After the Riot: Green Zones within Green Zones

By Michael F. Duggan

The first thing you noticed was the desolation of the place.  No more than 20 people got off of the train at the long platform at Union Station where a year ago hundreds would have detrained.  It was before 7:00 and mostly dark.

The station was well-lit and more alive than I expected, so strange, so unchanged since last March.  The virus had shut down the routine life, and for ten months I had driven to work.  But The Hill was now buttoned-down. Major arteries were blocked off making driving difficult, and I was back on the commuter train.  A half-dozen people crossed the great airless concourse of the station at 7:04.  Outside under the arches facing south to the Capitol were the perennial homeless, restless and unmasked in a pandemic.

There were clouds on the east horizon and the sunrise was more vivid than usual, and the light of dawn reflected in the windows of office buildings along North Capitol Street to the west of the station’s plaza.  There were no cars for blocks in either direction on Massachusetts Avenue at Columbus Circle.  The crosswalk too was deserted and terminated at at the base of nine-foot-high fence-barricades, and I entered the green zone at First Street, NE. The barricades were topped with razor wire.

3 Revisions

The checkpoint was manned by police flanked by solders of the Guard. I recognized the insignia of the Twenty-eighth “Keystone” Division and the yin-yang shoulder patches of Twenty-ninth “Blue and Gray” Division—heirs to the men who went in with the first wave on Omaha Beach.  There were other patches I did not recognize.  You just presented your ID and named your building, and the police officer let you in. Two MTVs were parked back-to-back but unaligned across First Street just below Massachusetts blocking all but a single lane of traffic between them.  But few cars came and in spite of the sunrise it did not feel like rush hour.

Walking up The Hill, there were many more Guardsmen and women than pedestrians: young people with M4s, some of whom nodded and called me “sir” as I passed.  Constitution Avenue was blocked off from traffic below the Hill and there were no other people as I crossed adjacent to the Capitol.  As I passed the Supreme Court I could see that both it and the Capitol grounds were enclosed behind the high fence-barricades and concertina wire—green zones within green zones.  I was alone outside of this internal line of barricades and kept walking.

All was quiet.  And I went into my building, turned on my computer and drank my coffee and went to work.

January 15, 2021

The Confederate Bikini

By Michael F. Duggan

I wrote the account below a few years ago during one of the occasional dustups involving Confederate flags and related symbolism. Given the social and political rifts that remain in this country, I think it is as topical as ever.  It has nothing to do with realism or policy, and I hope that the satirical tone will not distract from the usually serious timbre of this blog. All of the events depicted are true.  

Warning: Mildly indelicate/regressive (frankly childish) humor to follow.

The Confederates have finally taken Gettysburg. 

With the week off and far too many errands to reasonably accomplish, I took the day and went to the small Pennsylvania town. It was a glorious afternoon, and the battlefield was awash in the full splendor of August flora—blood red cardinal flowers between Plum Run and Houck’s Ridge, asters throughout.  Then I went into the town.

Without getting into constitutional or legal issues, let me just say that the tourist area and the road leading into it were a bit of a jolt.  It ranged from the disappointing (e.g. Pennsylvania farmhouses flying the Battle Flag of the Army of Northern Virginia) to the brazenly in-your-face (e.g. a sign on a shop door reading “Don’t criticize what you can’t understand.” “Really?” I thought, “unreconstructed, pro-Confederate types quoting Bob Dylan?  How about a few lines from Oxford Town”?).  In an attempt to please everybody, Gettysburg has long catered to both “sides.”  But now the northern town and site of the Union’s greatest victory seems to have taken on a distinctly Southern twang.

In one sutler store, I interloped (feinting interest in various historical reproduction items) on a fifteen-minute lecture as a man, who I assume was the storeowner, enlightened two earnest out-of-towners on the history of the Battle Flag of the Army of Northern Virginia (and then on every other banner he believed gave liberals moral discomfort) in excruciating detail.

He explained: “First they [meddling liberals] came for the Confederate flag.  Now they are coming for the MIA and Tea Party flags.” He then went into the eighteenth-century origins of the latter with equally stultifying minutia.    

“Why would they do that?” asked one of his audience members with innocent disappointment.     

“One word,” he replied, “Political. Correctness.”    

One word?” I thought, looking up with a grimace bordering on an audible scoff (causing me to fumble the Made-in-India knockoff of a Model 1853 Enfield socket bayonet I had been examining). This blew my cover as a disinterested bystander. The store owner was on to me like gray on Robert E. Lee, and, like Marse Robert heading for the Potomac after Pickett’s Charge, I beat a hasty retreat.

But the apex of this anachronistic adventure into the absurd was the “Confederate Bikini”(TM?) prominently displayed on a manikin in another storefront window.  Suffice it to say that this item—perhaps evoking the likes of Daisy Duke in a defiant “Hell no!” mood—was not in the drab gray or butternut of a Confederate uniform, but rather was comprised of Confederate Flags strategically positioned to hold the high ground and bottomland alike.  Somehow it just didn’t seem like a solemn celebration of “heritage” to say nothing of its limited usefulness for reenactors; it is well documented that comparatively few Confederate soldiers actually wore bikinis on campaign, much less in combat.

Driving home I thought to myself: what would be a good sales pitch or catchphrase to market such an unusual and patently inoffensive piece of apparel?  (Regressive humor about to start)  Here are a few I came up with (feel free to come up with your own):

1). Now you can cover your “Southern regions” with your “heritage”!

2). This thong has nothing to do with slavery (but it is suggestive of a cleft in the Union).

3). How do you like these “Little Round Tops”?

4). Hell no, I’ll never forget… the sunscreen.

5). Betcha can’t “look away, look away, look away…”

I’m sure that one could come up with others about “waxing” nostalgic for The Lost Cause, “Mason-Dixon” tan lines, and how “the South will rise again,” but I will leave these to the imaginations of others.  

Apologies for any bruised sensibilities, North or South, left or right (and bottom to top).

2020, Losses

By Michael F. Duggan

On December 10, 2020, the number of Americans who had died of COVID-19 surpassed the number of United States combat deaths in the Second World War (given as 291,557). Sometime in January we will surpass U.S. deaths from all causes in World War II (405,399). In spite of news stories about overrun ICU wards and people who have lost relatives, there is not an overwhelming sense loss among many of our people. Some defiant Americans still think that the pandemic is a hoax or else real but greatly exaggerated, a bad flu season. Even with social media memes taking shots at 2020—as if a year was a person to be insulted or shamed—it just doesn’t feel like we are living in a nation that has lost more than one-third of a million people in ten months. We are still met with happy, reassuring commercials when we turn on the television. At worst we see sympathetic pitchmen/women referencing “these difficult times” and the “new normal.”

And then there is the official response. Even with the impressive development of several effective vaccines, and now the massive logistical efforts to distribute them, there is still no universal national mobilization like that of the war years. Lacking sufficient commonsense and a national will to defeat the virus through minor sacrifices (we are being asked to wear a mask in public after all and not to die on the beaches of an island in the South Pacific) and by altering our behavior, we must rely now on medical technology to save us. New Zealand lost 25 people to the virus without a vaccine. Taiwan lost 7. With almost 20 million infections and more than 340,000 deaths in this country, the Great Abdication continues.

Many of us feel the pandemic as a menacing omnipresence lingering unseen in the air we breath. We know its scale and scope as abstractions and from news stories with nurses weeping for people who died in their arms that day, and the day before, and the day before that. But empathizing with someone who has been punched in the stomach is not the same as being punched yourself. Unless you are a front line medical professional or know someone who died of COVID-19, it is hard to personalize the all-pervasive sense of loss felt by an increasing number of Americans. The PBS News Hour has made an admirable effort to spotlight ordinary people who have died and their families.

When all COVID and non-COVID deaths are tallied, 2020 turns out to be a dour year for the Mass Culture. With the deaths of Olivia De Havilland and Kirk Douglas, a final door seems to have closed on the Golden Age of Hollywood. Sports and entertainment took heavy hits with the deaths of Wilford Brimley, Lou Brock, Kobe Bryant, Pierre Cardin, Sean Connery, Robert Conrad, Charley Daniels, Brian Dennehy, Whitey Ford, Buck Henry, Ian Holm, James Lipton, Rebecca Luker, Vera Lynn, Ellis Marsalis, Jr., Johnny Nash, Curly Neal, Geoffrey Palmer, Charley Pride, John Prine, Helen Reddy, Carl Reiner, Ann Reinking, Little Richard, Diana Rigg, Kenny Rogers, Tom Seaver, Jerry Stiller, Alex Trebek, Max von Sydow, Fred Willard, Bill Withers, and now Dawn Wells, to name a few. We also lost the man who broke the sound barrier.

