The Winter Offensive II

By Michael F. Duggan

With Russian reservists arriving or soon to arrive at the front in eastern Ukraine, it is possible that a winter ground offensive is in the works. One also hears the argument: given that the ongoing drone and missile campaign appears to be degrading the Ukrainian infrastructure at the onset of winter, and that a massive land assault could bringing NATO units directly into the fight while risking increased casualty rates even without a wider war, Russia may choose to stake its chances on the air offensive alone. If this is true, it is also a gamble.

My father was a career combat infantry officer, and while he readily conceded the importance of airpower, it was always secondary and adjunct in his estimation. Tactical air superiority gave ground forces a powerful advantage, and strategic bombing was always impressive in terms of scale. But it was “boots on the ground” that won wars.

As time went on, there were exceptions to this rule; the NATO air campaign in Kosovo in 1999 appears to have been decisive without the introduction of Western ground forces. Likewise the aerial portion of Operation Desert Storm all but destroyed the Iraqi Army and might have been decisive had the war continued. Although the trend toward something like decisive air war under certain circumstances is more than suggestive, as of now Desert Storm and Kosovo are exceptions.

The Nazi Blitz of September 1940 to May 1941 only steeled British resolve, and the massive allied bombing campaigns over Germany are believed to have not been decisive in winning the war on the European front in WWII. Likewise, the B-29 fire raids on Japanese cities spread horror and suffering, but in spite of the hundreds of thousands of civilians killed, they did not by themselves end the war. The tonnage of high explosives dropped on North Korea and North Vietnam boggles the mind, and yet these air campaigns did not break the will of the people in either country. The regimes in Hanoi and Pyongyang remain in place.

Is the current drone and missile campaign the anticipated Russian winter offensive? Time will tell. If this is Russia’s strategy, will it work, and what will become of a Ukraine with great reductions in power and sanitation? Who will pay for and rebuild the Ukrainian grid and other infrastructure? The Ukrainians have shown themselves to be brave, tough, and resilient, but all of the signs point to a long and difficult winter for them. As of now, the Russian aerial blitz appears to be yet another aggravating factor in what has been a humanitarian disaster from the start. With the possibility of the United States supplying Ukraine with Patriot missiles, it has also triggered another round of escalation.