Monthly Archives: June 2023

By Michael F. Duggan

A few weeks ago, a friend of mine devised a topical-analytical term of art—a specialized usage of a common word and its variations—to describe the bases of divisions that now threaten the domestic tranquility of our nation.  The term is incomprehension. His use of the word means an inability of ordinary Americans to understand each other or to communicate on the same wavelength or with similar perceptions and assumptions.

For instance, Democrats and progressives are unable to understand how anyone could fall for someone like Trump.  They regard MAGA supporters to be deluded—either a manifestation of mass psychosis or else a cult phenomenon—and unable to see through the illusion.  Trump supporters say that it is the liberals who are deluded, that they take him too literally out of hostility and cannot understand his greatness (as Salena Zito observed “The press takes [Trump] literally but not seriously; his supporters take him seriously, but not literally).¹  Non-supporters comprehend him differently from supporters and their comprehension is incomprehensible to the other side, so they must be bad. The MAGA and Woke communities represent different universes that are fundametnally at odds with each other, work on different sets of assumptions, and are therefore Irreconcilable.   

Likewise, the populist right is dumbfounded by the progressive preoccupation with various social-sexual and gender issues.  To those on the right, the liberal focus on transgender issues and activities like drag shows, for instance, is eccentric, outlandish, baffling, and offensive to traditional values.  Other than what they regard to be a calculated attack on their moral beliefs, such causes are incomprehensible to them. These issues are as bewildering to the Right as QAnon conspiracy theories are to the Left. And from such a lack of mutual understanding and sympathy for the other side comes distrust, anger, and then hatred. 

But the incomprehension of our people goes beyond the ideologies of the culture wars.  It is also found in the interactions of daily life.  When white, working class Americans come face to face with newly-arrived immigrants from Latin America, both sides will likely experience incomprehension.  Although members of both groups may embrace variations of Christian faith and may occupy a similar economic space, there is a strong manifestation of cultural and linguistic incomprehension.   

For progressives, or anyone with sympathy for others, it is a difficult thing to admit, but the larger and more diverse a nation becomes, the less governable it becomes.  The smaller and more homogeneous a democracy is, the better its chances (think of a New England town hall meeting or a small country, like Denmark).  This is because the citizens of a small, uniform community or nation can comprehend their fellow citizens and understand and identify with their interests. 

By contrast, the larger and more diverse a nation becomes, the less democratic it becomes as individual rights give way to group rights, identification, interests, and social causes (name a nation as large or larger than the United States with a burgeoning, diverse population that is a showcase for liberal democracy).  Social democracy in a nation as large and varied as the U.S. in 2023 is probably a nonstarter.  As the late Tony Judt observed in 2010, “There may be something inherently selfish in the social service states of the mid-20^th century: blessed for a few decades with the good fortune of ethnic homogeneity and a small, educated, population where almost everyone could recognize themselves in everyone else.”²  The New Deal worked in large part because Americans could see themselves in the faces of the dispossessed.  They could comprehend their fellow citizens and their plight.   

I realize that all of this suggests something ugly about people, a hardwired propensity for tribalism and racism.  I don’t like this fact, and yet we must acknowledge it in order to address it. Rather than resorting to name-calling, it is better to try to understand what lies beneath bigoted attitudes and the foundations of incomprehension.  As the sociobiologist, Edward O. Wilson notes,

“All things being equal (fortunately things are seldom equal, not exactly), people prefer to be with others who look like them, speak the same dialect, and hold the same beliefs.  An amplification of this evidently inborn predisposition leads with frightening ease to racism and religious bigotry.  Then, also with frightening ease, good people do bad things.  I know this truth from having grown up in the Deep South during the 1930s and 1940s.”³

 Although Wilson’s observation flies in the face of the idea that differences sometimes attract and that diversifying the gene pool is a good thing that might be reflected in social behavior, he appears to be right that, on balance, people prefer to be with others that they can comprehend, and that race, language, and beliefs are bases for comprehension.  Wilson’s observation also identifies the inborn propensity for the tribalism that underlies racism, and therefore embraces the idea that racism must be actively opposed.  There is no such thing as the benign neglect of bigotry, and the hope that if we don’t teach children to be bigots they won’t become bigots is a dangerous one.  We must teach and encourage the comprehension of others if we are to bridge the dangerous divides in our country.

