of the Elks Club.  By today’s standards, Lincoln was a racist and Purdy references him favorably.  It was this racist backwoods lawyer who more than anybody was responsible for destroying slavery and not Wendell Phillips, who kept slavery in the forefront of his mind.  Lyndon Johnson was a racist even by the standards of his day but also pushed the Civil Rights Act, Voting Rights Act, the Fair Housing Act, and the programs of the Great Society through Congress.

My reading is that the New Deal was a leap forward in progressive policies and for someone to impugn Roosevelt’s domestic programs in such casually strong language is not constructive.  Ironically, although the New Deal was far less socially progressive than the modern Democratic Party, it was economically more progressive than the party’s mainstream of the past 30 years.  Purdy concedes that the environmental and health and safety goals of legislators of the late New Deal Paradigm and its allies in organized labor “would seem fantastical today” (90).  It is demoralizing to see the gains of the past characterized in disapproving terms.  Here, as elsewhere, the perfect is the enemy of the good just as the utopian is the enemy of the possible, and radicalism is the enemy of real progress.  

Purdy understands history, understands the conservative nature of much of the country and yet still embraces the word “radical” and takes it out for a walk in its various forms throughout his book (he also has an affinity for the vague intensifier, “deep”).  It is unclear how he hopes to sell his “radical” ideas to a mainstream necessary to win over in order to win elections and to enact effective legislation for the environment.  

In this chapter also, the author discusses Aziz Rana and the important observation of “the two faces of American freedom,” that “From the beginning, the country was built on a more radical (that word again) respect for the equal freedom of its insiders—white male citizens—than any other in the world.  At the same time it was among the cruelest in its domination and exploitation of ‘outsiders,’ especially enslaved and indigenous people, women, and those who did not fit its gender and sexual norms.”

There is a lot in this passage, this dichotomy.  Without defending the obscene practices of slavery, the killing and displacing of native peoples, and the racism that remains a living feature of our nation, one could present a plausible interpretation of the history of the United States also characterized by the expansion of the franchise and rights.  Did the Northern states not attempt to correct an imperfect constitution via fratricidal war all of whose causes go back to either slavery or political issues directly related to the spread of slavery and whose conclusion brought about the death of slavery? There is of course the unforgivable national abandonment of Reconstruction, the great lost opportunity, the lost revolution. And there is Jim Crow.

But history is characterized by numerous countervailing currents. Is the U.S. history of the late nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries not in part the story if an ultimately successful organized labor movement (now largely undone by its enemies and abandoned by former allies) and a noble and partially successful civil rights movement? Is our own time not characterized by an ongoing women’s movement and an inspiring Black Lives Matter movement attempting to rid our guilty nation of its continuing ingrained racism?  Does Professor Purdy agree with the claim that the legal status of most women at any time in our history is really “among the cruelest” relative to the treatment of women in traditional cultures in places like Southwest Asia, much of the Middle East, East Africa, and nineteenth-century China?

Purdy goes on to address Theodore Roosevelt, the man most singularly responsible for “America’s best idea,” the creation of more than 230 million acres of parkland (T.R. set aside more than 100 million acres himself: six national parks, 18 national monuments, 51 bird reservations, and 150 national forests), and his unsavory friend, Madison Grant.  Apparently “nature was worth saving for its aristocratic qualities; where there were lacking, the conservationists were indifferent.” (114)

Although there is some truth to this observation in regard to the preservation of spectacular landscapes like Crater Lake, Devil’s Tower, the Grand Canyon, and the Sequoia groves, what about Pelican Island?  What “aristocratic” qualities do white pelicans exhibit and why did T.R. equate killing of them with murder? (Douglas Brinkley, The Wilderness Warrior, 211).  What was so particularly noble about the terns of Tern Island that led him to declared it a preserve?  Although the snowy egret is a beautiful bird, “aristocratic” is not the first adjective the leaps into my mind when I see one.  And yet T.R. made a number of Florida islands into sanctuaries to save them and other birds from the fate of the Carolina parakeet.  The egret population had been decimated by a demand for plumes for women’s hats.  

My reading of T.R.’s conservation efforts is that he saw the wilderness as a thing of great intrinsic importance to be preserved.  In a more personal sense, he saw it as a place in which to test oneself and wished to set aside large portions of wild areas for ordinary Americans to have the kind of experiences that he believed shaped his own character (T.R. may not have had the common touch, but his life among the cowboys in the mid-1880s and the eclectic makeup of the Rough Riders suggests an affinity for ordinary people).  TR’s ethos of preservation probably has as much to do with his own intellectual interests as an amateur naturalist and the nineteenth-century notion “manliness” than it does with class considerations.   

Thus various strata and lineages leading to a modern liberal perspective are tainted as excrescences of a racist, elitist, patriarchal past: the magnificent conservation efforts of T.R. are smeared as “the last redoubt of nobility in a leveling and hybridizing democracy.  They went to the woods to escape humanity.” Why then make a gift of 230,000 million acres of preserved nature to that mass of humanity? Even John Muir is written off as a “romantic naturalist,” a misanthropic purist, and bigot.

The author also dismisses Paul Ehrlich’s very real concerns about overpopulation—the bedrock crisis of environment upon which all others are incumbent—as “misanthropic,” and one is left wondering whether the mere acknowledgement of the fact that humans have become a plague species makes one a misanthrope in Purdy’s estimation. As for the eugenics of Madison Grant and Gifford Pinchot, it is important to note that with the pendulum deep on “nature” side of the “nature versus” debate during the early 1900s, these ideas were frequently supported by progressives of the time including Margaret Sanger and Louis Brandeis, who signed on to the 1927 Holmes opinion in Buck v. Bell. On a side note, the times in which Jed Purdy and I live are far more involved in genetic tampering than the early twentieth-century.  We just don’t call it “eugenics” anymore.

That I have digressed so far as to defend a mixed nature like Theodore Roosevelt illustrates the problem of strong presentism and acontextual history: it risks alienating non-radical progressives who might otherwise be sympathetic.  Chris Hedges makes a similar mistake in America: The Farewell Tour (301).  I am defending T.R.’s conservationist impulses and accomplishments, and yet most of what the author has been trying to get across in this meditation is tainted or lost on me altogether.  It also seems to be bad form to insult those upon whose shoulders one stands, to include the Roosevelts—the most successful progressives and conservationists in U.S. history. Perhaps this point of view, like Roy Scranton’s belief that the Second World War in the South Pacific was genocidal represents the van of a new wave of historiography denouncing everything that has come before as criminal—the apotheosis of the blame game of superior people. By standards of a future time, we may be be found wanting as the people who ruined the entire planet.