The purview of this blog is policy and comment and there were notable losses in government too. It seems a little odd to single out the passing of a noble-minded few during a pandemic, but Ruth Bader Ginsburg and John Lewis, both of whom comfortably bear the appositive “the great,” are gone. Gone too is foreign policy advisor, Brent Scowcroft, a great realist, public servant, and gentleman.

It was an especially bad year for independent voices. Stephen F. Cohen, Robert Fisk, and Pete Hamill are gone. You will find tributes to all three of these writers (and Brent Scowcroft) on this blog. Take note of benevolent leaders and fearless independent voices while they live. It will make you appreciate what is good, what still works, and what courage still exists in the world, while it exists in the world.

As human beings continue to violently encroach into hitherto undisturbed wild areas and come into direct contact with animals that are hosts to wide ranges of viruses, one can only wonder if 2020 is a demarcation that marks an opening shot of the Apocalypse of the environment.

I apologize for the tone of this somber posting. Indeed there are things to be optimistic about, especially the vaccines that promise to ease and perhaps defeat the pandemic. There is also a majority of people who do take the crisis seriously. But with an even more contagious mutated variation of the disease abroad in the world (and now in the United States), one wonders if the future of our species will be a series of desperate efforts to stamp out pathogenic brush fires—outbreaks—as they crop up and before they become pandemics. It is possible that variants of COVID-19 will become seasonal, like the cold and flu. Vaccines are now in the offing with 95% effectiveness against the present virus in its current form. The time may come when we have to face pathogens that are more problematic than the current one. It is therefore in our interest to leave alone the remaining unspoiled habitats of the world and the creatures therein.

The War Correspondent (Robert Fisk)

By Michael F. Duggan

There [are] no good guys in war… War is primarily about the total failure of the human spirit. It is about death and the inflation of death. And if you don’t realize that, you will die in a war.
-Robert Fisk

You see this terrible suffering, these monumental crimes against humanity—let’s speak frankly, that’s what we are talking about—we have all committed them, not just al-Qaeda.  We [have] all committed crimes against humanity, and if you don’t report it, people won’t know.  I always say… we can tell you what’s happening, don’t ever say no one told you.  Don’t say you didn’t know.
-Robert Fisk

It seems to me that [the role of war correspondents] at the moment is to be out there on the street, in the battlefield with soldiers, with civilians in hospitals particularly and record the suffering of ordinary people and talk to them.
-Robert Fisk1

Another important independent voice is gone, another casualty of 2020.  As a foreign correspondent, Robert Fisk was the best at what he did: covering wars from the front lines and in front of the front lines when the lines existed at all.  Except perhaps for the job of combat photographer, it is, when done right, the most dangerous calling in journalism. In a career that spanned almost 50 years, he covered conflicts in the massive expanse between Afghanistan and the Balkans as well as in Northern Ireland and North Africa.  He appears to have died of natural causes.

There are other reporters who have matched Fisk’s doggedness and physical courage.2 But few if any equal his depth and breadth of understanding.  He had an intimate knowledge of the regions he covered—saw the big picture and saw through the stated reasons of those who waged wars and was able to adumbrate the likely outcomes of those wars.  With a doctorate from Dublin’s Trinity College, he also had academic credentials and was a journalists with a greater depth of the historical understanding of war than most scholars and area specialists. When it came to writing about the Middle East, Fisk wrote with passion and presented the “hot” analysis relative to Patrick Cockburn’s “cool.” At 1109 pages, his The Great War for Civilisation, The Conquest of the Middle East, is magisterial, readable, and endlessly rich in its insights.

Fisk presented the bottom-up view of conflicts, a perspective missing or glossed over in much of the reporting by the corporate media (we can hardly be surprised if most Americans are unaware that millions of people have died in the Middle East since the beginning of the U.S. war in Afghanistan in 2001).  He always named the names of perpetrators regardless of what side they were on. His frequent criticism of American and Israeli polices made him enemies both powerful and ordinary.  In 2002 he was famously threatened by the actor, John Malkovich.3

Fisk was one of those legendary on-the-ground correspondents—“a historian of the present”4—who immersed himself in the Middle East and seemed to be everywhere in that troubled region from the 1970s until 2020.  He was fluent in Arabic and lived in Beirut.  He was also fluent with the region and its cultures as well as its conflicts.  He wrote well and often with good humor (it was from him that I learned the slangy codswallop).  

He covered the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980, the Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War, the Balkan wars of the 1990s, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and both U.S. campaigns in Iraq to name but a few.  He covered the civil wars in Lebanon, Algeria, Syria, and Libya.  He was at the massacre of Sabra and Chatila while the killing was still in progress.5 He knew that one must leave the pack in order to get to the real story, ignoring official dog-and-pony shows and prejudicial stunts like embedding.  He loathed and lamented “grad school journalism” and the “safe” “fifty-fifty journalism” of “obedient reporters” who he saw as willing and uncritical spokespeople for governmental agencies. He despised the “parasitic, osmotic relationship between journalists and power.”6 He covered five Israeli invasions and interviewed Bin Laden three times (the fame from which he called his “albatross”). It is striking that in spite of his experiences he never lost his humanity—his belief in human potential—and his capacity to be shocked by the degradation of war.

Given the dangerous places and situations Fisk was frequently in, it is noteworthy that he carried a weapon only once, when a Kalashnikov was thrust into his hands before an expected ambush in the early days of the Soviet war in Afghanistan. Of this experience he wrote: “I have never since held a weapon in wartime and I hope that I shall never again. I have always cursed the journalists who wear military costumes and don helmets and play soldiers with a gun on their hip, greying over the line between reporter and combatant, making our lives ever more dangerous as armies and militias come to regard us as an extension of their enemies, a potential combatant, a military target. But I had not volunteered to travel with the Soviet army. I was not—as that repulsive expression would have it in later wars—’embedded.’ I was as much their prisoner as guest.”7

The swaggering foreign correspondents of the Big Three and cable television can at times match Fisk’s physical courage, often while dramatically inserting themselves into stories.  But there has to be more to being what Hemingway dramatically calls a journalistic “carnivore” than just being on the ground and in the shit.  As with the historian, the job of the journalist is to get the story right, to tell the truth.  While we cannot doubt the conspicuous courage of big network reporters, their broader perspectives are conventional and homogenized—uninteresting—and more often than not, identical to the official line. The striking footage brought to you in living color by network valor and careerism cannot touch Fisk’s insight, depth of knowledge, and moral courage to tell the truth.

It is ironic that the correspondent who saw more of war than most soldiers would die of natural causes far from the battlefields he covered. It apparently was a stroke at St. Vincent’s Hospital in Dublin on October 30.8 He was 74.

This blurb in no way does justice to Robert Fisk and only hints at his accomplishments and integrity.  I did not know him. I only knew of him.  I hope that this minimalist treatment of a great journalist will inspire others to read the remembrances and tributes by those who did know him.  Above all, they should investigate his articles and books.9 We need his brand of driven honesty now more than ever.

Notes 

  1. All prefatory quotes are from Harry Kreisler’s interview with Fisk on University of California TV’s Conversations with History: Robert Fisk, February, 2007.
  2. For example other reporters interviewed Bin Laden on his own territory and the number of journalist and media support workers killed in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001 is more than three times the number killed in the Second World War.  The tally of reporters killed in Afghanistan between 2001 and the middle of 2014 is given at 28, while the number of journalists killed in Iraq between March 2003 and June 2012 is 150 along with 54 media support workers.  By contrast 68 journalists were killed during World War Two.  Sixty-six were killed in Vietnam between 1955 and 1975.  One reason given for the large number of journalists lost in recent wars is that they were the victims of targeted killings rather than combat casualties.                                                                                 https://cpj.org/2013/03/iraq-war-and-news-media-a-look-inside-the-death-to/                                                     https://globaljournalist.org/2014/06/timeline-press-casualties-afghanistan/           
  3. https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-why-does-john-malkovich-want-kill-me-9204117.html       
  4. https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/robert-fisk-iraq-2003-patrick-cockburn-the-troubles-b1539514.html
  5. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/forgotten-massacre-8139930.html
  6. Address to the Georgetown University Center for International and Regional Studies, State of Denial: Western Journalism and the Middle East, April 10. 2010. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l6ASJA7fbcE&t=1646s
  7. The Great War for Civilisation, 68.
  8. Reading that Fisk died of a stroke made me think of the head injuries he sustained on December 12, 2001 in a small Afghan village when his jeep broke down. A crowd gather and quickly turned hostile; they were enraged over the Mazar-i-Sharif massacres and by B-52 strikes and severely beat and stoned Fish and fellow journalist, Justin Huggler. Fisk was lucky to to have escaped at all (with the help of an elder Muslim cleric, who took his arm and walked him away from the mob). See The Great War for Civilisation, 871-876. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/my-beating-refugees-symbol-hatred-and-fury-filthy-war-9179496.html
  9. https://www.counterpunch.org/2020/11/17/robert-fisk-had-true-independence-of-mind-which-is-why-he-angered-governments-and-parts-of-the-media/ https://www.counterpunch.org/2020/11/09/the-life-of-robert-fisk/    

Stephen F. Cohen

By Michael F. Duggan

During an ominous election season, it is understandable that the nation would be distracted by the death of a Supreme Court justice, especially one with the mass culture stature of Ruth Bader Ginsburg. But it is worth noting in these troubled times that one of the leading American experts on Russia and Russian history, Professor Stephen F. Cohen of NYU, died on the same day. He was an important scholar and commentator who frequently and bravely went against the grain and appears to have been ostracized—perhaps even black-listed—for it in recent years.