I believe it is the conservative political thinker, Peter Viereck (who now reads like a cautious progressive) who observes that when fundamental change comes too quickly, the result is instability and eventually violence.  I would offer that the cause of that instability and violence is a situation in which comprehension does not keep pace with change.  Therefore we must educate all sides about the humanity and rationale of those they oppose, those who they do not comprehend.  We cannot change the nation in fundamental ways and hope that attitudes will just catch up with new social realities.  We must make sure that social change and education about such things are on the same timetable and that the change is wanted and considered to be desirable by a sizable majority. Of course there is no guarantee, or even likelihood that a greater comprehension of both sides by both sides will be welcomed by either side. My sense is that the divides are already too deep to be bridged.     

Notes
1). Selena Zito, “Taking Trump Seriously, not Literally, The Atlantic, Sept. 23, 2016.
2). Tony Judt, Ill Fares the Land, 2010. 70. 
3) Edward O. Wilson, The Meaning of Human Existence, 31.

By Michael F. Duggan

After months of discussion and speculation, the Ukrainian offensive has begun. I don’t know how an army is supposed to launch an effective breaching attack along a fixed line when virtually everybody has called attention to it for so long. Such talk has not helped the Ukrainian war effort. I will not repeat anything here that one cannot access on any number of public sites.

What appears to be happening are battalion to brigade-size operations in front the Russian lines to the south and east of the city of Zaporizhia. There are also attacks in Donetsk around Bakhmut and further to the north. The media, parroting each other, are delighted to have discovered the military term “shaping” to describe these attacks. Although the Ukrainians are certainly trying to shape the emerging battlefields, they are also preforming reconnaissance-in-force attacks, or the use of battalions, regiments, and brigades to probe the Russian defenses in search for weak points and to determine enemy strength generally. These units would then be robust enough to exploit holes in the enemy lines and perhaps act as spearheads for brigades of the main force behind them.

At this point, there appear to be several possible outcomes for the operations already underway.
First, if Western-trained and equipped probing units reveal that the Russian lines are too strong to be breached, the offensive could be called off, allowing for a new strategy to be formulated. This could be the beginning of the frozen war of which some commentators have spoken, although the Russians might see an abandoned attack as an opportunity to launch their a counteroffensive (as with the American Civil War, the Western Front in the First World War, and the Eastern Front in the Second, counterpunches might be effectively used in this war).

Second, the Ukrainians could proceed with the offensive and commit the main body of attacking units. If reports are correct that Russian forces have created a defense in depth—successive lines with pre-sighted kill zones between them—the Ukrainians could be facing a strategic disaster that could shift the course and nature of the war. This is because of the inherent advantage of the defensive mode of warfare and the fact that the Russians have had months to dig in. Without significant advantages in heavy artillery and air superiority, it is doubtful that any combined arms campaign could succeed against such a well-entrenched foe.

The front in eastern Ukraine is often compared to the stalemate, the “trenchlock,” of the Western Front in the First World War. Throughout most of WWI, both sides believed that a single exploited breakthrough would rupture the equlibrium and could win the war. In fact the final victory in that war was the result of a general collapse of the German lines due to exhaustion vis-a-vis the arrival of 2 million American troops. It seems possible that even a dynamic breakthrough will not end this war either, so long as both armies have the capacity to fight. The end may come as a general collapse of the line.

Third, the Ukrainian forces break through to Mariupol or Melitopol or some other point or points on the Sea of Azov. If so the Russian-occupied territory in Ukraine would be cut in half, and the “land bridge” from Russia to Crimea would be severed. The Ukrainian forces would then have to immediately turn their focus to the south with a holding action to the north. If not they would find themselves in a narrow corridor facing attacks from two sides (like the allied Arnhem campaign of September 1944). This scenario seems unlikely, and were the Ukrainian forces to push through to the Azov, one can only wonder what would happen next.