Purdy’s moral frankness therefore risks undermining his own program in terms of practical policy.  In the meditation “This Land is Our Land” he perceptively diagnosis the plight of the powerless on the land with real sympathy and empathy.  He must realize that many of the same people harbor resentments about the attention that modern social (as opposed to economic) progressives lavish on identity politics at their expense (see for instance, Jean Bricmont’s “Trump and the Liberal Intelligentsia: a View from Europe,” The Counterpunch, March 30, 2016).  There appears to be a disconnect in Purdy’s understanding, between his sympathy for the dispossessed and its relationship with the radical nationalism he rightfully despises. If we are going to solve the crises of the environment and the economy, we must make the problems and the solutions cognizable and congenial to a great majority of people—make the people a part of the solution, rather than objects of derision.  We must bring people together.

The point, as so many others have noted before, is that when people fling epithets like racist and racism at ordinary people and well intended programs of the past, they have not only ended any possibility of further discussion, but have also written-off these people as irredeemable.  This obviously does not include people who embrace racism, who should be denounced in the strongest possible terms. But do we really want to write-off the impressive historical first step in American economic progressivism, its bold experimentation, and earlier efforts at environmental protection?  In order to address the environment, we will have to close ranks and entirely reconfigure the human relationship with the planet.  And you can’t win people over with name-calling.    

Purdy may well be a foreshadow, a bell weather, for an emerging outlook that will come to the fore as the Millennials rise into positions of academic and political leadership.  Some of the young people I have spoken with in my classes and elsewhere embrace a powerful utopianism that is heavy on the speculative social philosophy and moral judgment and harsh in its historical understanding.  Some are true believers who see things in terms of either/or moral absolutism.  The implication here, to paraphrase George W. Bush, is that you are either with them or against them.  People who disagree with them are to be defeated rather than won over.  If the climate crises turn out to match the worst predictions, we can only assume that these true believes will advocate violence against obstructionists.  From my vantage point this seems more likely than an ideal commonwealth materializing somehow.

As Regards the New Deal, I realize that I have focused unduly in this section on a few lines in which the author likely intended no offense to mainstream progressives with the suggestion of building something like an ideal Green New Deal out of the potential of the original New Deal with all of its warts.  These I have probably blown up beyond all proportion.

Chapter 5 Forward

 “The Value of Life,” is a magnificent lecture, a sermon of reason and humanity.  Here he shines—soars—although, as with reading science fiction, you have to take it in its own terms and suspend disbelief, until he presents his solutions that is.  I am still curious about what this last chapter is a “Forward” to.  Hopefully it is for a future magnum opus in which he spells out the realistic measures of how to implement his commonwealth point by point.

He begins by discussing the false assumptions of capitalist economics and theories of value and price.  Free market capitalism tells us that price can be know and quantified and that it is the result of freedom—the exerting of priorities as choices in a marketplace.  “By contrast, a theory of value would be totalitarian… Freedom and equality cannot tolerate a public theory of value, but price is their favorite child.” (142-143)  It’s a fancy way of describing supply and demand.  Purdy then demolishes this outlook with a power that I have seldom seen before, and it was shocking in the way that the questioning of fundamental assumptions is always shocking when done well.  

To the contrary, Purdy tells us, the economy “does embrace a theory of value and is driving our slow but accelerating disaster for both human and nonhuman life” (the delusional detachment of economists and economics from the natural world is also a point that Edward O. Wilson discusses in The Future of Life, which he coincidentally begins with a letter to Henry David Thoreau, 22-41).  The next three pages outline how the economy imposes value on our lives, what we produce, resources, the living world, and in doing so reveals itself to be a de facto  “totalitarian system of value” whose systems betray the ideals they supposedly uphold, of the equality and freedom of human beings.  They impose a flawed and destructive theory of value.”  (145-146).  Everybody—especially economists and businessmen/women—should read this.  He concludes these moving passages with the encouraging “We have made a world that overmasters us.  Some of us have learned to call it freedom, and others call it a sin.  But the reality is both worse and better than that.  It is the sum of human choices and powers, and those—and only those—can remake it.”  Bravo.

Although his observations equating the values of capitalist economics with the oppression of a totalitarian system are in my opinion overstated, at this point I was engaged and couldn’t wait to read about his solution.  It is the commonwealth.  This is where he loses me in a final sense with “a way of living in which our survival and flourishing do not prey constantly and involuntarily on the lives of others…”  This would involve a “deep reworking of two intertwined infrastructures, the economy and the material technosphere.”  In the next sentence he tells us what it would take to do this.  “If we change those, we will have to change human nature and begin a kind of peace with one anther and the rest of life.”  Oh, is that all?  

That we will have to change the human relationship with nature and ourselves is undeniable.  But for me the “changing of human nature” position is a categorical deal breaker, a kind of moral perpetual motion machine (and human nature is the moral second law of thermodynamics): it might be possible, but it is yet to be proven, and no existing one has ever been built.  As the late Tony Judt observed: “If we have learned anything from the 20th century, we should have grasped that the more perfect the answer, the more terrifying its consequences.” (Ill Fares the Land). 

My reading of history is that the most successful political programs are those designed to accommodate human nature while preserving rights and equality (as the Roosevelts tried to do) and that the most notable failures have been attempts to perfect human nature.  Given that that scientific means to alter human nature may now exist (read: genetics), the danger of well meaning utopianism is even greater than it has ever been.  For a true believer, “utopian” means a plan for a perfect world; for a realist historian, it is an adjective to describe the ideas behind the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany.

The other problem with Purdy’s outlook is its base of moral rationalism.  All programs thus founded—whether it be Marxism or the Chicago School or Law and Economics—ignore the fundamental reality that people are not primarily rational or predominantly good (and morality is located more in the realm of the passions than in reason).  The cut-and-dried tenets of moral-rational programs do violence to a nuanced understanding of the reality of human moral and social complexity.

Yes, predatory capitalism creates disparities, winners, and losers, in a similar way that a biosphere, in addition to symbiosis and the altruism driven by pressures of group selection requires the death and suffering of individuals.  Yes, the greatest American presidents have attempted to abolish or minimize inequality, disparity, abuses of power, and poverty.  Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt attempted to bring the worse abuses of capitalism to heel and to regulate the economy to better serve the public’s interest.  But to equate political equality/inequality to de facto economic parity/disparity is a bridge too far for any realistic political calculus.  It is also all-too easy to write about this and to make this equation into a literary exercise of eloquent utopianism like Thoreau and Emerson, who were content to write and talk about slavery.