I corresponded with him a few times via email. Seemed like a nice guy.

For a review of his last book, War with Russia?, see the posting of July 21, 2019 on this blog.

Pete Hamill, “Those Times”

By Michael F. Duggan

And you that shall cross from shore to shore years hence are more to me, and more in my meditations, than you may suppose. -Walt Whitman

East Side, West Side, all around the town
The tots sang “ring-around-rosie,” “London Bridge is falling down”
Boys and girls together, me and Mamie O’Rourke
Tripped the light fantastic on the sidewalks of New York

Things have changed since those times, some are up in “G”
Others they are wand’rers, but they all feel just like me
They would part with all they’ve got, if could they once more walk
With their best girl and have a twirl on the sidewalks of New York. -James W. Blake

Nostalgia isn’t what it used to be. -Sam Phillips

Pete Hamill is gone.  He was as New York as stickball, egg creams, Coney Island, and the Brooklyn Bridge. Like the Dodgers, only the memory of him remains.  How do you write about a writer like Hamill? With clipped, declarative sentences, of course.  Beyond that it is hard to know where to begin and what to include and what to leave out from such a rich life.

He was born in 1935, the eldest of seven children of Northern Irish Catholic immigrants from Belfast. His father lost a leg in 1927 after a severe soccer injury turned gangrenous.  His first home was Brooklyn, that innermost of outer boroughs relative to Downtown and the only one to have had an independent identity as Manhattan’s twin city prior to the consolidation of Greater New York in 1898.  As a young child, his mother walked him across the Brooklyn Bridge for the first time after seeing The Wizard of Oz, and for the rest of his larger-than-life life, he regarded the towers of Lower Manhattan to be the real Emerald City.  In a recent interview he characterized his upbringing as “poor” but not “impoverished” because he had a library card.

Hamill came of age during Brooklyn’s Golden Age of the 1940s and 1950s (see: Woody Allen’s Radio Days, Doris Kearns Goodwin’s Wait Till Next Year: A Memoir, the Great #42, most of the writing about “Dem Bums” during this period, and the movie Brooklyn).  As a kid I caught a fleeting glimpse of this world when we lived near my mother’s parents in Middle Village in Queens during the 1960s.  Elements of the American mid-century and before lingered there as late as the 1969 World Series or shortly thereafter.  It was part “the center of the world” and part small town manifested as neighborhoods (New York cannot be taken whole and so your neighborhood becomes your world).  My mom’s upbringing in Queens and my girlfriend’s family in Bedford-Stuyvesant and Maspeth were all a part of this mostly lost world.  But things really have changed since those times, and if there was ever a place and period in recent American history that legitimizes nostalgia as an ennobling emotion, it is this.1

Perhaps because he grew up in a plausible Halcyon Age that seems to have concentrated what was good about the United States, Hamill believed that much of what is justified as progress is actually the destruction of good things, things that worked, things that still resonate. To him New York exemplifies the tendency of change-for-the-sake-of-change more than any other American city, and in doing so, tramples on much of what is, or was, good about it. In this sense, he is a plain-talking conceptual cousin of Jane Jacobs and his views are sympathetic to the ideas she presents in The Death and Life of Great American Cities.

But Hamill’s life was not all sunshine and roses. A sensitive tough guy familiar with dysfunction, the low life, and the streets, he drank too much as a young man in a culture of drinking and fought in bars. He briefly saw the inside of a jail in Mexico City that included both solitary confinement and a large, crowded room where two men fought over a young woman with bricks. His first publication was a beat-inspired poem after meeting Jack Kerouac in 1957 (in a bar, of course). He quit drinking by sheer force of will and the easily-spoken rationale “that I only had to give up one drink: the next one. If I didn’t have that one drink, I’d never have another.” It worked. All of this is recounted in his unflinching 1994 memoir, A Drinking Life.

Coming out of this world of “sunshine and shadow” (and after a hitch in the navy and his stint in Mexico on the GI Bill), Hamill seems to have crossed paths with every writer and musician from the great American Mid-Century.  If A Drinking Life is a confession, then his later memoir, Downtown (2004), is a love letter to his city. His reminiscences of lower Manhattan in this book are fascinating in their insights and an education in themselves.  As a historian, Hamill is so compelling because he is non-theoretical and because he lived so much of what he describes.  He saw it with his own eyes. A streetwise realist, he “hated abstractions” and believed that ideology is “not thinking [but] a substitute for thinking” leading to snares. His knowledge is intimate and he knew most of the people about whom he writes. Like many New York writers, this local intimacy also creates cosmopolitanism out of the urban provincial.

He and his friend, competitor, and fellow “deadline artist,” Jimmy Breslin (1928-2017), were at the forefront of the New Journalism of the 1960s and ’70s and would become the newsprint voices for ordinary New Yorkers. By Breslin’s own reverse-snobbish account, they were not “journalists” (“That’s a college word”) but “reporters.” As public intellectuals for the regular Joe, they also became celebrities. With the good looks of a rugged leading man, Hamill, the poor kid from Brooklyn, dated Shirley MacLaine, Jacqueline Onassis, and Linda Ronstadt.  At one point he managed two newspapers.  He was a shoe-leather autodidact with enough grounding in the outer-borough ethos to know that fame was all bullshit, and a distraction.  “Fame was never the goal. [You] can’t write while trying to be famous,” and he never forgot where he came from. But fame followed him and even during this lifetime, stories—legends—abounded.

In 1968 Hamill wrote a letter to Robert Kennedy, spelling out the reasons why he had to run for the presidency.  RFK launched his campaign shortly thereafter and carried Hamill’s letter with him.  Hamill was with Kennedy at the Ambassador Hotel when Kennedy was shot. The letter would haunt him for the rest of his life.

Once, in a London bar called The Ad Lib Club, John Lennon, apparently not wanting an American to sit at his table, said to Hamill to “Why don’t you get the hell out of here.”  The tough kid from Prospect Park replied, “Why don’t you make me?”  Lennon said “What?” “I said, why don’t you try to make me leave?” Hamill answered. Lennon looked down at his drink and smiled.  Hamill sat down. Later he would call Lennon “one of the bravest human beings I know.”

He was a war correspondent who filed dispatches from Vietnam, Nicaragua, Lebanon, and Northern Ireland.  He covered civil rights in the South. He predicted what he called “the revolt of the white lower middle class” 47 years before the 2016 election.

When a powerful New York City real estate developer, who would go on to become president, took out a full-page ad calling for the death penalty for the suspects in the Central Park Jogger case, Hamill punched back, writing:

“Snarling and heartless and fraudulently tough, insisting on the virtues of stupidity, it is the epitome of blind negation. Hate was just another luxury. And Trump stood naked, revealed as the spokesman for that tiny minority of Americans who lead well-defended lives. Forget poverty and its causes, forget the collapse of the manufacturing economy, forget the degradation and squalor of millions; fry them into passivity.” The central Park Five were later exonerated.

But what about Hamill as a writer? 

I have long had an interest in novelists who were also reporters—Defoe, Twain, Crane, London, Hemingway, Camus, Mailer.  I also admire reporters with the courage to tell the truth as they see it, even if I don’t always agree with their politics or outlook.  Some of these are Andrew and Patrick Cockburn, Robert Fisk, Chris Hedges, Diana Johnstone, and historically, George Seldes, Lincoln Steffens, Jack Reed, and Martha Gelhorn. Hamill checks both boxes.

