By Michael F. Duggan
The Russian withdrawal from southern Ukrainian city of Kherson is being widely reported as a battlefield victory for the Ukrainians and an inglorious reverse for the Russian forces. According to Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, it marks nothing less than “the beginning of the end of the war,” the conflict’s equivalent to the D-Day landings. Although it is hard to know what is really going on in Ukraine, the pullback of Russian troops from the city appears to be a consolidation of their positions behind the Dnieper River, in essence strengthening their lines. In this sense, the initial Ukrainian suspicion of the Russian withdrawal appears to have been well-founded.
In some respects, the Russian redeployment may be like the German strategy of February and March 1917 of withdrawing from inferior positions on the Western Front to prepared positions with greater defensive advantages. Although Germany would eventually lose the First World War, the redeployment to the Hindenburg Line was a sound strategy (and the bigger picture of Germany in 1917 and Russia in 2022 are quite different in terms of resources). The Dnieper—a mile wide at Kherson and considerably wider upstream—is a natural barrier that will be difficult for the Ukrainians to overcome as tens, perhaps hundreds of thousands of Russian reservists and other non-regular army troops begin to arrive at the front. The Russians may then just wait for Ukrainian attacks to impale themselves on the new positions. When the hitherto anemic Russian forces are sufficient, it is entirely possible that they will launch an offensive sometime in the winter or spring of 2023. At that point, the purpose of last week’s withdrawal will come into sharper focus.
But there is an even darker side to these recent developments. Encouraged by its apparent victory, Ukraine now has no reason to sue for peace short of reoccupying its lost territory, including Crimea. With replacements arriving on the front—and with the possibility of holding the good cards in terms of fresh manpower and resources—Russia has no reason to negotiate either.
Russia can now replace its losses more effectively and in greater numbers than before. Ukraine will likely have a harder time replacing losses, and the question is what are the real numbers—the actual losses on both sides (i.e. the ratio of loses) relative to the overall resources of both nations to sustain their war efforts? This is the real calculus in determining how the war might end. Especially important is the losses sustained by Ukraine in its recent offensive in the south relative to Russian losses falling back on the defensive.