Practical questions and objections to Purdy’s commonwealth abound.  Would the egalitarianism and altruism necessary for this plan be voluntary—could one opt-out?  Would such dissent and nonconformity be tolerated?  If not, then what does that say about freedom in the commonwealth?  Would not the commonwealth be just as authoritarian as capitalism?  Where the law is not enforced the law ceases to exist and one is left wondering who would enforce the egalitarianism of the commonwealth and how (see generally the Soviet Union)?  If human equality—equality of intelligence, common sense, ambition and drive, artistic and musical talent, morality (height?)—is not literally true, how would it be enforced?  Stalin had some ideas on this subject.  Would the economy of a “world-renewing ecological commonwealth” in which nurses are “prized comparably to surgeons” and which rewarded “elementary school teachers comparably to professors at research universities” be a managed one or would it sprout naturally from human benevolence (see, again, the Soviet Union)?  What does the history of completely managed economies look like?

People hate to be required to tow the line and there is great differentiation between the ambition and talents among the individuals of any group.  Some people are content with what they have.  Others wish to reach for unknown spheres.  Would they be allowed to do this?  Would they be rewarded proportionally for rarer abilities or a greater contribution or the relative difficult of their efforts?  Would they be forcibly restrained if they acted on their ambition?  Again, what of dissent?  

Small, eccentric communities of likeminded individuals can collect to form societies like the one Purdy proffers.  The Shakers and other religious utopian groups might serve as examples.  But how would you sustain this at a national level in a diverse and populous nation?  Where are the Shakers today?  Moreover such conformity tends to undermine progress.  Would the Amish have ever produce penicillin, the Works of Shakespeare, Special or General Relativity or quantum mechanics, or advanced theories on the environment?  How would the Amish have stood up to Hitler?  How do you scale up a homogenous community like this?  These groups may be dissenters from a national norm, but within their groups they are conformist to the extreme.  Would nonconformity be permitted within the commonwealth?  What if he non-conformists are aggressively against and resist the commonwealth?   

These are the easy questions, and until one devises and equally elegant program for implementing it and then scaling it up to the nations of a world heading for 8 billion people, it is essentially a discussion about either unicorns or more likely, monsters.  It makes no sense to have millions of people conform to a program based on nonexistent standards and a stipulation of perfecting human nature.  Anybody who advocates such a monolithic view to be generalized into a working system that would include all people is not in touch with political reality.    

Purdy’s model is heavy on the altruism, but without specifics about how to implement it and with only the vaguest of economic details (what exactly would “an economy where no one gets their living by degrading someone else, nor by degrading the health of the land or the larger living world” entail as a practical matter?).  How can he be sure that his plan would lead to the “the flourishing of everyone and everything would sustain the flourishing of each person” anymore than Marx could not imagine the worst abuses of Stalin?  What exactly is “living in deep reciprocity as well as deep equality,” and even with a vague assertion of some kind of depth, how would a basis for such a life be put in place?  The world is a complex interplay of good and evil that is impossible to completely sort out.  Very bad things come from well-intended programs (making utopian efforts a nonstarter), and sometimes good things come out of evil efforts.  The only thing we can be sure of is that the commonwealth, if implemented, would not work as intended.    

We should always be skeptical whenever a brilliant theorist, an ideologue with his or her own plan presents a clear, pleasing vision about how a society, the economy, and government should be ordered.  Government may be based on a general outline, but it is always imperfect—an overlay allowing for a naturalistic process of trial and error and adaptation.  The U.S. Constitution was a very impressive document by eighteenth-century standards, but took a war that resulted in the deaths of perhaps a million people to work out its flaws.  There is no utopia, there is only piecemeal social engineering (see Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies). There are no clear and applicable universal standards and there are few things more dangerous than a true believer with clarity of vision.  Even with all of its wonderful propositions, I believe that if Purdy’s program was put in place, it would quickly become something unintended, something oppressive.  As Hemingway writes, “All truly wicked things began as innocent.”  Henry Adams puts the blame on the author of the ideas and actions: “It is always the good men who do the most harm in the world.” (The Civil War, Geoffrey C. Ward, 284). Purdy is like a tragic hero, and his excessive optimism is his flaw. As a superhero for a kind of progressive academic sensibility, his idealism is his kryptonite, and he carries it with him.

In spite of his powerful understanding of relationships of the weak and powerful to the land and his broad and deep understanding of history, the law and legislation, what Purdy does not seem to realize is the relationship of human nature to power.  In human society, power aggregates, and the elite tend to separate themselves from the weak and favor their own and their own interests.  New elites tend to acts just as poorly as the previous landlords.  The elites in all communist nations (e.g. the Soviet Nomenclatura) favored their own over the masses.  A simplistic argument can be made that, even when its applications are generous and altruistic, the whole purpose of having power from those who possess it is to help their own. Rarified visions expressed with grace and refinement will not uproot the realities that underlie politics as an expression of power. Thus Purdy is reminiscent of Noam Chomsky: a brilliant diagnostician without a realistic prescription.

Can the weak be protected?  Yes—the fact that the law is primarily a power enterprise and a tool for the elite to serve their own interests does not mean that it cannot be generous and high-minded, and, if a nation’s elite is wise, it will be generous.  This was also known by early legal positivists like Brooks Adams. (James Herget, American Jurisprudence, 131-134).  The law is an external set of rules; morality is the internal impulses that rise up in us in response to events.  Again, where the law is not enforced, the law ceases to exist (the law requires a written or understood rule, general compliance, and enforcement; if any of these elements are missing, the law is not extant as a practical matter—and the purpose of the law is fundamentally practical).  The question is how the poor, the disenfranchised, the unrepresented minority can use the law to their favor.

The weak in society can be protected by laws and by the enforcement of those laws.  Excluded minorities attain rights by increasing in their political power, by the increase of recognition and sympathy for them in society at large.  They can demand recognition and they can appeal to the morality and sense of decency of the majority, and in a representative system this sometimes works (as with the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and ‘60s).  Shifts in demographics manifested as changes in ratios of power hastened by appeals to morality may succeed.  Moral arguments and appeals to basic fairness can be made to increase sympathy, recognition, and power, but ultimately it is about attaining and wielding power that brings political equality.  French Algerians have made some progress in attaining rights because they now exert some degree of influence; French gypsies have not.   

The twin moral concepts of our system, equality and freedom, have a kind of Cain and Abel relationship: the more freedom, the less equality; the more equality is enforced, the less freedom.  Like the conceptual non-identical twins of price and value, these are siblings that don’t play well together.  They are values fundamentally at odds with each other and their rivalry make governance in this nation a constant balancing act, or rather, they keep the Republic in a precarious state of imbalance, like an inverted pyramid.  The rift between equality and freedom make balancing a necessary condition lest the Republic collapse (similar to the struggle between freedom and security, but that is another story).  Governing in a free society is a constant process of balancing and fine-tuning.     