A couple of years ago, with Philip Roth gone, I asked some friends if there were any great American writers of the old school left.  Heller, Mailer, Updike, Vidal, and Breslin were all gone.  What about Pete Hamill?  What I heard from him and others was that Hamill was a great, two-fisted journalistic stylist with little of his own to say.  He was an impressive observer but, unlike Camus or Hemingway, there was no unique worldview or original take on things.  The consensus, more or less, was that he was an earthy writer in the tradition of other New Yorkers like Liebling, Mailer, and Miller, but not a standalone literary philosopher and commentator on life.  So I picked up a copy of his memoir about lower Manhattan, Downtown (essentially a long essay incorporating history with personal memory—an extended sonnet in prose to a city he spent his life trying to know)—and found it to be rich with plenty to say about life and loss.

Hamill reads like a cross between Hemingway and a harder-edged version of Whitman.  He is more poetic than Breslin. For many people, he was New York City personified.  He combines Hemingway’s impressionistic realism with what one critic called the magical realism of Gabriel Garcia Marquez (although otherworldly crossovers and the overlapping “in between times” are also distinctly, but not uniquely, Celtic).  He has Whitman’s love for the cacophony of the city—the urban hive—and is an observer of the first rate with a reporter’s critical eye. He has Twain’s ability to see through shams, usually.

Some critics accused him of being too sentimental.  Hamill counters this in Downtown by saying that the inevitable loss and change that NYC inflicts upon its people makes them embrace a deep and profound sense of “nostalgia”—the longing for important things lost or taken.  By contrast, “sentimentality” is a superficial, often dishonest, emotion.  As he puts it:

“The New York version of nostalgia is not simply about lost buildings or their presence in the youth of the individuals who lived with them.  It involves an almost fatalistic acceptance of the permanent presence of loss.  Nothing will ever stay the same.  Tuesday turns into Wednesday and something valuable is behind you forever.  An ‘is’ becomes a ‘was.’  Whatever you have lost, you will not get it back: not that much-loved brother, not that ball club, not that splendid bar, not that place where you once went dancing with the person you later married.  Irreversible change happens so often in New York that the experience affects the character itself.  New York toughens its people against sentimentality by allowing the truer emotion of nostalgia.  Sentimentality is always about a lie.  Nostalgia is about real things gone.  Nobody mourns a lie.”

Not bad (and those of us who call Bethesda our home, can certainly relate to the idea of a place being ruined by destruction in the name of “progress”).  And yet I am not sure what to make of it and of the misty-eyed Heraclitus of the Bowery who wrote it.  This gorgeous paragraph expresses the universal particularized in the cauldron and intensifier of change that is New York City. He raises love of place to a high faith of loss without the possibility of resurrection, outside of memory. But is his idea of nostalgia fresh and new in a profound way?  We all know loss.  We all mourn at the “shallow graves” of the recent past now and forever just beyond reach. Just as all matter is really stable energy, all people and things are verbs posing as nouns—physical processes destined to play themselves out, destined to succumb to the second law of thermodynamics. Heraclitus writes that reality is change, and we have all experienced the tyranny of the arrow of time and the capriciousness of life. But so what?   Why seems it so particular with thee? Perhaps it is as simple as the realization that nostalgia is a sensibility of someone who has lived a rich and memorable live, and that changes is always dicey, even though, as Parmenides holds, it is inevitable. A future that is different from the past already exists and we are merely walking a path to it and through it in Einstein’s “stubbornly persistent illusion” of the present moment.

Is there a bigger idea here, like a view that human history, change, and progress is nothing more than the progress—the metastasis—of a Malthusian plague species? I don’t think so. It is all personal and proximate, didactic, and elegiac. After all, Hamill believes in and defends something like a Golden Age—the great window of opportunity and the parabolic curve called the postwar United States (again, particularized to New York), which was perfectly coterminous with Hamill’s career. And so we are left taking or leaving him on his own terms.

Hamill also metes out glimpses of his worldview in Ric Burn’s 1997 documentary series, New York.  At one point he observes there is no definitive novel about the city in the same way that any number of Dickens’ novels capture London at a certain point of its history.  He attributes this to New York’s ever changing “daily-ness” and “a sense of surprise” and concludes that the closest thing to The Great New York City Novel is a local daily newspaper.  Perhaps this is why so much of his work is observational or descriptive rather than prescriptive, although there always seems to be a moral.  He sees the city as embodying an ineffable, kinetic chaos and the reality that “something is going to happen between here and 57th street and you’d better be ready for it.” He adds that “although [the city] insists on routine from a lot of its people, [it] knows that routine is a utopian goal.” Thus the experience of loss and change instills the expectation of new unexpected change. This is clearly realism, and he knows as well as anybody that in order to be vital, cities must also be dynamic.

Hamill’s worldview is too deeply rooted the 20th century, outer borough, son-of-an-immigrant ethos to be fully original.  He is an interpreter-as-exemplar of a code rather than its inventor, and yet his experience, instincts, and observations amount to flashes of insight and instances of originality (like the idea that New York is an “alloy” rather than the more traditional “melting pot” or “mixing bowl”). And for pure writing, nobody today, can touch his lean style.  It is understandable that Hamill would embrace this ethos, a working class chivalric code.  As the grandson of outer borough immigrants myself, I know that this code can be overpowering in its simple virtues of duty and decency.  What is the code?  As Hamill puts it:

“Where I came from, the rules were relatively simple.  Work. Put food on the table.  Always pay your debts.  Never cross a picket line.  Don’t look for trouble, because in New York you can always find it.  But don’t back off either.  Make certain that the old and weak are never in danger.  Vote the straight ticket.” 

Okay, so it isn’t as original as the Hemingway Code’s blend of stoicism and Epicureanism, but it’s pretty damned good and in some ways better (the drinking life he abandoned not withstanding). And nobody ever distilled the code better than Hamill.2

But as Hamill reminds us, nothing lasts for ever. The Outer Borough Code is quickly passing into history, and is probably as dead in the outer boroughs as Henry Miller’s Yorkville accent is in Yorkville. It was killed off by cynicism born of moral complexity and material success. One of the changes in Greater New York since “those times” was the white flight of the upwardly mobile from the city during the 1970s and ’80s.  People born in Brooklyn or Queens during the 1930s, ‘40s, and ‘50s are now senior citizens who likely spent recent decades in places like Westchester, Nassau County, and innumerable other places across the country.  My family did.  If you “made it,” you got out of the five boroughs. Many who left now “vote the straight ticket” for the other party, and embrace their own selective kind of nostalgia. The people who remained in the boroughs likely work gig jobs or else are the children of more recent arrivals with their own outlooks.  In Brooklyn the children of suburbanites and rich professionals have rediscovered the neighborhoods and have come back to play at being consciously (and fashionably) urban with no real connection to the area or its history or code.

I am not sure that Hamill realized that his staunch ethos may be gone for good.  For although he refers to the “sustained purgatory” of New York after the 1960s, and loathed the predatory plutocratic wealth embodied by the super tall skyscrapers of the 21st century, he also wrote that “Somehow our luck held.  We have lived long enough to see the city gather its will and energy and rise again, and its people playing by the old rules.”  Hmm.

Of course nobody is perfect and Hamill might have been too accepting of then Mayor Giuliani’s law and order crackdowns in the 1990s and the “Disneyfication” of Times Square that helped make the city safe for tourists and the highest bidders.  By contrast, as Jimmy Breslin observed in a 60 Minutes segment in 1997, “The city dies unless it’s got some dirt and a little raciness.”  Given a choice between the financial/corporate overlords and the prostitutes who used to occupy the area, he told Leslie Stahl, “I’ll take the hookers.” Hamil was well aware of his own contradictions and those of his fellow New Yorkers.

There is something fresh about the no-nonsense, see-through-the-bullshit reporting of Hamill and Breslin, something both painfully and numbingly missing in the homogenized reporting of today’s corporate media. This is to say nothing of the vile propaganda and political entertainment that so many Americans mistake for news. Division is good for business, and when the purpose of the news is profit and manipulation, then the free press is more or less dead.

I came to Hamill’s work relatively late in life.  I never met him. All history and biography is selective and my observations are selective, haphazard, secondhand, and incomplete. But to me Hamill was somehow both a univeralist and a tribalist: the city was his territory, but it included all races therein as a universal type, the single category of human beings with all of our differences. He was a progressive in the old sense of the term denoting the tough-guy looking out for the little guy and who fought for simple fairness. At times one senses in him an undercurrent of first-generation, working class conservatism bleeding through his observations in a similar way that old money matrons, new money couples, and prep school boys are seldom the good guys on Law and Order: SVU.