Was it wise to put so much pressure on the Ukrainians by suggesting that the entire course of the war was riding on the outcome of a single offensive (I have even read that the entire “rule-based international order” of the world is hanging in the balance)? Over the past week, a number of media outlets have been trying to manage expectations by walking back statements on the either/or importance of the offensive. There now appears to be a failure of confidence among the pundits, or else a partial return to caution after so much blather and hype. Did talk help drive events? A video with exquisite production quality released a few days before the offensive showed a sequence of Ukrainian fighting men sushing the viewer not to talk about the offensive. Good advice. But it was too late for that. The element of surprise was blown months ago, if it ever existed, and now efforts to tamp-down speculation about the offensive and expectations are just another part of the story.

Initial reports are that Ukrainian units on the offensive are encountering considerable resistance. A push to the north of Bakhmut near the village of Berkhivka appears to have gained ground, but elsewhere the Russian lines have not been breached. There are now stories and grainy images from the battlefield of destroyed Bradley Fighting Vehicles and a Leopard 2 tank, although at this point in the campaign, such images do not mean much.

By Michael F. Duggan

Like so much in a war that makes little sense, the blowing up of the Nova Kakhovka hydroelectric dam  upriver from Kherson is baffling.  It appears to have been either a mutually destructive act of desperation by one side or the other, or else an accident.   

Why would the Russians blow up the Dam?  Consider:

• The Western media would likely blame Russia in any event, thus giving rise to greater sympathy for Ukraine just as support for the war is flagging in the NATO nations and as Russian dominance on the battlefield appears to be consolidating.
• A major prong of Russian strategy has been to systematically destroy/degrade Ukrainian infrastructure.  Given this, why would Russia so vehemently deny culpability in this particular instance?
• The Russian defensive positions on the bottomland of the “Left Bank” of the Dnieper are lower than the adjacent shore, the Ukrainian-controlled side of the river.  Why would the Russians flood their own positions before pulling back their forces and defenses?
• Why would the Russians turn off the water to Crimea, including the Crimea Canal?
• Why would Russia turn off the water to a nuclear power plant under their control?    
• Taking out the “Kakhovka Sea”—a Great Salt Lake-size reservoir 150 miles long and 14 miles wide at points (and an impressive defensive barrier)—increases the length of front line significantly between Kherson and Zaporizhia.  Once the mud dries, the Dniepro will presumably be easier to cross in this area.  The Russians will now have a considerably longer defensive line to defend.  This will have the practical effect of drawing Russian forces and resources off of other parts of the line (although in the event of a Russian offensive, all of these observations could be applied to the Ukrainians).
• Could Russia have blown the dam in order to thwart an impending cross-river attack on the Russian-controlled portion of the Kherson Oblast?

Why would the Ukrainians blow up the Dam? 

• Why would the Ukrainians intentionally flood large areas of Kherson, a city they fought so hard to retake, as well as dozens of smaller towns?
• Why would they cut off the water to the agricultural areas of southern Ukraine under their control?
• Why would they inflict such a distraction onto themselves immediately before launching the much-discussed spring offensive?    
• The idea that the Ukrainians blew the dam might make sense as an act of extreme desperation to win greater sympathy from Europe and to flood Russian forces on the eastern bank of the lower Dnieper.  It could also be useful as a justification if the spring offensive fails.   

All of the reasons for either side blowing the dame seem thin and/or counterproductive.  Both sides will suffer from the lost irrigation water and from the environmental damage done to the region, the Black Sea, and its fisheries. Perhaps it was an accident of the kind so common in war, a fuckup. Sometimes the least dramatic answer is the real one. The dam had been shelled by the Ukrainians and it is possible that the Russian occupiers let the water behind the dam rise to an unsafe level during and after the winter rains.  