Conclusion

Does Purdy offer a workable plan?  What exactly is the “commonwealth” as a proposition?  Is it a practical model?  A stopgap or half measure devised for a time beyond the looming environmental catastrophe?  Or is the commonwealth just more of the same: vague idealism in the face of an unfolding catastrophe?  Is it a preface to a post-apocalyptic eschatology—a handy blueprint for the calms after the storm? The world after the Flood?  The bare bones outline handed down from a great prophet from before the collapse?  Is it wishful thinking—the hypothesis of an untestable thought experiment—or the “The World according to Jed Purdy, if He were God”?  Of what good is this?  Until we have details, it is all just as discussion of unicorns.  Until we talk about first steps and how ordinary people will generate wealth and a means to live, I suspect we are talking about building castles in an increasingly carbon-suffused sky. 

Ultimately, Purdy is a chauvinist for the species: a tribalist of a species-wide chosen class—a “we”—that includes all human beings, a universalism within the limits of the human genome.  As with Adam Frank and E. O. Wilson, Purdy believes that all people must come to accept all other people as their brothers and sisters if the world is to be saved.  If this is the only chance we have, then the game is up given the timeframe with which we are dealing.  It is a tenet of mine that when a prescription is necessary but rendered impossible by existing political realities, then it is the political system and not the remedy that is unrealistic.  The caveat is that the prescription would have had to be workable if its implementation were politically feasible.  Even if the nations of the world were positively predisposed to attempt such an audacious undertaking—and the powerful were inclined to voluntarily relinquish their wealth and power or let ordinary people vote it away—there is no reason to assume that the great majority of people would be inclined to such a world order. The unsettling political reality of our time is that most of the populist revolutionary fervor appears to be on the far right.

If the survival of human beings and the planet depend upon a universal mutual sympathy of all humankind suddenly coming to the fore as our dominant characteristic, then I fear we are finished.  If people can be brought together in a shotgun marriage of cooperation by a “Pearl Harbor of the environment,” then perhaps there is a chance.  There is something morally suspect about the idea of imposing an involuntary system on people regardless of its motives. We must be careful not to impose on the world a hypothetical model of commonwealth based on ultra-Enlightenment principles that might not be a part of local traditions. The idea of Jane Jacobs of a world order based on sustainable naturalistic production regions in turn based on local customs, traditions, and natural and human resources seems far more practicable (again, Jane Jacobs, Cities and the Wealth of Nations).  As with Purdy’s model, the question is how to get there from here.

And so I recommend Professor Purdy’s book without agreeing with its prescriptions and in spite of my doubt about the plausibility of his commonwealth as a model.  History is discussion and policy should be based on historical understanding.  In my opinion Purdy has a penetrating understanding of history, but fails to apply its lessons realistically as a basis for his model.  Regardless, I hope that many others will read his book and that its ideas will inspire spirited discussion.

Yes, we have seen Plato’s Republic, Moore’s Utopia, and Marx’s worker’s paradise and all have been nonstarters or failures.  Now we have Purdy’s commonwealth.  We shall see.  (Apologies to Georges Clemenceau). 

I hope that this review has not come across as unduly harsh or a piling-on in opposition to a noble effort with the highest of purposes: to sketch out a basis for a better world.  I have not tried to be mean, and I recommend reading this book.  From what I infer from his writings and speeches, Professor Purdy is an impressive person, a high-minded rational man in an increasingly mean and irrational time.  There are few contemporary commentators whose writing and abilities I admire more.  If I didn’t have respect for him, I would not have taken the time to write this.

1917

Reviewed by Michael F. Duggan

Spoiler Alert: You will likely be able to piece together the plot of this movie from this review.

Yesterday I saw 1917, the blockbuster by Sam Mendes (American Beauty, Road to Perdition, Revolutionary Road) that has walked away with a trenchful of awards, a trend likely to continue through the Oscars.  For anybody with an interest in the Great War, it is a must see.

Above all it is a brilliant technical achievement: a movie that seems to be a single shot done in one take (although knowing this ahead of time proved to be distracting as I watched closely for breaks in the shot).  Because of this, there is a seamless quality to the film that allows one to easily replay the general outline over in the mind. 

The film is conceptually related to Peter Weir’s 1981 Gallipoli (the race-against-time, WWI buddy film), and Saving Private Ryan (the search for an imperiled sibling).  As with Saving Private Ryan (another DreamWorks production) the film embraces a tangible realism that strips away the sepia tone, and the 103 years of First World War historical accretion since the purported events of the story. In terms of appearance, it is the most realistic portrayal of First World War I have seen on the big screen.  While it is as gritty as Private Ryan, it never attempts to achieve the intensity of the famous landing scene at Omaha Beach.

The film appropriates a number of devises and themes from other books and movies.  Without giving away the story, it borrows a plot twist from Mailer’s The Naked and the Dead, and there is an escape scene right out of A Farewell to Arms.  The latter scene—and a plane crash more than reminiscent of the one in Anthony Minghella’s The English Patient—leaves one wondering how they shot these segments.   

The camerawork is especially interesting: a soldier’s-eye-view that makes the range of vision both narrow at points—even claustrophobic—and wide-angle at others.  A scene late in the film where one of the protagonists runs parallel to a trench line as an attack begins is impressive.

There is a single scene that made no sense to me as two British soldiers on a high-priority, time urgent, mission whose success will save an entire regiment, feel compelled to stop to make sure that a deserted French farm is really deserted.  There is also a nighttime chase scene in a ruined French town that is right out of a nightmare.   

My only other criticism is that at times the front seems too quiet and depopulated, but then this was the period in 1917 when the Germans withdrawn from their front line trenches to occupy the Hindenburg Line (Siegfriedstellung). As with Apocalypse Now, the film’s greatest star power—Colin Firth and Benedict Cumberbatch—is limited to brief scenes that bookend the action.  In a way this is a strength and the film centers around two English Tommies, Lance Corporals Tom Blake and Will Schofield played pitch-perfect by Dean-Charles Chapmen (Game of Thrones) and George MacKay.  These two actors look the part of the quintessential British every men who fought and died—the “lions led by donkeys,” the latter of whom are appropriately played by big names.  The rest of the trappings and material culture of the First World War are causal, accurate, and ubiquitous (even down to the mean and rough-hewn depictions of British trenches relative to the cleaner and perhaps overengineered German trenches).

Overall it is a terrific film, perhaps a great movie, and, with all of the impressive technical aspects, the question is the degree to which the story itself draws you in (arts is even more about feeling than it is about technical mastery).  Although like life itself, it may be a film worth seeing once, and, unlike most other movies I like, I am not sure I will watch this one over and over again.  Time will tell.  

On Books, Personal Libraries, and the Evaluation of Ideas

By Michael F. Duggan

You can tell a lot about a person by their library; my library consists of several thousand books in no particular order.