When I heard that Hamill was in failing health back in late January, I sent an email to the members of a book club I belong to, suggesting that we read Downtown sooner rather than later. Sometimes we are able to get authors to call in to our meetings, and the possibility of speaking with Pete Hamill would have been a coup. It is now seems like a that I had drafted and was about to send a follow up email when I heard the news that he had died. I was also rereading Downtown.

With Hamill’s death, “something valuable is behind [us] forever.”  But as with other things lost, the memory of him remains. I suspect that his journalism and reminiscences will be remembered more than his fiction; if there is no Great New York Novel—if a local newspaper is its closest approximation—then it follows that a reporter must be its greatest writer.  As with the Brooklyn Dodgers and all things loved and lost, we must let him go, although we may speak his name with nostalgia. Without devolving into bathos (the kind of word Breslin hated), perhaps the lesson is that brave new generations should not be too quick to dismiss the tears of “weepy old men” when they speak of a better past and provide plausible reasons for it.

His 2003 novel, Forever, is about an Irishman who comes to Manhattan in 1740 and is granted immortality by a dead African priestess on the condition that he never leaves the island.  Perhaps that Irishman was Hamill himself, because in 2016, he left his beloved Emerald City and moved back to Brooklyn where he now rests a few feet from Boss Tweed, another larger than life New Yorker.

Notes

  1. Of course there is a danger in romanticizing or living in the past. Poor Richard chides that “The Golden Age was never the present age,” and Jay Gatsby could not repeat even the superficial details of his own past much less improve upon them. All borough hagiographies should be weighed against darker and more gritty accounts. Hubert Selby’s 1964 Last Exit to Brooklyn and even the artful blend of nostalgia and realism in Chazz Palminteri’s Manichaeist A Bronx Tale are good tonics against uncritical outer borough myth-making (so is Hamill’s own A Drinking Life). After all, primary purpose of history is to embrace what was good about the past and what worked, while learning what did not work and why.
  2. There is overlap between the Hemingway Code and the Outer Borough Code. Hamill states “The only unforgivable sin was self-pity” in both A Drinking Life (p. 184) and Downtown (p. 8).

Brent Scowcroft

By Michael F. Duggan

Brent Scowcroft has died at 95.

You didn’t have to be a Republican to appreciate his form of moderate realism in foreign affairs. He, along with James Baker and the first President Bush masterfully eased the world out of the (first) Cold War during 1989-1991.

Other foreign policy successes were the reunification of Germany, the intervention in Panama, and Desert Storm (in spite of its toxic spawn and the subsequent U.S. military entrenchment in the region, it was a great operational success). The only beginning-to-end mistake of this period the intervention in Somalia in the waning days of the administration, and this seems to have been an unrealistic concession to humanitarianism.

Excommunicated by the Neocons of the George W. Bush Administration, he wrote an article that appeared in the Wall St. Journal on August 15, 2002 making the case not to invade Iraq. This article is a more-than fair sample of his good sense and wisdom. He turned out to be right, and, having not heeded his advice, we are left with haunting counterfactuals of history and a legacy of failure in an already volatile region.

A thoroughly decent man, he took a meeting with me—a nobody—when I was the Supreme Court Fellow in 2011-2012. I just called his office and scheduled an appointment. This man who had advised presidents and oversaw world historical events in momentous times gave me a full hour of his own time. Quiet spoken and unfailingly courteous. A gentleman. A great policy adviser. The world is literally a less sane place without him.

I could write volumes singing the praises of General Scowcroft, but will defer to those who knew him. Suffice it to say that he and his ideas were an inspiration for creating this blog. It is in part a memorial to him and others like him.

X, Y, and Z Vectors: The Great Abdication

By Michael F. Duggan

One hears a lot these days about generations—shorthand categories for cohorts of people supposed to embody distinctive personality traits, virtues, and flaws based on the multi-decade cycle in which they were born.  People who would never reduce others by categories of race or sex have no problem with lumping them together in broad chronological swaths.  As with decades, generations are a handy, if imprecise, basis for periodization with added moral implications for the placing of kudos or blame.  There is a saying that a bigot is a sociologist without a degree.

Generations used to have names.  We speak of the Founding and Framing Generation(s), the writers of the Lost Generation, the rapidly fading Greatest Generation of WWII, their children the Baby Boomers (aka the “Pepsi Generation,” or more simply “Boomers”), and the Silent Generation that came of age in the 1950s.  Nowadays we designate generations with letters, like variables to be plugged into equations (X, Y, Z).  Although each of us has a formative aesthetic, historical, and social backdrop that we share with others of similar age—and as animals, we reproduce in 20-30 year cycles—the fact is that people are born in every minute of every day and to speak in such general terms is only slightly better than the categories of Chinese astrology.  As with the categories of race and sex, there are far more differences among individuals within a generation than between generations.  But if “generations” are the terms of discussion of mass behavior these days, so be it.  After all, everybody generalizes.

Oedipal chafing is inevitable between members of successive generations.  I have certainly experienced this two-way street in classes I have taught (I am a member of a supposed sub-generation sometimes called “Generation Jones”—those who are too young to match all of the stereotypes about bona fide Boomers, but too old to be Gen Xers).  But by and large, my experiences with people of the rising generations have been most mostly positive.  For a number of years, I have seen them as the only glimmers of hope for the future of the nation and the planet.  The Millennials and Gen Zers I knew have been of a high order in terms of education and thoughtfulness.  I found many of them to be angry, idealistic, smart, and well-informed on issues of the economy, the environment, and other emerging crises that threaten us all.  I was banking on their intensity and high-minded discontent to be a catalyst for change.  It is therefore all the more demoralizing to realize how the resurgence of COVID-19 in the United States is disproportionately the result of the behavior of people under 40.

Generations X, Y, and Z, along with conservative populists, appear to be engaging in some of the worst pandemic-related behavior: COVID-19 parties, crowding into bars and clubs without masks, and what seems like a kind of self-conscious generational smugness.  This exceptionalism is apparently the result of the much-reported age-based resistance to the virus.  While hiking I have come across smirking young people—presumably amused by the simple precautions of the over-forty crowd—as if some degree of age-based immunity were a basis for categorical superiority.  Apparently it does not matter to some of these people that they may become vectors to more vulnerable people.  Their defiance of sensible precautions reminds me of the psychopathic logic for committing a crime: “I did it because I could.”  

The young people I know are not of this sort.  They are impatient with their elders, but they want to save the world, and they realize that the clock is running.  Some see the pandemic as the opening volley of the looming global environmental crises and are as concerned about the present visitation as their parents, perhaps more so. And yet others of their cohort are acting in ways that seems like the large scale bad behavior of any other generation.  The popular meme that made its rounds back in March referring to the COVID-19 virus as the “Boomer Remover” goes beyond smugness.  It makes light of a global tragedy with crassness that shocks the conscience. 

There is of course an irony to the bad blood between today’s young people and the Baby Boomers.  The stereotypes and wholesale loathing of Boomers by many young people is well-known to be a cliché of the culture wars.  And yet if there is another generation that the rising generations resemble, it is the first wave of the Baby Boom who embraced idealism—civil rights, the Peace Corps, the antiwar movement, the environmental, women’s rights, and gay rights movements.  Now they appear to embody the charges leveled against Boomers as the 1970s sellouts—the hippies-turned-yuppies—of the “Me Generation.”  

The danger of stereotypes—and generational categories are certainly based on stereotypes—is not found in their patent falsity, but rather in the fact that they contain enough generalized truth to appear to be plausible in specific cases where they do not apply.  Some of the stories we read about irresponsible youthful behavior back in May, June, and early July may be exaggerations and distractions—the efforts of desperate governors and mayors trying to deflect blame for the consequences of opening their state and local economies too soon.  It’s a convenient take on the “kids these days” argument that goes back to Gildas, Tacitus, and even the Old Testament.  Indeed a major cause of the climb in infections was the rush to reopen and a lack of a coherent national strategy. 

As infection rates continue to increase, the COVID-19 pandemic in the U.S. is taking on the character of a national-historical tragedy of epic proportions, but also of a blunder that might someday be called the Great Abdication.  It is not just that the virus was bad enough, but our response to it has been a colossal failure of policy, and a failure of our spirit, our will. It is a national shirking.

We know that the World War II generation was “disciplined by a hard and bitter peace” before fighting and dying in the largest conflict in history.  But what will history say about people of our time who have resisted even the mildest measures to flatten the curve and how they responded to this crisis in general? It is as if it is the spring of 1942 and a considerable number of our people do not want to enlist or join the industrial war effort—which called for much more severe impositions on individual rights and the private life than wearing a mask in public—because the general crisis is getting in the way of their enjoyment of life.  It is as if we are losing the Second World War by default.