By Michael F. Duggan

In a time when so much of the news ranges from the merely bad to the pre-Apocalyptic, the news out of Brazil was mixed this week. On the one hand, the bossa nova singer, Astrud “The Girl from Impanema” Gilberto, died at 83. On the other hand, Brazilian president, Lula de Silva declared an ambitious plan to stop all illegal cutting in the Amazon basin by 2030. If he succeeds, it will be an important victory for the environment.

Although Lula is committed to environment, I will believe it when I see it. As we all know from the election of Jair Bolsonaro, Brazilian presidential politics can turn on a 10 Centavos piece, and even the best efforts can be undone in short order. Lula still has three and a half years to begin implementing this noble plan. In an increasingly dark time, it is a singular glimmer of light.

By Michael F. Duggan

Robert F. Kennedy, who died 55 years ago today, represents the last gasp of the vital American liberalism that died along with so much else of the promise of the 1960s in 1968.  What many Americans do not know, is that for much of his life, Bobby Kennedy was suspicious of liberals. 

Bobby had been Jack’s pit bull, his “ruthless” fixer, and there was a hard, pragmatic edge to him that is so conspicuously missing in many progressive politicians from Adlai Stevenson to the present day.  Writing about himself in the third person, Norman Mailer observes “Of course [Mailer] had been partisan to Bobby Kennedy, excited precisely by his admixture of idealism plus willingness to traffic with demons, ogres, and overlords of corruption.”  In spite the depth and soulfulness of his final years and his steady drift to the left, Kennedy had long been skeptical about “professional liberals.”  He once observed that, “They like it much better to have a cause than a course of action that’s been successful.”¹  

Was RFK right?  Do some American liberals prefer to talk about their outrage rather than realistically solve problems?  Could this in part be why conservatives have been more successful than liberals in recent decades and why hard-nosed, unapoligetic progressivism is more or less dead in the United States?  Some of the liberals whose posts I read on social media are happy to express indignation, but do liberals really prefer to be right than successful?  They seem to like pushing back against rhetoric with rhetoric of their own rather than trying to solve the root cause of the serious and not-so-serious problems so conspicuously manifested in the sound and fury of the culture wars.  

For instance, many of progressives I read tend to focus on the outward symptoms of the perspectives that offend them, whether it is racism, sexism, homophobia, and related gender bigotry.  Cleverness appears to be a surrogate for effective action. Their opponents are simply stupid or else bad and without motive beyond a kind of unthinking, unfeeling malice existing in an ahistorical, causal vacuum.  Progressives also seem to take a solemn, righteous joy in the discomfort their positions on gender instill in opponents who embrace traditional morality, and then are quick to resort to name-calling rather than trying to understand the opposing positions and bridge the gap.

They consider their fellow Americans on the populist right to be beyond redemption and seem to have little curiosity about the longstanding issues of economics, bad governance, and national decline that led to such attitudes.  Every day they are disappointed, disbelieving, or righteously indignant over the bigoted or insensitive attitudes of those who oppose them, and who are not sufficiently evolved in their thinking to agree with the moral purity and patent common sense their own enlightened positions.

As long as we address only the symptoms of our national divide, we will never find a way to bridge it. And while we must sometimes treat the symptoms of an illness in order to save a patient, such an approach will never stem a general outbreak.  Americans are an unhistorical people; we prefer to react to what offends us, reinforcing what we already believe, rather than looking at longstanding historical causes and pedigrees behind the attitudes.  As Bertrand Russel observes, “it is pleasant to think of ourselves as virtuous and our enemies wicked,” but we must go beyond appearances and get to the root causes of our differences if we are to bridge them.²  I hope that no reader of mine will think that my criticism is only reserved for the Left. I am far more critical of the extremism of the Right.  But I believe that we must look below the surface of people’s positions in good faith and empathy if we are to effectively address the divides that threaten our nation.

Notes
1. Arthur Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His Times, 372.
2. Bertrand Russell, Why I am not a Christian, 50.