By Michael F. Duggan
Watch Bakhmit. Some of the most significant battles of the World Wars involved salients, promontories jutting into enemy territory, and this may prove to be the case in the Russo-Ukrainian War.
The first large-scale offensive of the independent American Expeditionary Force in the First World War was launched at the St. Mihiel salient in September 1918. In December 1944, an unexpected German offensive created a burgeoning “bulge” in the Allied lines in the Ardennes Forest in Belgium, France, and Luxemburg. You destroy salients by nipping them off at the base combined with direct assaults elsewhere. In both cases, these salients were reduced in part by coordinate attacks on either side at the point where the bulge joined the line (the Germans were withdrawing from St. Mihiel at the time of the American attack, so the task for the U.S. forces was perhaps less costly than it might have otherwise been).
The Bakhmut salient is somewhat different from these historical examples. Rather than denoting a previously quiet sector (like St. Michiel and Verdun) or a the result of surprise offensive (like the Ardennes) into Russian-held territory, the protruding nature of the Bakhmut salient is the result of Russian pincer movements on either side of the city, an encirclement conducted largely by the Wagner Group (whose December strength of around 50,000 is the approximate equivalent of two corps). Following the fall of nearby Soledar in mid-January, it has been the result of ongoing Russian attacks and the magnificent defense of the small city by Ukrainian forces (the town has been under fire since the middle of last May). The Russian goal is to presumably cut it off, force its surrender, or destroy it outright as an enemy pocket. The strategy appears to be one that was favored initially by the Wehrmacht and then the Soviets on the Eastern Front during WWII.
During the second half of the war, the Soviets became expert in large-scale pincer movements: pin down the enemy in the front, encircle on both sides, and then close the circle or wait for its defenders to capitulate. The Eastern Front moved westward by a series of these battles, some of them in Ukraine. It became the signature operational strategy of the Red Army, and some of these actions were among the largest and most costly battles in history. The Germans never developed an effective counterstrategy to this approach, and encircled areas became kill zones before being completely reduced. The present offensive around Bakhmut has the characteristics of a WWII pincer/encirclement offensive and a slow, grinding WWI offensive with gains measured in meters. To date the casualty rates are supposed to have been horrendous.
In a war that is going well, encircled units may be relieved before destruction. This was the case of the 101st Airborne Division at Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge (the Screaming Eagles were surrounded within an enemy salient that was quickly reduced). If relief or withdrawal are not possible, encircled units,—besieged and cut off from supply lines—have three choices: a fighting breakout to the rear, surrender, or destruction. On the Eastern Front, the Soviets used combined arms attacks supported by massed rocket artillery, Katyushas—the horrifying, shrieking area weapons that the Germans called “Stalin’s organ”—to reduce encircled sectors. If the present Russian offensive grinds on, as it is expected to do, and an orderly withdrawal from the area becomes impossible, then these three options may become the only choices left for the Ukrainian defenders of Bakhmut. If the town falls, it could spell disaster for the side that fought so well to defend it. The best option therefore, may be to abandon the city and fall back to stronger defensive positions, as the Russians themselves did at Kherson.
Although the Russians will press their offensive at multiple points along the front, the town is seen by both sides as a linchpin of the war. Russia and Ukraine are both committing massive resources to the fight. Why? Except for the fact that it is an administrative center—perhaps the equivalent of an important county (raion) seat (with a prewar population around 71,000, it is slightly larger than Rockville, Maryland)—in a salt mining area and a crossroads town (like Borodino, Gettysburg, and Bastogne), what is its strategic importance?
From what I understand—and accurate information is hard to come by—both sides may consider the town to be the gateway to western (i.e. unoccupied) Donetsk. Taking Bakhmut would therefore allow the Russians to move on the larger cities of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk and securing the rest of the Donetsk oblast. Some commentators have speculated that a Russian victory at Bakhmut could mark the beginning of the end of the war—a latter-day Stalingrad on a smaller scale. But again, it is hard to tell. At least one observer (Scott Ritter) has pointed out that Bakhmut is a strategic strong point in the line. Thus the Russians appear to be violating the Napoleonic precept to avoid an enemy in a prepared position. If the Russians do break through there, it is difficult to say how the U.S. and NATO would respond, but it might signal a new and extremely dangerous phase of the war. The town has also become an important symbol for the brave Ukrainian resistance, and winning there appears to have become a matter of national pride for both sides. Casualties are supposed to be horrendous. It is a microcosm of the war.
Postscript, May 13, 2023
Over the past few days, Ukrainian forces have made gains to the immediate north and south of the Bakhmut salient. The Russian strategy of the past few months now appears to have been similar to that of the Soviets at Stalingrad: to bleed the other side white.
Postscript, May 21, 2023
Russian sources are reporting that Bakhmut has fallen.