Realism and Policy

By Michael F. Duggan

With twenty battle stars, the USS Enterprise is the most highly decorated U.S. warship of the Second World War. Many, perhaps most, Americans associate its name with a fictional spaceship. Between 57 million and 97 million people are estimated to have died in the World Wars, and yet many, perhaps most, Americans associate the term stormtrooper with fictional, anonymous soldiers from the Star Wars franchise. Rocky Marciano was the only undefeated world heavyweight boxing champion winning 49 out of 49 fights, 43 by knockout, and was never fought to a draw. And yet most Americans associate the name with a fictional fighter played by Sylvester Stallone.

Donatello, Leonardo, Michelangelo, and Raphael were among the front row of Renaissance painters. Except for art and art history majors, a generation or two of Americans associate these names with anthropomorphized cartoon turtles. In terms of volume, the Amazon is the largest river on Earth and its basin is the most biologically diverse region of the planets. And yet a simple Google search of “Amazon” did not provide a single result for the river and its basin among the top 20 hits. A result for a WWF site the Amazon came in at 21.

I will let these observations speak for themselves.

By Michael F. Duggan

In an essay titled “Fog of War brought Down to Life” (September 4), Gilbert Doctorow suggests that even the most informed of us—a category to which I do not include myself—really have little idea of what is happening on the front lines in Ukraine. At least that is how I read it.

Western news sources point out Russian mistakes and miscalculations, poor equipment, bad morale, and incompetent leadership, and yet they devised a defensive line in depth that stopped the Ukrainian summer counteroffensive. Some independent, realist, and pro-Russian sources predicted the failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, huge casualty rates, shortages of Ukrainian reserves and artillery shells, and a grinding Russian counter-counteroffensive leading to victory in late summer or fall. And yet is late summer and Ukraine is still punching hard and fighting back with great intensity.

Scott Ritter stands by his prediction of a Russian strategic victory over the coming month or two, and Western media sources are heartened by the apparent breakthrough by Ukrainian forces in the area around Robotyne and Verbove. What seems certain is that something will give, somewhere. The alternative is an “ugly” Russian victory and/or a never-ending frozen conflict that is like a larger and more active version of the demilitarized zone between the Koreas. Ukraine may end up as “Korea West” in the new Cold War.

By Michael F. Duggan

America’s favorite epicurean billionaire is gone at 76. He wrote some fun songs, and created and guarded a branding empire like a Gilded Age robber baron.

I was ambivalent about Buffett’s music, briefly embracing at fleeting moments during fleeting summers in my twenties, and I am sure that I knew some Parrot Heads. It was certainly a background mainstay of laidback summer drinking events at the shore. A lot of his songs are about drinking and now seem self-indulgent, self-centered, and even self-pitying (“A Pirate turns 40”).

But beyond a Dionysian celebration of drinking rum and braggadocio about the high-octane escapist lifestyle, what is there? Among his Greatest Hits are a couple of decent breakup/makeup songs (“Come Monday,” “Miss You so Badly”), and a few novelty songs (“Cheeseburger in Paradise,” Pencil-Thin Mustache,” “Why Don’t We get Drunk?”, and that really silly one about the volcano). This hardly puts him up there with Dylan or Lennon and McCartney, much less the Gershwin’s or T.S. Eliot. As a friend of mine pointed out, his most soulful song, one that is not about himself, may be “He Went to Paris,” which is thoughtful, sympathetic, and bittersweet.

He had a knack for melody, although sometimes they run together a little. But in general, Buffett seemed to be mostly about Buffett, and I suspect the appeal, beyond the facial allure of tropical carousing, was the fact that we could put ourselves in his shoes by singling along with him (if The Simpsons is to be believed, he did not let people cover his songs). Perhaps I am overthinking it and should take his music for what it is as a not insignificant contribution to the songbook of American summer vacation.

It seems fitting that he left us at the end of summer on Labor Day Friday.

By Michael F. Duggan

Last week the Ukrainian Ground Forces took the village of Robotyne on the Russian front lines along the Tomak-Melitopol axis in Zaporizhzhia. The town appears to have been destroyed and one wonders if the destruction was entirely due to extremely heavy fighting, or if it was pre-targeted as a likely objective of the counteroffensive, or both. The next town in the direction of Tomak is Novoprokopivka, a short distance to the south.

But rather than attacking this town directly, Ukrainian forces appear to be using a flanking operation from the east in order to envelope or else bypass it. They appear to be moving southeast by the left flank, toward the town of Verbove. Reports from both sides indicate that advanced elements of the elite Ukrainian 82nd Airmobile Brigade, which until recently had been held in reserve, have breached the initial Russian lines of tank traps and minefields by securing a road into the town. At this point, the Ukrainians may be holding the northwest part of Verbove.