A few days ago I had a discussion with some friends on the importance of books and personal libraries and why people collect books. I have several thousand books of my own because I am a generalist by nature and there are a number of areas on which I write. If I see an important work that I might possibly need to consult/refer to, I will buy it. This obviously has a problematic side; books take up space, and buying them is probably the closest thing I have to an actual addition (which is comparatively minor and less constantly distracting than the”new heroin”/”new nicotine” that are the smart technologies of our time).

But the buying and not buying of books has even deeper social/cultural/historical/political/policy implications. I would argue that young people today are on balance among the most intelligent who have ever lived. I have also sensed that because accessing raw, non-contextual information is so absurdly easy these days because of the Internet and the portable toys we use to interact with it, that some of those among the most recent generation or two have comparatively little understanding of the historical lineages and connections–the historical-conceptual context–between ideas and the people who devised/discovered them.

When research involved actually going to libraries and archives, comparatively few people did it. Now that it is ridiculously easy it is also trendy, but many of the “kids these days” have little understanding about how to evaluate the disembodied ideas and information they access. The Internet is a Wild West in which true ideas are frequently intermixed with untrue, partially true, narrowly or technically true-but-misleading, distorted/propagandistic, and incomplete information. As with the Western printing revolution of 500 years ago, the information revolution brings along with its many benefits the possibility of unprecedented social instability and conflict. This blog is a latter day incarnation of a small seventeenth or eighteenth-century press, its posts are pamphlets and broadsides .

As recently as a couple of decades ago, intelligent young people took pride in their voluminous personal collections. They knew the ideas and authors and their connections, interrelations, histories, pre-histories, subtleties, flaws and merits, weaknesses and strengths. They knew the ideas that they believed in and could back up their views with contextual understanding and evaluation. Some of this obviously still exists (especially among those of us who are over 40; for for any bibliophile with a local Friends of the Library, we are living is a Golden Age of low-cost, high-quality texts), but I believe that it is increasingly less common among the young. This is dangerous, especially as regards policy, which should be based more upon a broad and deep historical understanding of ideas than on pure theories and unselfcritical ideology.

For example, some young people I know from the courses I have taught, know more about the climate crises and the pitfalls of neoliberal globalization than most people of my own generation. Yet when you press them on solutions however, they may start rhapsodizing about the virtues of global Marxism and spontaneous, bottom-up plebiscite world socialism. When you reply “no, really, what’s your solution?” they double-down on models that either have never existed, have long records of trial and failure, or whose closest real-world analogs have never come close to working and have frequently devolved into totalitarian monstrosities.

I’m not sure what the answer is or even if there is a workable solution. The brave new world is here and you cannot unring a bell. Although we exist in the cognitive world and interact in the ideational world of which the cyber world is a hybrid, subset, multiplier, and accelerant, human beings evolved, interact, and function in the physical world. I hope that thoughtful young will appreciate the importance of physical books in the real world. Ideas are valuable and dangerous things, and some of the most pernicious concepts may also be among the most appealing on their face, the most seductive. In order for us to accentuate their value while minimizing their danger, we must know their histories and linkages. In my experience this is most effectively accomplished through the compiling of physical collections of books in addition to discussion with other people and in conjunction with the powerful technologies of recent decades. We must know how to evaluate ideas before we accept or reject them.

It seems increasingly likely that the task of saving the world from ourselves will fall on the shoulders of the current and rising generations of young people–we are all counting on them. Let us hope that they will avail themselves of all of the tools and understanding in order to do the best job possible.

Setting the Record Straight: Stephen F. Cohen’s “War with Russia?”

Stephen F. Cohen, War With Russia?  From Putin & Ukraine to Trump & Russiagate, New York: Skyhorse Publications, Inc., 2019.  225 pages.

Reviewed by Michael F. Duggan

With all of the partisan theatrics and bad media coverage of “Russiagate” it is difficult to know what the true state of U.S.-Russian relations is.  One can infer that it is not good, but just how bad is it and what are the causes of its deterioration?  To answer these and related questions, it is useful to get back to basics, to see what the Americans who know the most about Russia are saying about U.S.-Russian relations as a backdrop relative to the dangerous hyperbole we see in the news every day.  

There was a time when a foreign policy outlook advocating détente was considered a mature, bipartisan position in this country.  Times have changed.  Today, when a (perhaps the) leading scholar of Russian studies and history—an emeritus professor at Princeton and New York University and long-term network media Russia expert—calls for parity and respect in our dealings with Russia and simple accuracy in media coverage, he is called “the most controversial Russia expert in America today” as well as some juvenile cheap shots like “a dupe” and “toady.”

The fact that Stephen Cohen is considered by some to be the most controversial Russia expert in the United States says far more about the times than it does of Cohen’s perspective. Getting history right matters and the unprofessional name-calling and unselfcritical media interpretations of U.S.-Russia affairs are not accidental.  They amount to a kind of vulgar, propagandistic perspective that is well beyond the pall when one considers that getting history wrong can itself bring dire consequences. 

Consider for example that in the nineteenth-century Germany led the world in the philosophy, theory, and practice of academic history.  Universities in the United States sent their most promising students of history—men like Henry Adams, William Lothrop Motley, and Francis Parkman—to Germany to learn the newest ideas in historiography.  And yet the outlooks of Hegel, von Ranke, and Treitschke were problematic—mistaken—and with the help of other nations and their geopolitical miscalculations, helped launch the world into the bloodiest period of its history.

Consider also that George F. Kennan, with a sensible historical perspective, a deep understanding of his subject—Russia—and a realistic view of Soviet Marxist-Leninism and human nature, devised a grand strategy that ended the (first) Cold War more or less on schedule even after considerable modification, tampering, and outright vandalism of his idea by lesser men.  Even with such insight and understanding, luck played a major part.

Today, by contrast, it appears that the United States in its dealing with Russia is acting on an incorrect historical model—an equal and opposite eschatology (relative to Marxist-Leninism) of its own—one based on aggressive neo-liberal and neo-conservative policies, that have led us back into something like a new and potentially even more dangerous cold war.  One senses that Professor Cohen just wants to get history and news coverage right.  As we can see from the tragic history of the twentieth-century, the cost of getting it wrong is too high.

Premises

Depending on how you count them, War with Russia? is either the ninth or tenth book by Stephen Cohen (some of which he edited, co-edited, or co-authored), and it reads somewhat differently from much of his academic works.  Taken from radio broadcasts covering about four-and-a-half years from August 2014 to August 2018, the book is essentially a sequential collection of short, punchy essays that chronicle the unfolding of what he calls (perhaps a little too often) the “new Cold War”—something he has seen coming since the 1990s.  It is arranged in four chronological parts: Part I: The New Cold War Erupts 2014-2015, Part II: U.S. Follies and Media Malpractice 2016, Part III: Unprecedented Danger 2017, and Part IV: War With Russia?