Just as crises provide opportunities for the emergence of great leadership (those who aspire to greatness consciously or unconsciously welcome crises), they are also opportunities for “generations” to distinguish themselves.  Insofar as the idea of generations has any legitimacy, we can make comparisons (as long as we generalize with precision).  Given their first test in facing a world historical crises, the rising generations hardly seem to be among our greatest. As others have observed, the COVID-19 pandemic is, among other things, a test of character. With the initial results of this test becoming apparent, one wonders if there may be something to the stereotype that Americans are increasingly becoming a bunch of yahoos incapable of sacrifice and who are primarily concerned with their own entertainment.

As for the behavior itself, we must ask: if there is no punishment for stupidity and recklessness, then what is the benefit of not being stupid and reckless?  If infections were limited to those who shun modest precautions, then we could shrug off the newly infected as victims of self-inflicted natural selection.  But the consequences of this kind of brazen stupidity (or delusions, in the case of political deniers) obviously run deeper, and many of those who will become sick and die are blameless victims along the vectors of the unthinking, the unfeeling.

Two Books by Independents: Diana Johnstone and Larry Wilkerson

Diana Johnstone, Circle in the Darkness, Memoir of a World Watcher (New York: Clarity Press, Inc. 2020). 435 pages. $24.95.

Lawrence Wilkerson, War Is Not About Truth, Justice and the American Way (New York: The Real News Network, 2015). 210 pages.

By Michael F. Duggan

The Internet Age is also the Age of the Corporate Media and the Age of Political-Propaganda-as-Entertainment. The first encourages a solipsistic existence of self-reinforcing delusions that may further radicalize upon meeting kindred spirits.  The second lulls us into a fool’s paradise of consensus by offering something like an official or “mainstream” version of events, and in dark times, pulls us back from the brink with manipulative feel-good segments at the end of their nightly broadcasts.  These are “news” segments complete with soft focus piano or guitar background music for atmosphere and feature heartwarming stories that no decent person could oppose.

The third, political propaganda and entertainment cable networks, are an amalgam of the first two: they offer clearinghouses for the “news” that true believers select on the basis of ideology and temperament and embody the seeming legitimacy of a big network newsroom/anchor desk format.  They also may reflect the myriad of subdivided views found on smaller online outlets.  Cable TV offers corporate mouthpieces for angry right as well as networks presenting an ideological standard line for what passes for the mainstream left and center these days: heavy on social issues, light on economic progressivism.

The irony of all this is that the Internet—the technological communication and information miracle that provides a virtually limitless array of perspectives and news outlets—has rendered Americans more intellectually provincial and divided than ever before (more so than the 1790s, 1960s, and perhaps the 1850s).  Cable television and opinion programing on local AM radio stations have only reinforced the anger and chaos.

Obviously, none of this is healthy.  The amalgamated effect of these things is a synergy that drives division and a kind of mass psychosis.  It is an open question about whether or not a large and diverse liberal republic can coexist with such powerful and ubiquitous tools of manipulation (of course it is also an open question about whether a large, diverse, and overpopulated nation can exist as all as a social democracy).

In our time of the Three Ages of Mass Communications, rational people have to select news sources and individual commentators judiciously with an eye to the truth rather than just a desire to have their own perspective affirmed and spoon-fed back to them.  Sometimes the truth must be found among independent voices outside of the mainstream (but not on the extremes), both left and right.  In an age of neoliberal predominance and a lockstep corporate media on the one hand, and angry cranks and insurgents on the other, I feel that we must look to reasonable independent commentators, whether it is, for instance, a self-described conservative like Andrew Bacevich, or an old school independent journalist of the left, like Chris Hedges.

Below are reviews of two books by very different authors who fall into the category of honest brokers, of truth-tellers who call it like they see it.  They are voices that are not owned by anybody but the author.  One of these was a part of the antiwar movement of the 1960s, the other fought in the Vietnam War.  These are the journalist, Diana Johnstone, and Colin Powell’s former chief of staff, Colonel Larry Wilkerson.

Diana Johnstone, Independent

The journalist, Diana Johnstone, has written a fascinating memoir.  Her reputation as a radical should not put off non-radicals. It makes no difference who delivers the truth.  We all have assumptions, but Ms. Johnstone, who certainly has a point of view, writes with a clarity and insight that rises above the clichés of ideological orthodoxy. In my opinion, she is too smart, her perception too acute and nuanced to accept any packaged outlook whole cloth.

Although not resembling it in any literal way, Johnstone’s memoir is reminiscent of The Education of Henry Adams in that the author is a good writer and chronicler of her time with a distinctive point of view. Although you will likely not agree with all of her opinions, the book is rich and rewarding.

The memoir takes us from Jonstone’s youth in Minnesota and Washington D.C. (as a child her family lived immediately behind the Supreme Court building, and Johnstone recalls a “lively little friend” shouting “Resign!” to passing justices during Roosevelt’s battle with the Court), to the American antiwar protests of the 1960s, to the May Revolution of Paris in 1968, and then down to the present day by way of events in Yugoslavia and Libya. She has spend a large portion of her long career in France working as a correspondent for In These Times and as press officer for the Green Group in the European Parliament.  She is a perceptive reporter of events, although her nuanced understanding of French political and intellectual affairs may be of limited interest to some American readers.  

Johnstone has a fearless commitment to the truth as she sees it, and as far as I can tell, she has never backed down from a fight.  She has a simple, perhaps naive, confidence in the truth.  In this world, telling the truth tends to garner more enemies than friends, and when the truth is particularly inconvenient, it will anger the powerful.  Johnstone has angered a lot of people over the course of her long career.  Quick to point out flaws and contradictions among those on all sides, she has made powerful enemies on the left, right, and what passes for the center these days.  In this sense she has in some circles come to be regarded as an apostate and even a betrayer rather than a straight shooter. A moving target for those of differing perspectives, one senses that she has axes to grind. For those who search her name online, be aware that the Internet is full of ad hominem screeds against her and even seemingly respectable articles may uncritically reference distortions. Read everything hostile to her with skeptical eye after researching the specifics of the case in question. 

For me, Johnstone is a serious correspondent of the old school.  She writes with a powerful and distinctive journalistic style and clarity of voice, vision, and understanding.  Because her language is so clear, so concrete, it was equally clear to me to see where I disagreed with her and why (e.g. she makes the case that Nixon was both a “scapegoat” for the “distraction” of the Watergate scandal and an early victim of the deep state, thus downplaying his significant and very real domestic crimes relative to what she sees are the far greater crimes of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia).  Unlike so many writers on the academic left, she is a down-in-the trenches journalist and a good writer who does not hide behind neologisms.

I think that Johnstone and her book are important for several reasons.  The first is the care she takes in researching accounts of complex events that most Americans either know little about or else misunderstand because of bad mainstream reporting.  A paragon example of this is the widespread, uncritical acceptance of the inaccurate reporting of the 1990s Balkans wars by major American and European news outlets.  Her chapters on these conflicts, and NATO’s “humanitarian” bombing of Libya in 2011 should be read by all Americans (her 2004 book Fool’s Crusade is the best account of the enormously complex Balkans wars I have read and outlines just how badly the Western media dropped the ball in terms of reporting what happened there).

Her reporting of intellectual trends is also impressive and she gives a lucid account about how the new philosophers of the late 1970s superseded the existentialists of the postwar period (she sees through the Postmodernists as phonies).  On the point of French intellectuals (and of death of French intellectualism in general) Judt’s Past Imperfect makes for an interesting cross reference to this chapter in Johnston’s memoir.

But along with her powerful understanding are currents of naïveté and perhaps misapprehension.  Again, one senses in her a simple belief in the power of speaking the truth.  She also seems to have misjudged the earnestness and motives of the radicals of the 1960s somewhat.  Rather than Marxist revolutionaries genuinely concerned with the plight of the proletariat, most seem to have been more individualistic than the Old Left which really was concerned with collectivist economic issues (as Tony Judt has observed in Ill Fares the Land, 85-91).  More like self-interested eighteenth-century liberals—libertarians—the hippies of the late 1960s became the yuppies of the early 1980s.  A few became postmodernist academic careerists. Others voted for Donald Trump in 2016.  This individualism and shifting loyalties is also a source for the antipathy felt by the left of the rising generation for Baby Boomers.