When a combined arms operation breaches the initial lines of a defense-in-depth, it has either found a chink in the enemy armor—a corridor through which it may more easily pass—or it has stumbled into a shaping zone with presighted artillery traps. The Ukrainian Ground Forces have penetrated the grey zone to a depth of roughly four miles, creating an impressive salient. At this point, the Ukrainians and the West are measuring success in terms of territory taken while the Russians appear to be fighting an attritional war. It is Jomini versus von Clausewitz.

Advances in territory have to be measure against what military men call burn rates—casualties, losses of vehicles and materiel, and the expenditures of munitions, especially artillery shells. These rates must then be measured against, not only the ground gained, but the capacity of both sides to sustain and replace such losses. Measuring success in terms of territory gained (a Jominian approach to tactics, operations, and strategy) can be misleading, unless such gains signify a game-changing breakthrough or an all out collapse of the enemy lines.

But what is really going on? What is real? Accurate information is difficult to come by and all of these observations are conjectural and based on control maps and other publicly-available online sources. It is in the interest of both sides to lie about casualties. Questions abound: Have the Ukrainians found a genuine weak point in the Russian lines that they are now effectively exploiting? Have they created a breach through which armor and mechanized infantry can now be rammed through with momentum toward objectives deeper into Russian-held territory with a strategic goal of cutting a swath to the Sea of Azov? Did they really avoid the worst of Russian defenses—tank traps, dragon’s teeth, and minefields—by securing a road leading directly into a likely objective? If so, why was this approach not more heavily defended by the Russians? Was it, as Western news outlets are reporting, less guarded so as to allow Russians to pull back quickly, and, if so, was it intended as a Russian escape route, or a means to draw the in the Ukrainians? Time will tell.

These may be real gains—the attackers have gained ground. The Ukrainians may be exploiting a weak point in the Russian defenses, or, given that they have only breached the foremost Russian lines, it could be an artillery trap. After all, why would the Russians allow a weak point along a vector running near a succession of strategic towns, but one that also directs the attackers away from that line? Deception is a first principle of war.

Robotyne is about 18 miles from Tokmak and around 54 miles from Melitopol. The sea is a little beyond Melitopol.

By Michael F. Duggan

BRICS, an emerging alternative to the G20, appears to be coming of age.

In the new and more conspicuously multipolar world—and the Second Cold War—the two primary poles of the US/West and Russia/China/Iran will be increasingly competing for the favor and resources of the third pole, a loosely aggregated league of mostly free agent states of the Global South (“BRICS” stands for Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and the league may prove attractive to much of the developing world). Looks like China and Russia intend to beat the West to the punch.

Take special note of the 15th annual BRICS summit that was held this past week in Johannesburg. Although there is currently no talk about supplanting the Dollar with the Yuan as the world reserve currency (or as a competitive alternative to the Dollar), it seems likely that if the world were to significantly de-dollarized, the US could find itself in the Great Depression II or something even worse.

Some commentators have observed that the sanctions the West has placed on Russia has had the effect of de-dollarazation parts of the world economy, and that the war in Ukraine is driving the decline of Western economic dominance. The sullen response to the war by many of the nations of the South would seem to corroborate this. Worse yet, the new and less cooperative world order is coming at a time when unity is needed, when the cooperation of China, Russia, and the Global South’s will be necessary to combat the unfolding crises of the environment.

It’s all starting to look like a Shakespearean tragedy writ large.

By Michael F. Duggan

It is a first principle of political survival for the ambitious, the audacious: “When you strike at a king, you must kill him.” The fact that this quote is from Ralph Waldo Emerson means that even the most etherial of idealists acknowledge the primacy of power politics.

From the reprisals of the earliest tribal chieftains against their rivals to the brutal realism of the Romans and the Mob, from Machiavelli and the Tudors to the failed Valkyrie plot against Hitler, from The Godfather to the Gangs of New York, history, commentary, and art all tell us that plots against the powerful are a dangerous zero-sum game. As the story of Candaules in The Histories of Herodotus tells us, a successful coup may yield fruit, but there is nothing more lethal to would-be usurpers than a failed one.

Although coups are often the acts of ambitious lieutenants, I suspect the Prigozhin putsch was more the act of a loose cannon.

In many ways it is surprising that Prigozhin survived as long as he did. When the June 24 coup failed, I thought that it would be presumptuous of him to make Labor Day plans. Let us see how the U.S. justice system treats those charged with making a coup in this country.

*At this writing, the stories of the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin in a plane crash are uncorroborated.