His primary points are:

  • The United States and Russia are now engaged in a new Cold War that is even more dangerous than the first.  It is primarily the result of American triumphalism and its embracing of internal Russian elements that plundered the nation under Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s.  He also blames the provocative expansion of NATO far into the Russian sphere of influence and the demonization of Vladimir Putin and all things Russian.
  • Both American political parties and the mainstream press are engaging in a latter-day version of McCarthyism in which voices that dissent from the orthodox narrative condemning Russia and its president are maligned. Therefore, unlike the first Cold War, there is no robust multi-sided debate about Russia today—the media has completely abdicated on this point—and those who oppose the monolithic American position are shouted down, even by people who call themselves liberals and who for traditionally progressive outlets like the New Republic, The New York Times and The Washington Post.
  • The mainstream reporting on Russia therefore is highly inaccurate and egregiously bad, one-sided, and shrill.  Far from embracing the best traditions of investigative journalism and a fee press, coverage of Russia is characterized by lockstep conformity and a lazy acceptance of an unquestioned orthodoxy.
  • The United States, whose leaders negotiated with every Soviet leader during the Cold War, has abandoned the idea of parity in its negotiations with Russia and has given up on the idea of détente and the assumption that the other side has its own sphere of influence and legitimate regional interests.  Instead the U.S. has preferred to treat Russia disrespectfully as a pathetic, defeated country.
  • In short, the mainstream media has embraced the positions of U.S. intelligence agencies.
  • What has become known as “Russiagate” can be more accurately described as “Intelgate” and is the product of U.S. intelligence agencies.

The essays are as varied as the events of the period 2014-2018 and can be read individually or sequentially thus allowing the reader to understand how events unfolded in the order they happened.  Cohen’s fluency in Russian history and culture is humbling in terms of details, depth of understanding, and broadness of sweep.  Although certain themes do recur throughout—as he has noted himself, there is some unavoidable redundancy—the book holds together as an unfolding episodic interpretation of events during this period. 

The book is well-written and reads close to the spoken language—and although Cohen writes with clarity—this one is likely aimed at a broader audience and reads faster than previous books like The Failed Crusade and Soviet Fates and Lost Alternatives.  It is a threadbare tenet of conventional wisdom that news is “the first edition of history,” and when reading Cohen, one gets the feeling that he is writing a more settled interpretation of events as they happen.  One does not have to agree with all of his points to realize the importance of his overall point of view, his diagnoses, and prescriptions (in a recent interview, his wife, Katrina vanden Heuven, editor of The Nation, and Dan Rather dissented on a number of Cohen’s points (as do I)).

In terms of niche, Cohen may not be completely unique as the rational man as heretical expert standing against the tide and armed only with the truth in an effort to set the record straight.  But his stature as a scholar and journalist make him a Napoleonic figure on most issues regarding modern Russia and American relations with it.  Despite continuing efforts to malign or marginalize him, his point of view cannot be dismissed.  In some respects he is analogous to Alfred McCoy in regard to China (In the Shadows of the American Century) and Diana Johnston on the Balkans wars of the 1990s (Fool’s Crusade), but in some ways his timbre more of  traditional centralist.  It is the politics of our day that has made him seem like a radical (in this sense, he may be akin to Andrew Bacevich, who describes himself as a traditional conservative).  All of these commentators provide precious alternatives of in-depth historical understanding to the unfounded clichés and bubbles and misreported accounts by the corporate media.

Adopting a Mature Stance toward Russia

Why should the United States adopt a more conciliatory stance toward Russia?  For me the answer is simple: policy is about the pursuit of national interest and not the lording of moral superiority over others.  It is about trying to achieve the optimal over the maximal.  Quite simply (to paraphrase George Kennan on another topic) there is no reason why as a mature nation we cannot deal with Russia maturely as neither friend nor foe but as an important nation with its own legitimate interests and sphere of interest.  Why not treat them with the same dispassion with which we treat other major countries like Germany and Japan?  In other words we should improve relations with Russia because is makes no sense to antagonize them and because both the United States and Russia still have thousands of nuclear weapons pointed at each other on a hair-trigger, first strike basis (See Daniel Ellsberg, The Doomsday Machine, and review of it in this blog). 

To understand the dangers of treating a nation harshly after a bitter struggle one need only compare the results of Versailles with those of the Marshall Plan and the rebuilding of Japan.  Such a comparison underscores the folly of our present course.  Now add nuclear weapons to the equation.  Our baffling vilification of Russia is also driving it closer to China at a time when the latter is attempting to devise a Eurasian economic sphere that would undermine U.S. economic standing in the world possibly allowing the Yuan to supplant the Dollar as the world reserve currency.

Cohen believes that the period we are now in is at least as perilous as the most dangerous periods of the Cold War, a new low.  He sees the recent and ongoing situations in Georgia, Syria, and Ukraine collectively as the Cuban Missile Crisis-times-three.  This may or may not be an overstatement or an imperfect equation; the Cuban Crisis was a rapidly-evolving direct confrontation characterized by poor communication between the U.S. and the USSR, and an American president give horrible advice by those around him.  But when taken as a historical whole, U.S. policy toward Russia since 1991 has been unnecessarily provocative—even confrontational—and one quickly realizes the possibility that any of these crises could have easily turned into a direct confrontation very quickly.  If this is Cohen’s point, then he is probably right. And now another unnecessary crisis potentially looms with Russian ally, Iran.

As with the original Cold War, the danger today lays both in the possibility of accident and miscalculation: in mistaking boilerplate rhetoric and saber rattling (if you will excuse the mixed metaphor) for genuine brinksmanship and escalation and vise-versa (e.g. was the positioning of heavy U.S. weapons in Poland and some of the Baltic nations an escalation or mere symbolism, and how do the Russians see it?  How would the United States regard an equal and opposite move by the Russian?).  Policy makers in this nation and in Europe must realize that the Russia—like any old and proud nation—can only be pushed so far.  What we might take to be just another round NATO expansion, might be a final straw to them.  Cohen, like the rest of us, presumably does not know about the existence or the extent of back channels and secret diplomacy.

Americans may choose to live in a fool’s paradise and assume that there is always constructive communication and quiet and cooperative diplomacy between the U.S. and Russia that ameliorates all of the bellicose public posturing.  But even if this is true, it is scant comfort to those of us who believe that history is often characterized by mistakes and screw ups.  On this point, one would do well to research the origins of the informal military acronyms SNAFU and FUBAR.