Perhaps this naïveté is the product of Johnstone’s intelligence and clarity of vision: her grasp of the big picture may at time blind her to problematic details. She may report from on the ground, but her ideals are often at 30,000 feet. It is one thing to defend unpopular ideas under a rubric of free speech, but it is also important to call out people when the go too far—Holocaust deniers and bigots masquerading as comedians, for example.

What about Johnstone’s radicalism?  Here I can only speak for myself.  Even when I have not agreed with them, I have occasionally enjoyed the better writing by some radicals, and Johnston’s book qualifies as good writing.  Although it is an important historical text, Ten Days that Shook the World, like the Bible, is not dispassionate history because its author is a true believer.  It does not attempt to tell the dispassionate truth.  I suppose the logic is that value-neutral interpretations in realms where values are at play is for cowards, cynics, and sociopaths.  The problem with this perspective is that even extremists can claim earnest efforts at the truth, and Jack Reed’s account of the Russian Revolution is too skewed to be anything other than a perspective of strong advocacy.  On the other hand, I enjoyed Witness to a Century, the autobiography of George Seldes, and the gonzo journalism of the late Alexander Cockburn collected in A Colossal Wreck, because these authors were independent thinkers in spite of their strong views.

I think that Johnstone’s intellectual DNA comes less from Marx and his acolytes and more from the tradition of crusading journalism and scholarship trying to set the record straight.  In this she is like contemporary scholars like Stephen F. Cohen and Alfred W. McCoy, and the ideologically very different Andrew J. Bacevich (the works of all three have been reviewed on this blog).  I also see her as heiress to the proud muckraking tradition of Upton Sinclair and Lincoln Steffens.  One also senses something of the serious expatriate journalist—the in-country foreign correspondent as truth-seeking adventurer—about her, like Stephen Crane, Jack London, Ernest Hemingway, Martha Gelhorn, Clare Hollingworth, Chris Hedges, and the photographer, Frank Capa.  I might be mistaken in this perception in that her earnestness and cerebral nature seems fundamentally at odds with the designation of “adventurer.”

Perhaps the greatest importance of this book is Johnstone’s analysis of the failure of the Left in recent decades.  It is how she concludes her memoir and reading the final chapters it becomes clear how her honesty has made her seem like an apostate to more rigid progressives and radicals.  She calls out the hypocrisies of false progressives such as their embracing of war as a basis for foreign policy.  She is also highly critical of their support of neoliberal open border policies and the abandonment of organized labor in favor of immigration and identity issues (which go a long way to explain the outcome of the 2016 election).  She sees liberal support for immigration as the product of guilt and a rejection of the Westphalian nation state that gave rise to liberalism and democracy.  It is not clear whether or not she sees the immigration crises as the inevitable byproduct of the interventionism she deplores.

Having herself been been denounced by Antifa (and there is apparently a distinction to be made between American and European Antifa), Johnstone sees much of today’s radical left as zealous dupes of the real enemy, the neoliberal mainstream, as they attack an unsavory but equally marginalized far right.  Division is good for politics.  On this point, I think a another distinction is in order: an argument can be made in favor of Antifa in a proximate sense: if Germany during the 1920s taught us anything (other than not to debase a national currency), it should have been that when the Nazis show up, they must be strongly opposed, that you cannot concede the streets to them.  However, in terms of the big picture about the failure of the left in our time relative to the neoliberal establishment, I think that Johnstone’s critique has some validity.

But what exactly is the soft authoritarianism that she describes as having undermined the Left?  According to Johnstone, it goes beyond neoliberal policy and includes the Internet and entertainment industries as parts of a rotten overarching status quo.  She disparages the name-calling on the left amounting to the reduction of this state of affairs to “fascism.”  Such epithets are both too easy and inaccurate. She writes:

“The contemporary West combines a mood of ‘anything goes’ with a new sort of nameless tyranny.  The term ‘fascism’ is misleading.  Fascism historically involved a strong charismatic leader of a disciplined, armed party, imposing unity and order on the basis of a clear (however erroneous) program commanding mass support.  Today, whatever leadership there is lies behind the scenes, promoting chaos and disorder.  Today’s strange tyranny is something new, without a name of its own.  In the ‘information society,’ it has no clear doctrine but rather a fluid and often contradictory set of beliefs circulated by the information industry.  This is a media-message tyranny, and it is significant that the most important stance of government repression has concerned not some act of violent rebellion but the peaceful revelation of facts that the public was not supposed to know.  Treated by U.S. leaders as Enemy Number One, Julian Assange was not building bombs to attack Washington but was simply conveying significant information to the public.” 

I’ll leave it at that, other than to say that I recommend the book.

The Reluctant Insider, Larry Wilkerson

I have always liked the idea of the “good” government official and as a historian, have taken joy in each example I have happened upon: Stephen Mather, Harry Hopkins, Harold Ickes, Frances Perkins, George C. Marshall, George F. Kennan, Sargent Shriver, Brent Scowcroft, etc.  It is always a pleasure to come across a new one.

Even if you follow foreign affairs, you may not know of Lawrence Wilkerson.  To the extent that he is known outside of military and government circles, it is for his role as Colin Powell’s chief of staff and speechwriter when Powell was Secretary of State. Increasingly he is known for his frank criticism of the administration for which he worked.  Even if his name is not familiar to you, you still know him—he was one of the people who helped put together Powell’s fateful presentation at the United Nations during the run up to the invasion of Iraq, a performance about which Wilkerson has been completely candid and brutally honest.  Were it not for this performance, Powell, in a more moderate administration, might have become the George Marshall of the twenty-first century.  

Colonel Wilkerson is one of those people who seem to have been everywhere and understood everything that was going on in a time of momentous events as something more than a fly-on-the-wall, an insider.  He is a moderate in the high-minded, traditional sense of the word and a military intellectual and patriot in the best sense of these terms.  

Wilkerson was born in Gaffney, South Carolina in 1945, and his life is an interesting chronicle of events as lived by an American of the postwar period.  A philosophy major, he dropped out of Bucknell to volunteer for service in Vietnam, where, by his own account, flew observation helicopters “low and slow” at treetop level as live bait to draw fire.  He saved Vietnamese civilians from massacre by landing his craft between them and the soldiers about to fire upon them.

It was through his experience in Vietnam that Wilkerson came to realize that the real reasons for war are generally not the stated ones.  It marked a sea change from a simple patriotic view of “good” American wars being fought on principle to, the realist Clauswitzian perspective that war is about power and interests, and in recent times, bad ideology.  This view further gelled during his time as a student at the Naval War College, a point in the careers of many officers when they “Peter Principle out” (i.e. when a person recaches the level of his/her incompetence and/or a level of understanding that they cannot accept without risking a kind of fundamental cognitive dissonance).  Not only is Wilkerson a policy Clauswitzian, but he also realizes the sociobiological fact that human beings are naturally aggressive creatures.

In 1989 Colin Powell noticed Wilkerson and called him in to interview for an open slot as his chief of staff.  Wilkerson aced the interview and got the job after the frank admission that he didn’t want it, that he would rather continue teaching.  

Now that the events of the George W. Bush Administration have passed into history—even though their dividends are still prominent in the news—books like this are important in setting the record straight.  This one corroborates and goes beyond recent works dealing with the ugly behind-the-scenes reality of the Bush II White House that lay the groundwork for what is likely the most catastrophic period in the history of American foreign and military affairs. 

Notable are Wilkerson’s descriptions of the internal power struggles of the Bush II years and his discussions of where the power really resided.  Cheney and Rumsfeld are obviously major players.  By now it will probably surprise few people that the first term of the second Bush Administration was the de facto the Cheney Administration.

Wilkerson details the abuses of power that continue to this day.  In this he is nonpartisan in his criticisms and notes the unsettling trend characterized by the ratcheting-up of illiberal policies (e.g. the dramatic increase of drone strikes in the post-G.W. Bush years).  He presciently observes that all administrations willingly accept the increased power inherited from the previous administration as well as the abuses of that power. 

According to Wilkerson, this trend goes far to explain why the Obama Administration never pursued charges of alleged war crimes by the previous administration.  The excesses and errors of the Bush Administration are well publicized, but the following administration cemented earlier policies in place, and in many cases expanded them and made them respectable for moderates and progressives to embrace.  Wilkerson sees the policies of the Obama Administration as being more “draconian” than those of the administration that preceded it.

Wilkerson is honest, and smart—an idea man with a keen analytical mind and a forthright, no-nonsense military style.  He is smart in a decent, commonsensical way and has a powerful, disillusioned ability to see through cynicism and frauds.  He is completely open about his views and is courageous in speaking the truth. Just as two-time recipient of the Congressional Medal of Honor, Smedley Butler realized that the Banana Wars of the early twentieth-century were about corporate interests, Wilkerson knows that our involvement in the Middle East is in large measure about oil. 