By Michael F. Duggan

There is a town in the Zaporizhzhia oblast to the east of what was the Kakhova Reservoir called Robotyne. It is located on the front at or near the first line of Russian defenses. Over the past several days, a new push by the Ukrainian Ground Forces has been directed toward this town and appear to have gained ground. By some reports, the Ukrainians have captured a part of the town, which lies along vectors toward the crossroads town of Tomak, Melitopal, and the Azov port city of Berdyans’k. Reaching any of these places would be a major Ukraine victory and an initial step in an apparent larger strategy to sever the Russian landbridge.

Notable in this attack is the deployment of the elite Ukrainian 82nd Air Assault Brigade, one of the Western-trained and equipped units that has to date been held in reserve. The commitment of this unit and others, like the 46th Airmobile Brigade, suggests that Ukraine is now “all in” and fully committed to the counteroffensive that began in early June. The 82nd is also notable in that it has 14 British Challenger II tanks and a larger number of U.S. Stryker CVs, and Marder IFVs, the German equivalent of the Bradley.

For months this 82nd was celebrated by some U.S. sources as “ridiculously powerful,” and boosted to the point where one wondered if the story was a plant.^1.

Although the latest push may gain additional territory in the flex zone between the lines and may even breach the foremost Russian defensive lines, penetrating all of the Russian lines and defensive zones in a drive to the Sea of Azov would seem to be all but impossible. At least one former U.S. military officer said that the commitment of these units may also signal the final major push of the Ukrainian offensive, that it could be “the beginning of the end” of the military phase of the war.

The question is: what comes next?

Note
1. For example, see, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/05/03/ukraines-82nd-air-assault-brigade-is-ridiculously-powerful-and-could-lead-the-coming-counteroffensive/?sh=7d1ef8811bbf

By Michael F. Duggan

There are necessary wars and unnecessary wars. There are crises that one side or the other wants, and there are crises that, through error or escalation, take on a will of their own.

In 1861 the Confederates forced the Sumpter Crisis: if the U.S. Army resupplied its own forts in the South, there would be war. The Imperial Japanese obviously wanted the crisis initiated by the attacks on Pearl Harbor and U.S. installations in the Philippines. In both instances, events took on a course of their own and proved catastrophic for their instigators. As long as politicians and policymakers control events and seek diplomatic resolutions, there is hope. As Churchill observes “Jaw, jaw, is always better than war, war.” But when decisions become subject to the rapidly-unfolding dictates of the crisis as seen through the lens of national security interests by the military, things may spiral, regardless of whether or not war is necessary.

The exception to this rule is when the military does not not want war.

In the summer of 1914, the politicians and their ministers went back and forth through diplomatic cables, but the two prewar European alliances—the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente—ostensibly designed to create security for the signatories, had in fact created a perfect apparatus for starting a world war. Except for Britain (whose entry in the war was based on national honour and interests like its friendship with France and protecting the Empire), every waring nation could claim self defense.¹ This is because each of the continental belligerents believed that at a certain point they had to mobilize or else fall victim to the mobilization of the enemy. It was an outlook that is reminiscent of the “use or lose” rational for modern first strike nuclear strategy.

If Russia mobilized against Austria in order to protect their slavic ally, the Serbs, Germany would have to mobilize against Russia, causing France to mobilize against Germany. Germany, faced with a two-front war, had to take out France as quickly as possible in the event of a Russian mobilization so that it could turn its efforts to the east. But in order to invade France through a course of least resistance, Germany would have to cross Belgium, thus bringing in Britain. In other words, once policy shifted from the political leaders to the military leaders, events would take on a horrible momentum, a will of their own, and avoiding war would become logistically impossible. When Russia mobilized in response to the Austrian-Hungarian attack on Serbia, the game was on, and the other three major powers of Europe followed suit. Cue: Roses of Picardy.

John Kennedy is supposed to to have read Barbara Tuchman’s The Guns of August the summer before the Cuban Missile Crisis. Although academic historians even since have created a cottage industry out of underscoring Tuchman’s errors (or else ignoring her altogether as a non-academic historian), she got some of the basics right, and Kennedy took away the proper lessons. Unlike 1861 and 1941, the leaders of October 1962 were looking for a way out. Unlike 1914, Kennedy was calling the shots for his side and did not let things get to the point where the military completely controlled events. This was also the case with the Bay if Pigs invasion. As we know, war was averted in 1962, and both sides “won.” It was a textbook instance of good judgment, crisis diplomacy, and applied history.

If reports coming from both sides of the Russo-Ukrainian War are accurate, the 2023 Ukrainian offensive has not breached the foremost Russian defensive lines. Ukraine has taken staggering losses, first in the Battle of Bakhmut and then in the offensive launched in early June. The Russians are deeply dug in and likely have hundreds of thousands of reserves in eastern Ukraine and adjacent areas in western Russia. If this is true, then it seems possible that Russia will launch an offensive of its own in the near future.