When I spoke to friends about the obvious danger of American and Russian combat aircraft sharing the same airspace to bomb different sides of the civil war in Syria a few years ago, I was assured of the close communication and cooperation between U.S. and Russian planners.  I was skeptical then and am still not felicitous about the coordination of opposing military operations between the backers of proxies in a vicious civil war.  My reading of history is that accidents happen—especially in war.  Friendly fire is vastly under reported in every conflict and incidents like the bombing of U.S. forces by American planes during Operation Cobra during the summer of 1944, or the airborne units shot down by Americans in Italy the year before may serve as cautionary example. 

With the added element of relying on the cooperation of an adversary in a hot war that could easily turn into a war between nuclear powers, it becomes clear that we are playing with Promethean fire regardless of precautions.  As I have noted before, in such cases, the potential exists for an August 1914 scenario with October 1962 (+57) technology and capacity for destruction.  As a frustrated John Kennedy observed when a U-2 strayed far into Soviet airspace at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis “[t]here is always some son-of-a-bitch that does not get the word.”  During the same crisis, U.S. destroyers rolled “practice” depth charges on nuclear-armed Soviet submarines.

History

In order to understand Russian behavior in recent years, I think those of us in this country should ask ourselves how we would feel if the U.S. had “lost” the Cold War and then a revitalized USSR began to act in an expansionist manner.  

For instance, how would the United States respond if the Soviet Union broke a vow not to move “one inch” (as Cohen has stated) into the American regional sphere of influence and then pushed the Warsaw Pact deep into Canada, supported extremist anti-US forces there in a successful effort to overthrow a democratically-elected, pro-U.S. government in Ottawa?  The mainstream media rightfully despises the thugs that showed up at Charlottesville two summers ago, yet is curiously silent about our Ukrainian “allies”—the most extreme of whom (including members of the Svoboda party) are more-or-less politically identical to them.

How would people in this country feel if after 1991 the USSR treated the United States as a defeated, second-rate nation, supported high-level bureaucrats (in Russia the Nomenclatura) as they plundered Federal pension funds and allied themselves with other internal elements that robbed our nation?  Professor Cohen has written extensively about the post-Cold War era —a period that has transitioned from news into history.  For a scholarly overview of the period from the 1980s until 2012, see: Failed Crusade, America and the Tragedy of Post-Communist Russia [2000], and Soviet Fates and Lost Alternatives, From Stalinism to the New Cold War [2009, 2011].

“A Strategic Blunder of Proportionally Epic Proportions”: The Expansion of NATO

The great misjudgment in American policy toward Russia begins late in the George Herbert Walker Bush Administration—Bush, who masterfully ended the Cold War only to start crowing about “victory” as the 1992 election loomed into sight—and then took off under Bill Clinton with a clean break from the past and the getting away from an assumption of parity in our dealings with Russia.  Emblematic of the lack of sensitivity shown by the U.S. toward Russia was the (ongoing) expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization farther and farther from the North Atlantic. 

In 1990 Germany was reunited on terms aligning it with West.  Beginning with the Clinton administration, NATO has expanded eastward, initially into the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland (1999).  Even though these are Central European nations that have frequently looked to the West (Poland is Catholic rather than Orthodox and uses the Roman rather than Cyrillic alphabet), some critics noted that even this violation of earlier assurances looked like Western expansionism.  As George Kennan, observed after President Clinton announced this initial expansion: “[t]he deep commitment of our government to press the expansion of NATO right up to the Russian border is the greatest mistake of the entire post-Cold War era” and “a strategic blunder of potentially epic proportions.”

In 2004 Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined NATO.  In 2009 Albania and Croatia joined.  In 2017 it was Montenegro.  Although it is difficult to imagine a U.S. military commander saying something like “You don’t want to go into an all-out war with Russia without Montenegro on your side,” the inclusion of Eastern European nations in NATO actually makes war with Russia more likely, and now the U.S. is has a treaty obligation to defend them, even if it leads to a nuclear war.  

Russian Psychology and History

What many casual observers in the United States apparently fail to understand about Russia is that it has the geographical qualities of a massive land empire (Cohen takes the “land empire” thesis to task in Soviet Fates) and is distrustful of outsiders and more concerned with buffer zones than with far flung expansion and conquest. In my opinion, an understanding of Russia’s tragic history of foreign invasion brings the impetus of this outlook into sharper focus. It also underscores why the expansion of NATO far into the Russian sphere of influence is so dangerous.

Media “Malpractice”

Cohen also takes to task the jaw-dropping hyperbole and outright falsehoods perpetuated by the mainstream media.  On this point he is a virtual voice in the wilderness and encourages others to also call out often-repeated lies and exaggerations.  The media’s getting it wrong goes beyond laziness, error, and even cynicism into what he calls “malpractice.” This malpractice includes the unhistorical characterization of the Russian “invasion” of Crimea (Crimea has long been an official or de facto part of Russia—how does a nation “invade” a region where it has already been for more than a century-and-a-half and where perhaps 80% of the people speak the language of the “invader”?). 

Perhaps the most notable misinformation perpetuated by the press are the often personal smears against Putin himself (who supported the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and gave President Obama face-saving cover to walk back his “red line” rhetoric about Syria).  Cohen believes that recent characterizations of Putin are on balance more severe than mainstream depictions of any of the Soviet leaders during Cold War. 

Charges of Hitlerian despotism leveled against Putin are especially perplexing when one considers that Soviet Russia lost 25-27 million people fighting Nazi Germany and the fact that the war was mostly fought and won on the Eastern Front.  Any equation of Putin with Hitler is therefore foolish, inaccurate, and dangerous; Hitler was a phobic psychopath and Nazi Germany was a rogue state with designs of ethic warfare, the extermination of entire peoples, continental conquest, and world domination (and the subtext of comparing a foreign leader to Hitler, is that he cannot remain in power, even if it takes world war to remove him).

Putin by contrast fits in well with the historical model of the Russian leader as strongman/woman (e.g. Ivan, Peter, Catherine). If the media must compare him imperfectly/superficially to a German leader, a more fitting analog would be to a consolidator and practitioner of realpolitik like Bismarck, rather than a madman like Hitler.  Like Bismarck, Putin is an unsentimental hardball realist and consolidationist with a good understanding of his nation’s vital interests (there are obvious differences as well). 

Is Putin the sensitive soul into whose eyes George W. Bush gazed wistfully?  No.  But that is not the point.  If his past behavior is any indication, Putin is a national leader with whom we can do business, and beyond a certain point will not be pushed.  Thus the danger Cohen sees in our recent policy toward Russia.  And given Soviet losses during the Second World War, and the fact that an estimated seven out of ten Wehrmacht solders who died in combat were killed by Soviet forces, ad hominen comparisons to Hitler are not only in extreme bad taste, but but are likely to poison any hope for meaningful future dialog.