The format of the book takes a little getting used to.  As its back cover describes it, the book is “A collection of interviews conducted by TRNN Senior Editor Paul Jay with Wilkerson.”  The interviews were conducted between 2008 and 2015, and so there is no comparisons of the first two administrations of the present century with the current one.  Except for Wilkerson’s address “The Military-Industrial-Congressional Complex,” delivered at the American University in 2009 (which serves as an introduction), the format is essentially that of a raw transcript that can be a little difficult to read at first.  The text is therefore not a structured monograph by a single author but rather an unscripted dialog and one has to get used to Wilkerson’s rhythms and informal speaking patterns.

At 210 pages (with no table of contents), the book covers a vast territory of topics from torture of terrorist suspects to how the destruction of Iraq made Iran the hegemon of the Gulf region, and this review in no way does justice to its scope.  The tone and expanse of topics make book an excellent compliment to parallel writings of other former military men like Andrew Bacevich (both of whom are members of the nonpartisan think tank, the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft), and perhaps Anthony Zinni, and can be a cross reference for histories on the post-2000 administrations and their various foreign adventures (e.g. the chapters on the second Bush Administration in Bartholomew Sparrow’s biography of Brent Scowcroft, The Strategist). 

I recommend this book, but you might have a hard time finding it.  You will likely not find it on the shelves of any bookstore when they reopen (assuming that there still are bookstores after the pandemic).  I don’t use Amazon, and I couldn’t find it elsewhere, so I just emailed The Real News Network and they kindly sent me a copy.

A Jane Jacobs Moment?

By Michael F. Duggan

Crisis is the mother of prophecy.

Predictions abound among the Cassandras and Jeremiahs of the chattering classes about the economic meltdown that may follow in the wake of the pandemic.  A common theme is that not only will a greater-than-the-Great-Depression depression result, but that the Keynesian machinery is no longer in place to effectively deal with it when it does.  Others have observed that even if a leader with the political skills and economic sensibilities to deal with such a crisis suddenly emerged—and there is no one like this on the horizon—this latter-day Franklin Roosevelt would not be able to unify a nation so badly divided toward an effective approach.1  Do “red” states have a right to impose their values on “blue” states, or vice-versa?   If the answer is “no,” then one possibility is that the nation could eventually break up into smaller sovereign or semi-sovereign regions in the not-too-distant future.  Where unity is not possible, separation becomes inevitable.

The idea of the United States finding a more effective arrangement than its traditional federalism is not a new one.  George F. Kennan and others have suggested the reconfiguration of the nation into provinces or “constituent republics.”2  These might be based on Canadian provinces, the lines of time zones, or cultural-geographical regions.  One justification for this view is the observation that the most successful countries are homogenous, medium-sized nations with diversified economies.  By contrast the Federal Government—at least in its present state of dysfunction—is too unwieldy to deal with local problems, and the states are too uneven in their abilities and approaches. The implication is that big is bad when it comes to a rapidly-evolving national crisis with multifarious local manifestations.  On the other hand, delegating the equivalent of a national war effort to the discretion of more than 50 smaller jurisdictions with varying levels of wisdom, honesty, and competency is even more problematic. 

Most people familiar with Jane Jacobs know her as the author of The Life and Death of Great American Cities and from her famous preservation efforts in New York City (she helped save Washington Square from a Fifth Avenue extension project and was instrumental in stopping Robert Moses’s dream of a Lower Manhattan Expressway that would have destroyed Greenwich Village).3  Jacobs was a natural-born, intuitive genius—an observer of the first order—and her career is the stuff of legend.  Her writing is fresh, her ideas striking and original. 

In the late 1950s and 60s, she stood up to the acolytes of Le Corbusier at Harvard, M.I.T., and the Port Authority.  She warned that the Title 1 projects—the soulless apartment buildings set among superblocks and “[p]romenades that go from no place to nowhere”—would become high-rise hellholes, and was pilloried for it.4  But Jacobs was right and the true believers of the mid-century urban orthodoxy were wrong: cities are living things, and neighborhoods must be reclaimed and not torn down under a misled ideology of the “doctrine of the salvation of brick” and related myths.

In 1984 Jacobs wrote Cities and the Wealth of Nations, a book that is every bit as important as her first.5  The earlier book depicts cities as living systems centered on the human interactions and transactions of street life; the latter work depicts the role of cities in a larger organic context as the basis for regional economies.  Jacobs believed that naturalistic production regions were a better and more sustainable basis for an economy than the artificial structures of the nation-state.  The two books are therefore linked by a concept of economic localism primarily based on small and medium-sized businesses. 

Jacobs argues that in a healthy economy, each region is centered on an import-replacing city.  The region depends on the city and the city depends on the region in close and necessary symbiosis.  By contrast, top-down economies based on military spending or permanent government work projects—although useful as temporary measures to pull a nation out of an economic crisis—ultimately undermine an otherwise healthy economy.6  Likewise, an overly-internationalized economy based on comparative advantage, labor arbitrage, multilateral trade agreements, and Big Finance, undermines naturalistic economies both at home and in developing nations.  A neoliberal economics based on efficiency all but destroys the potential of an economy based on regionally-produced durable goods and local employment.  Globalization is therefore bad for both rich and poor nations alike.

One can imagine a world of several hundred small nations all based on economic production regions and with a sufficient degree of economic diversity to prevent the dangers of over-specialization and “one-trick-pony” economies.  With no hegemons or monster nations, there would be little practical reason for nations to fight each other, although human irrationality and aggression would obviously remain.  Such an arrangement could be the closest thing to an optimal world economic order.

The basis for what constitutes a nation is an imprecise calculus of many things: shared aesthetic and cultural traditions, geographical considerations, historical and legal commonality, ethnicity, language, religion, and sometimes formal founding principles.  But in terms of economics, Jacobs appears to be on to something.  In this nation, localism construed as “states rights” was used as a smokescreen for segregation, provincial bullies, and urban political machines, but Jacob’s version of the local is different.  The question—as with all big ideas—is: how do you get there from here?  Aye, there’s the rub.

Do Americans on either side of the cultural divide have a right to impose their values on their counterparts?  Perhaps not.  But then what is the means to a more rational configuration and what would be the basis for opposing it?  Lincoln succeeded in holding the country together under a transcendent vision of Union, and an estimated 750,000 Americans died as a result.7  By contrast, Norway/Sweden and the Czech Republic/Slovakia chose amicable divorces and the results have been good.  The question is whether both sides of today’s culture wars have the ability and political maturity to cooperate toward such an end.  Does the nation have the capacity to transform into more coherent regionally-based autonomous sections along the lines of Jacob’s model?  At this point, Americans can’t even handle merge zones with grace, much less charity.  

Crises are also drivers of innovation.  Theodore Roosevelt’s Bull Moose campaign of 1912 dangled social democracy before the electorate, but it took the Great Depression and another Roosevelt to implement it.  With the proper political leadership, the current moment could also be one of change.  But with the discussion shifting to issues of reopening and a return to “normalcy”—presumably without taking advantage of a rare historical opportunity to address climate issues or structural flaws in the economy—the chances of something like Jacob’s model coming to the fruition seem as remote as ever.  If the economy tanks, as some economists it expect it to do, the possibility of a national breakup may force itself on decision-makers over the coming years or decades.  If so, a more likely outcome in a nation with hundreds of millions of guns could be a violent social ungluing rather than a cooperative transformation of the Union into regions.  If the United States does come apart at the seams, there is no telling what the result would be or whether it will be violent or controlled.

It is noteworthy that Jacobs’s last book, the uncharacteristically pessimistic Dark Age Ahead, predicts a downward spiral for the United States into a new Dark Age.  Here she casts the nation in the early twenty-first century as a latter-day Roman Empire prior to its collapse.8

Notes

  1. This idea was suggested to me by David Isenbergh.
  2. George F. Kennan, Around the Cragged Hill (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993), 149-151. Gore Vidal also suggested that the United States adopt a more wieldy arrangement of provinces.
  3. Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Random House, 1961).
  4. The Death and Life of Great American Cities, 6.  
  5. Cities and the Wealth of Nations (New York: Random House, 1984).  
  6. Cities and the Wealth of Nations, 183.
  7. See Guy Gugliotta, “New Estimate Raises Civil War Death Toll,” The New York Times, April 2, 2012.
  8. Jane Jacobs, Dark Age Ahead (New York: Random House, 2004), 198-199.  

I thank Joe Musumeci for editing this article.