If this happens, and it then appears that Russian is winning the war, the question becomes: what NATO will do? From what one infers, the true believers on the American side who may be in favor of expanding the war are politicians and policy people. Although I can’t prove it, my sense is that the Pentagon does not want a direct confrontation between NATO (i.e. the United States) and Russia. Unlike some of the military men of 1914 and 1962, they do not want to initiate a sequence that cannot be undone short of a self-destructive, unnecessary war. Like Kennedy, they may realize that when events are locked into a military course of action, they may take on a chaotic will of their own that is beyond human control. The question is whether or not the civilian leadership will heed their warnings.

Note
1. See Hew Strachan, The First World War, 34. See also Michael Howard, The First World War, 33-34.

By Michael F. Duggan

In World War One, there were big pushes and there were attritional battles.  For most of the war however, breaching operations attempted by both sides lacked the suppressing firepower necessary to overcome the defensive advantages of the enemy.  Armor and close air support lacked the power, sophistication, and doctrine for an effective modern combined arms offensive. The final victory of the Allies in the 100 Days campaign in 1918, had less to do with Blitzkrieg than with the arrival of two million American troops and a general collapse of the German lines. 

Between the big offensives of 1916-17 and the 100 Days battles in the summer and fall of 1918, there were trench raids and the development and refinement of infiltration tactics by both sides.  But as the name states, these actions involved tactics—small raids—more than strategy, although, like most of the big pushes, they did little to move the lines. Even the first major tank action at Cambrai at the end of 1917 ultimately proved futile as the lumbering monsters were eventually picked-off piecemeal by artillery after their initial shock and first-day gains.

The problem with tactics, operations, and strategy in the First World War—and never before had the three seemed more like one—was the belief that the front embodied a kind of pressurized equilibrium.  Pop the enemy’s bubble, so it went, and a general collapse would follow.  The petering-out of the German Michael Offensive in the spring of 1918 laid waste to this idea.  As Andrew Bacevich recently observed, “Punching holes is a poor substitute for strategy.”¹       

Western sources are now reporting that the Ukrainian offensive is failing, that after significant losses in armor and infantry, it has not breached the Russian lines (how an army is supposed to launch an integrated combined arms offensive without air superiority, massive stocks of artillery ammunition, a superiority in suppressing fire against an entrenched enemy, and a secure communication system to coordinate it all, is not clear).²  These reports told us what we already knew: that Bradleys and Leopard II tanks Its were picked-off en masse, like the British Mark IVs at Cambrai. Notably, Cambrai was followed by a German counteroffensive.   

The Russo-Ukrainian War appears to be a culmination of the World Wars and a return to initial states. After the big pushes of the First World War, the massive combined arms offensives of the Second World War, and the aerial bombing of civilians, modern war has come full circle to grinding offensives along a wide front, attrition, forays into no man’s land, an enemy with a flexible, multilayered defense in depth and pre-sighted kill zones, and small unit infiltration and raids into often booby-trapped enemy trenches. Ironically, tanks, originally developed by the British to breach the fortified German lines, now appear to be primary technological victims of the renewal of positional warfare. The drones and loitering munitions are new. As with the first Cold War, a nuclear Sword of Damocles hangs above the action on the ground.

The First World War was a tragedy, but it was also a crime.  After it became apparent during the fall of 1914 and early 1915 that the war would become bogged down into an attritional nightmare, the warring nations should have come to a settlement.  The fact that this was not politically feasible at the time does little to excuse it.  The Ukrainians have fought better than anyone had expected with competence, courage, and tenacity, but the situation on the front presents them with an overwhelming tactical, operational, strategic, and logistical impasse.  As I have written before, through no fault of their own, the numbers are against them.  If the diplomats of our time are to effectively apply the lessons of history, they would to well to succeed where the statesmen of 1914-18 failed.    

Notes

1. Andrew Bacevich, “America’s Compulsion is Intact and Ready for More,” Responsible Statecraft, June 5, 2023.
2. For example, see Daniel L. Davis, “Why Ukraine’s Counter-Offensive is Failing,” Responsible Statecraft, July 20, 2023.  Davis also makes a strong case for a diplomatic solution to the war.   

By Michael F. Duggan

This week 31 of the 50 U.S. states baked in 90+ degree weather, as a heat dome continues to cover the South and Southwest. Hot weather in the summer is hardly news, unless you consider that this week was also the hottest week in recorded history worldwide. The climate crises are here and have been for some time.

The question is whether or not we have reached a tipping point—a demarcation from the known into the chaotic, a change from which there is no return. The other question is whether or not the children and grandchildren of those reading this will be killed by the crises, or if their lives will be merely degraded by it.