One need only read the prologue of the book, “The Putin Spector: Who He is Not” and the first chapter, an essay dated August 27, 2014 titled “Patriotic Heresy vs. Cold War: to get a fair sample of mainstream “Fallacy” versus Cohen’s scholarly “Fact” about the Russian president.

“Russiagate” vs. “Intelgate”

Cohen’s most controversial position is his assertion that what the media and political parities have characterized as “Russiagate” is really “Intelgate,” that the scandal alleging collusion with Russia and its interference with the 2016 U.S. elections was in fact a conspiracy hatched and pulled off by U.S. agencies.  On this point I am agnostic; his claim seems unlikely and conspiratorial, but then we are living in strange times.  Without giving the story away—an account Cohen explains in detail—I will simply recommend reading the book and judging for oneself.

I will only add that the Intelgate thesis is, in my opinion, intriguing and suggestive but unproved.  At the very least, Cohen’s positing of this theory is a striking and singular instance of an important scholar going out on a limb and possibly staking his reputation on a single claim, even if one does not agree with it.  But even if this theory proves to be “a bridge too far” beyond the other premises of this book, the rest of it holds up well with or without it and I think Cohen’s overarching interpretation about U.S.-Russia relations and their recent mutual history is mostly correct.  

Solutions: Parity and Détente

So what are the solutions posited by a man who calls himself a “national security patriot” and a “patriotic heretic” in regard to tensions of a new cold war?  By historical standards—i.e. by the standards of the first Cold War—they are the most reasonable, the most conventional imaginable.  By the standards of the locked-brain ideology of the Washington Consensus, they are radical, scandalous, and perhaps even amounting to a kind of appeasement: the embracing of détente based on parity and respect over the baffling and ill-considered provocation that has led the two countries into a new cold war that could go hot in the worst possible way at a moment’s notice.  As for loaded epithets like “appeasement,” I would contended that a moderate and rational approach to a potentially dangerous nation from a position of strength—the position of a nation with a one trillion-dollar military backed by thousands of nuclear weapons—could be better characterized as measured maturity in the interest of maintaining peace.  Besides, what is the reasonable alternative? 

Cohen’s solutions are straightforward: the United States does not have to be allies or enemies with Russia, but it should deal with them productively and for mutual benefit via détente, as we did in negotiations with communist leader between the 1950s and the end of the Cold War (if we were willing to talk to communists, why not to Putin?).  We should deal with them fairly and evenly like we would any other nation.

Cohen’s point of view might be akin to that of de Tocqueville in recognizing that, due to their size, geography, history, and national interests, the United States and Russia will never be close friends.  His view is like that of Kennan, that as a mature nation we should strike a balance with them as neither allies nor enemies, a balance that from our perspective recognizes that they (like the U.S.) are entitled to a sphere of influence (an unfortunate fact that will persist as long as there are large and powerful nations). 

There is certainly a long and well-documented set of historical precedents for fair dealing with Russia, even if we regarded their system to be a bad one in terms of rights and representation.  As with Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and post-Reykjavik Reagan, and the first president Bush prior to the summer of 1991, Cohen advocates a strategy of live-and-let-live détente based on an assumption of parity and mutual legitimate interests.  But even a policy of mutual accommodation does not guarantee peace—there were numerous times when the first Cold War almost turned hot—and some historians are now saying that in retrospect the fact that the world survived the first great U.S.-Russian struggle is nothing short of miraculous.

There appears to be no agenda to this book other than to set things straight in the name of accurate reporting and policy that promises a less dangerous course.  Cohen seems to be a man dedicated to the truth, a clear sighted person in an age of The Emperor’s New Clothes who sees clearly when others are content to not see at all.

I recommend Cohen’s new book, War with Russia?.  It reads quickly and can be read profitably in conjunction with his academic writing on Russia, especially Soviet Fates and Lost Alternatives (on the post-Cold War period and the subsequent events leading to the new Cold War).  The overall message appears to be that the unnecessary ratcheting-up of tensions by heavy-handed policy and media misrepresentation risks transforming the new cold war into a hot war between major powers that would likely turn nuclear.  He might have a point.

For discussions with the author about his new book, see the links below.

John Paul Stevens: The Last Maverick

By Michael F. Duggan

It is a favorite theme of this blog: although we live in a time of ideological division, there is an unspoken consensus in the Establishment left, right, and “center.” We live in a time that despises mavericks in public office, and now the last maverick of the Third Branch is gone. If there were two ways of seeing a case or a constitutional question, Stevens would think of a third, fourth, and fifth way that nobody had ever thought of before. And then he would convince others he was right.

A native of Chicago, he witnessed at the age of twelve, Babe Ruth’s “Called Shot” home run, and had the framed scorecard to prove it. Stevens attended the University of Chicago and majored in English. One of his professors was Norman Maclean, who would got on to write A River Runs Through It.

At the urging of the university’s dean, Stevens entered the United States Navy the day before the Pearl Harbor attack. He would serve in the communications intelligence section (Op-20-G), and received the Bronze Star for his contribution. When he retired from public service in 2010, he was one of the last WWII veterans working for the U.S. Government (the only others that I know of who were still serving at the time of his retirement were representatives Ron Dingell and Ralph Hall, and Senators Daniel Inouye, Daniel Kahikina, and Frank Lautenberg).

After the war he attended the Northwestern University Law School on the G.I. Bill where he achieved the highest GPA in the school’s history. He clerked for Supreme Court Justice Wiley Rutledge during the October 1947 Term. He went on to a successful legal practice and was appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in 1970. He married twice and had four children.

In late 1975 Stevens was nominated by President Ford to fill the Supreme Court seat vacated by the retirement of William O. Douglas (the seat previously occupied by Louis Brandeis). Relative to the progressives of the Warren and early Burger Courts (Warren, Black, Douglas, Brennan, Marshall), he was regarded to be a moderate. By the time he retired 34 years, 192 days later, he was the leader of what was by then seen as the Court’s progressive wing (it is likely that Stevens did not change so much as did the American political landscape and perceptions of the liberal-conservative spectrum).

At the age of 90, he was the second oldest Justice to retire from the High Court’s bench, and could have easily beaten the record held by Oliver Wendell Holmes, who had retired when a few months older. He wrote three books over the age of 90. His autobiography was issued only a month or two ago. He was the third longest-serving justice in U.S. history after his predecessor, William O. Douglas, and Stephen Field.

Stevens brought to oral argument a keen analytical mind, a deep and profound humanity, good humor, unfailing courtesy, and a perennial bow tie. A progressive Republican, his death marks the extinction of a noble political genera. He is one of those rare people whose passing makes the world seem less rational. It was demonstrably better with him in it and seems less hopeful without him. Although it is still early, and although he was in many respects a standalone figure, his historical reputation is secure and it is safe to call him a great jurist. Without a doubt, he led a great life and we are all better off because of him.